“Self-Selection into Corrupt Judiciaries.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 38, 2 (2022): 386-421.
> Abstract
Drawing on experimental games and a survey conducted with university students at an elite legal academy in Ukraine, this study compares the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students aspiring to public sector legal careers as judges, prosecutors, and investigators with their counterparts aiming to pursue private sector legal careers as defense attorneys and commercial lawyers. I find evidence that students pursuing public sector legal careers display more willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as lower levels of altruism. These findings indicate that corruption in some societies may persist in part from the self-selection into government institutions of citizens with a higher propensity to seek profit from illicit activities. Moreover, the findings suggest that such corrupt self-selection can infect a country’s judicial and law enforcement apparatus, with potentially dire implications for the rule of law.
“Public Service Motivation as a Predictor of Corruption, Dishonesty, and Altruism” (with Alexander Kalgin, Andrei Klimenko, Dmitriy Vorobyev, and Andrei Yakovlev). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 32, 2 (2022): 287-309.
> Abstract
Understanding how Public Service Motivation (PSM) is tied to ethical or unethical conduct is critically important, given that civil servants and other public-sector employees throughout the world have been shown to exhibit high PSM levels. However, empirical evidence about the relationship between PSM and ethical or unethical behavior remains limited, due in part to the challenges of observing unethical conduct and overcoming social desirability bias in self-reported measures. We address these challenges by employing incentivized experimental games to study the relationships between PSM and two types of unethical behavior — corruption and dishonesty — as well as one type of ethical behavior: altruism. Based on data from approximately 1,870 university students at three research sites in Russia and Ukraine, we find evidence of a robust negative association between PSM and willingness to engage in corruption and a positive association between PSM and altruistic behavior. Results concerning dishonesty are more mixed. Our findings indicate that corruption and dishonesty are related yet fundamentally distinct concepts, particularly with respect to their compatibility with PSM. The findings additionally demonstrate that hypotheses about PSM and behavioral ethics generated in the Western context generalize well to the starkly different institutional context of the former Soviet Union.
“Public Service Motivation and Sectoral Employment in Russia: New Perspectives on the Attraction vs. Socialization Debate” (with Alexander Kalgin, Andrei Klimenko, Dmitriy Vorobyev, and Andrei Yakovlev). International Public Management Journal 25, 4 (2022): 497–516.
> Abstract
Numerous studies have shown that public service motivation (PSM) is higher among public sector employees, particularly in western countries. But whether these trends result from high-PSM individuals selecting into public sector employment or from on-the-job socialization remains subject to debate. We address this question utilizing novel panel data on Russian university students. Examining the relationships between PSM and sectoral employment both before and after students enter the labor force, we find that: (1) high-PSM students are more likely to prefer public sector employment; (2) high-PSM students are more likely to be employed in the public sector following graduation; and (3) PSM increases upon entry into the workplace at approximately the same rate in both the public and private sectors. These findings suggest that at least during early career stages, the association between PSM and public sector employment results largely from an attraction-selection process, rather than a socialization process. Our analyses additionally provide evidence that theories of PSM based on the western experience may generalize to the context of developing or post-communist countries, despite the prevalence of corruption and a less pronounced public service ethos in many of these countries.
“Self-Selection into Public Service When Corruption is Widespread: The Anomalous Russian Case” (with Alexander Kalgin, Andrei Klimenko, Dmitriy Vorobyev, and Andrei Yakovlev). Comparative Political Studies 54, 6 (2021): 1086-1128.
> Abstract
Drawing on experimental games and surveys conducted with students at two universities in Russia, we compare the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students seeking public sector employment to the traits of their peers seeking jobs in the private sector. Contrary to similar studies conducted in other high-corruption contexts, such as India, we find evidence that students who prefer a public sector career display less willingness to cheat or bribe in experimental games as well as higher levels of altruism. However, disaggregating public sector career paths reveals distinctions between the federal civil service and other types of public sector employment, with federal government positions attracting students who exhibit some similarities with their peers aspiring to private sector careers. We discuss multiple interpretations consistent with our findings, each of which has implications for the creation of effective anti-corruption policies and for understanding of state capacity in contexts where corruption is widespread.
“Would You Sell Your Vote?” (with Simeon Nichter). American Politics Research 49, 5 (2021): 452–463.
> Abstract
Prominent scholars in recent years have expressed alarm about political polarization, weakened civil liberties, and growing support for authoritarianism in the United States. But discussions of democratic backsliding pay short shrift to the value citizens place on one of the most fundamental democratic institutions: the act of voting. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, we show that despite traditional portrayals of the U.S. as the embodiment of a democratic “civic culture,” a substantial share of Americans express readiness to sell their votes for cash: 12% of respondents would do so for just $25, as would nearly 20% for $100. Citizens who place low importance on living in a democracy are significantly more willing to sell their votes. We argue that heightened attention to US voters’ attitudes toward clientelism would provide an additional barometer of democratic skepticism, help to integrate the study of American and comparative politics, and stimulate novel research agendas about the historic decline of vote buying in the United States.
“Taxes, Banking, and Legal Development in Russia: Lessons about Institutional Complementarities and the Rule of Law.” Demokratizatsiya 28, 1 (2020): 47-75 (Special Issue on Law & Society in the Former Soviet Union).
> Abstract
A significant challenge faced by rule-of-law reformers is that newly created legal institutions frequently remain divorced from the de facto rules governing economic transactions. Firms instead rely on informal, and sometimes illegal, means of enforcing contracts, protecting property, and resolving disputes. This article proposes that one key to overcoming the chasm between formal legal institutions and on-the-ground practices is to adopt a broader understanding of legal development. Legal development projects usual focus on improvements to the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, the penal system, and the legal profession, all of which are undeniably critical for a legal system to function effectively. But in many cases developments in spheres that are only indirectly related to formal legal institutions may be equally important, particularly if these developments either (1) increase the costs of illicit alternatives to reliance on law or (2) reduce barriers to firms’ use of formal legal institutions. Drawing on a case study of post-Soviet Russia, this article illustrates the argument with two key examples: banking sector development and improved tax compliance. Insights about the complementarities between taxation, banking, and legal development may allow rule-of-law reformers to effectively leverage these linkages across institutional spheres, particularly when direct reforms of the legal sector are technically infeasible or politically untenable.
“Reducing Bureaucratic Corruption: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Work” (with Mariana Borges, Alexey Makarin, Theresa Mannah-Blankson, Andre Nickow, and Dong Zhang). World Development 105 (2018): 171-188.