

# Self-Selection into Corrupt Judiciaries

## Online Appendix

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## A Scripts and Translations

### A.1 Dice-Task Game

#### Dice Game Instructions (English Translation)

This game will allow us to analyze decision making in conditions characterized by uncertainty. You will now play 20 rounds of a dice game. During each round you will have the opportunity to earn money. You will have to guess what the dice will show, and the more dice rolls you guess correctly, the more money you will win. Each round of the game proceeds as follows:

1. First, you will have to guess a number of dots between 1 to 6. When you have made your guess, click on the “next page” button.
2. Next, you will see the outcome of a dice roll, and you will be asked to report the number of dots which you guessed earlier.
3. The following screen will show the result of the round. If your guess matched the number of dots on the dice, then you will win 1 hryvnia and 50 kopecks. Otherwise, you will receive 50 kopecks.

Later in the study (after the fourth game), you will play another 20 rounds of the dice game, again with the opportunity to earn money. Depending on your number of correct guesses over these 40 rounds, you will be receive between 20 and 60 hryvnia.

You should avoid using the “previous page” button during the dice games as it might delete your total winnings. Note: It is important that you are careful about remembering and reporting the exact number of dots which you guessed prior to rolling the dice. We also want to emphasize that there is no deception in this game: The outcome of each dice roll is random.

## Dice-Task Game Instructions (Russian version)

Вторая игра позволит нам проанализировать процессы принятия решений в условиях неопределенности. Вам предлагается сыграть 20 раундов игры в кости, в ходе чего у Вас будет возможность выиграть деньги в каждом раунде. Чем больше чисел Вы угадаете, тем больше будет Ваш выигрыш.

Каждый раунд будет проходить следующим образом:

1. Сначала, Вы должны загадать число точек от 1 до 6. После того как Вы загадали число, Вы нажимаете на кнопку «Следующая страница».
2. Далее Вы увидите число, которое выпало на кости, и Вам понадобится ввести число точек, которое Вы загадали ранее, в специальную строку на экране.
3. На следующей странице Вам будут показаны результаты раунда. Если Ваше предположение соответствует числу, выпавшему на игральной кости, Вы получите 1 гривна 50 копеек. В противном случае Вы получите 50 копеек.

Позднее по ходу исследования (после завершения четвертой игры), Вам будет предложено сыграть еще 20 раундов, также с возможностью выиграть деньги. Поэтому, в общей сумме в этой игре, в зависимости от количества правильных ответов, Вы можете выиграть от 20 до 60 гривен.

Пожалуйста, не используйте кнопку «Предыдущая страница» во время игры, поскольку это может удалить Ваш общий выигрыш. Также обратите внимание: очень важно, чтобы Вы тщательно запомнили и ввели точное число точек, которое Вы загадали перед броском кости. Хотим отдельно подчеркнуть, что игра ведется по-честному, и выпавшие значения на игральной кости абсолютно случайны.

[Следующая страница](#)

## Dice-Task Game Screenshots

Загадайте количество точек от 1 до 6. После того как Вы загадали число, нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», чтобы бросить кость.

Предыдущая страница

Следующая страница

“Guess a number of dots between 1 and 6. After you have made your guess, click on the ‘next page’ button to roll the dice.”



Кость показывает 1. Какое число Вы загадали?  
Напишите его в строку ниже:

3

Предыдущая страница

Следующая страница

“The dice shows a 1. What number did you guess? Write you guess in the space below.”

К сожалению, Вы не угадали. Получите 50 копеек.

Пожалуйста, загадайте количество точек от 1 до 6 еще раз. После того как Вы загадали число, нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», чтобы бросить кость.

Предыдущая страница

Следующая страница

“Unfortunately, you guessed wrong. You will receive 50 kopecks. Now, please guess a number of dots between 1 and 6 once again. After you have made your guess, click on the ‘next page’ button to roll the dice.”

## A.2 Bribery Game

### Script for Citizen Role (English Translation)

In this game, you are in an interactive decision-making situation between a citizen and a public official. You have been randomly selected to play the role of the *citizen*. After the study concludes, you will be matched with another participant, who has randomly been assigned the role of the *public official*. Neither you nor the other participants will learn each other's identities. Although your interaction with the public official is not taking place in real time, please make decisions as if it were.

Your task in this game is to obtain from the public official a government permit, such as the type of permit needed to open a restaurant or register a real estate transaction. To start the game, you will be given 35 hryvnia. If you obtain the required permit, you will receive an additional 45 hryvnia. The public official also begins the game with 35 hryvnia.

In order to acquire the permit, you have to go through a series of procedures. For example, you will need to fill out the required forms, collect the necessary documents, file an application, and so on. All of this requires a significant amount of time, as well as expenses such as government fees.

*When you are ready, click "Next page" to proceed.*

At last, you have all of your documents in order. You make an appointment at the necessary agency and submit your documents to the public official. He points out a minor mistake and explains that according to his agency's regulations, you will have to resubmit your application. This will require more time and expenses, and delay your receipt of the permit you need.

*When you are ready, click "Next page" to proceed.*

At this stage in the game, you have a choice. You can accept the official rejection of your application. You will not receive the permit, this third game will end, and you will receive the 35 hryvnia with which you began the game. Alternatively, you can offer the public official a bribe. The bribe can be any amount from 5 to 35 hryvnia. If the public official accepts the bribe, then he will be obligated to give you the permit and you will receive an additional 45 hryvnia.

There is a cost, however, to bribery. If you offer a bribe and the public official accepts, then you will be fined. In reality fines for bribery are large – much larger than the size of the bribe itself. However, bribery does not always lead to punishment. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that if you give a bribe you get fined 10 hryvnia, but you can think about this as the "expected value" of a fine, taking into account the size of the punishment and the probability of getting caught.

Similarly, if the public official accepts your bribe, then he will be fined 15 hryvnia. Again, you can think about this as the "expected value" of facing a large fine but with a small probability

of getting caught. The public official's fine is larger than the citizen's fine because more harm is done to society when officials engage in corrupt behavior.

Bribery is also costly to society. If you offer and the official accepts a bribe, then two randomly chosen participants in the study will lose 5 hryvnia each. You may interpret this as the harm imposed on society by the citizen obtaining a permit for an activity for which he or she did not demonstrate the necessary qualifications, or as the broader economic and social costs resulting from government officials' acceptance of bribes.

*When you are ready, click "Next page" to proceed.*

Before beginning, let's consider a couple of examples.

Example 1: The citizen does not offer a bribe. Both the citizen and the public official keep the 35 hryvnia with which they each began the game. Since no bribe was offered, no other participants in the study incur a loss.

Example 2: The citizen offers a bribe of 20 hryvnia. The public official accepts. The citizen starts the game with 35 hryvnia and then earns an additional 45 hryvnia for obtaining the permit, but the citizen also pays the official 20 v and gets fined 10 hryvnia. The citizen's final payoff is  $35 + 45 - 20 - 10 = 50$  hryvnia. The official begins the game with 35 hryvnia and then receives 20 hryvnia from the citizen, but the official gets fined 15 hryvnia. The official's final payoff is  $35 + 20 - 15 = 40$  hryvnia. Because a bribe was offered and accepted, two randomly chosen participants in the study each lose 5 hryvnia.

Example 3: The citizen offers a bribe of 20 hryvnia. The public official rejects the offer and so the citizen does not receive the permit. The citizen starts the game with 35 hryvnia and then gets fined 10 hryvnia for offering a fine. The citizen's final payoff is  $35 - 10 = 25$  hryvnia. The official did not accept the bribe and thus keeps the 35 hryvnia with which he started the game. Because the official did not accept the bribe, no other participants in the study incur a loss.

The table below lists all possible payoffs contingent upon the offer you make to the official and whether the official accepts your offer. Take a moment to study these payoffs.

*When you are ready, click "Next page" to proceed.*

How much would you like to offer the public official? If you prefer to offer not bribe, then choose 0.

## Script for Citizen Role (Russian Version)

В третьей интерактивной игре моделируется ситуация взаимодействия гражданина и чиновника. Путём случайного выбора Вам выпала роль «гражданина». По завершению исследования ответы всех участников будут скомбинированы таким образом, чтобы составить пары взаимодействия: Ваши ответы будут использованы в паре с другим участником исследования, которому выпала роль «чиновника». Ни Вам, ни другим участникам не будут известны имена и личности партнёров по игре. Хотя Ваше взаимодействие с «чиновником» происходит не в режиме реального времени, пожалуйста, принимайте решения так, как будто всё происходит в реальном времени.

Ваша задача в этой игре — получить от «чиновника» какое-то официальное разрешение, например, разрешение на открытие ресторана, регистрацию сделки с недвижимостью и т. д. Вы («гражданин») начинаете эту игру с суммой в 35 гривен, а в случае успешного получения разрешения от «чиновника» — зарабатываете дополнительно еще 45 гривен. «Чиновник» также начинает игру с суммой в 35 гривен.

Чтобы получить необходимое разрешение, Вам требуется пройти ряд установленных процедур — например, заполнить все необходимые формы, собрать документы, пройти экспертизу, подать заявление и т. д. На совершение всех этих предварительных действий Вам понадобится довольно много времени. Возможны и другие издержки помимо временных затрат (например, оплата экспертизы или госпошлины).

*Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.*

Наконец, Вы записываетесь на прием и подаете заявление со всеми документами «чиновнику», а он находит в них ошибку, возможно, не очень значительную. По регламенту он должен вернуть Вам пакет документов, а Вы — потратить еще какое-то время и усилия для исправления документов, вновь записаться на прием и в очередной раз подать документы. Все это откладывает решение Вашего вопроса, вызывает дополнительные затраты и нарушает Ваш график.

*Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.*

Допустим, что на этом этапе у Вас есть выбор. Вы можете принять официальный отказ и уйти, не получив разрешения — на этом третья игра будет для Вас закончена. В этом случае Вы закончите эту игру с той же суммой с которой начали — 35 гривен.

Альтернативный вариант состоит в том, что Вы можете предложить «чиновнику» взятку. Её размер может быть от 5 до 35 гривен. Если «чиновник» согласится принять взятку, то Вы получаете разрешение и как результат его использования 45 гривен дохода.

В то же время, если Вы предлагаете взятку, то Вас штрафуют. В реальности штрафы за взятки являются большими и могут на порядок превышать размер самой взятки. Однако, как известно, не все случаи коррупции выявляются. Для простоты в этой игре в случае дачи взятки Вас автоматически штрафуют на 10 гривен (Вы можете рассматривать это как математическое ожидание штрафа и отнести это на счёт расходов, связанных с риском уличения и наказания).

Аналогично, если «чиновник» соглашается принять Вашу взятку, его также штрафуют, но на большую величину. Штраф для чиновника в случае принятия взятки составит 15 гривен. Вы

можете еще раз рассматривать это как математическое ожидание штрафа в условиях высоких штрафов и низкой вероятности выявления взятки. «Чиновника» штрафуют на большую сумму, нежели «гражданина», поскольку коррупционные действия «чиновника» наносят больший вред обществу.

Взятки также наносят урон и другим участникам игры. Если Вы предлагаете, а «чиновник» принимает взятку, то два участника исследования, определенных методом случайного отбора, понесут убытки на сумму 5 гривен каждый. Вы можете истолковать это как случай причинения вреда обществу гражданином, получающим разрешение на вид деятельности, для которого у него нет необходимой квалификации, однако возможен и более широкий взгляд: государственный чиновник, беря взятку, наносит существенный экономический и социальный урон обществу.

*Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.*

Прежде чем Вы примете решение, давайте рассмотрим несколько примеров.

Пример 1. «Гражданин» решает не предлагать взятку. У «гражданина» и у «чиновника» остаётся по 35 гривен, с которыми они начали игру. При этом никакие другие участники не потерпят убытков.

Пример 2. «Гражданин» предлагает взятку в размере 20 гривен (сумма для примера). «Чиновник» соглашается. Таким образом, «гражданин» начинает игру с 35 гривнами и зарабатывает ещё 45 гривен после получения разрешения, однако он при этом платит «чиновнику» 20 гривен, а в наказание за взятку вынужден заплатить штраф размером еще в 10 гривен. Итог для «гражданина»:  $(35 + 45 - 20 - 10 =) 50$  гривен. «Чиновник» начинает игру с 35 гривнами и получает 20 гривен от «гражданина», однако наказан штрафом в размере 15 гривен за коррупцию. Итог для «чиновника»:  $(35 + 20 - 15 =) 40$  гривен. Поскольку взятку и предложили, и приняли, два случайно выбранных участника игры потеряют по 5 гривен каждый.

Пример 3. «Гражданин» предлагает взятку в размере 20 гривен (сумма для примера). «Чиновник» отказывается, и «гражданин» не получает разрешения. Таким образом, «гражданин» начинает игру с 35 гривнами, а затем ему выписывают штраф на сумму 10 гривен. Итог для «гражданина»:  $(35 - 10 =) 25$  гривен. «Чиновник» отказывается от предложенной взятки и таким образом остается с 35 гривнами, с которыми начал игру. Поскольку «чиновник» отказался от взятки, никакие другие участники не потерпят убытков.

Нижеприведённая таблица перечисляет все возможные варианты итога в зависимости от того, предлагаете ли Вы «чиновнику» взятку и принимает ли он её. Изучите эту таблицу не спеша. Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.

Итоговая прибыль: Если Вы решаете не предлагать взятку, то Вы («гражданин») и «чиновник» заканчиваете игру с той же суммой (35 гривен), с которой начали. Если Вы решаете предложить взятку, то итог определяется следующими факторами:

*Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.*

Какую сумму Вы хотите предложить «чиновнику»? Если Вы вообще не хотите предлагать взятку, выберите 0.



## Screenshot of Payoff Matrix

Если Вы решаете не предлагать взятку, то Вы («гражданин») и «чиновник» заканчиваете игру с той же суммой (35 гривен), с которой начали. Если Вы решаете предложить взятку, то итог определяется следующими факторами:

		<b>Чиновник решает:</b>			
		<b>Принять</b>		<b>Отклонить</b>	
		<i>Зарплата гражданина</i>	<i>Зарплата чиновника</i>	<i>Зарплата гражданина</i>	<i>Зарплата чиновника</i>
<b>Гражданин предлагает сумму в размере:</b>	<b>5 грн.</b>	65 грн.	25 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>10 грн.</b>	60 грн.	30 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>15 грн.</b>	55 грн.	35 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>20 грн.</b>	50 грн.	40 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>25 грн.</b>	45 грн.	45 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>30 грн.</b>	40 грн.	50 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>35 грн.</b>	35 грн.	55 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
		<i>Два участника, определенных методом случайного отбора, потеряют по 5 грн.</i>		<i>Никакие другие участники ничего не потеряют</i>	

## Screenshot of Citizen's Bribe Choice

How much would you like to offer the public official? If you prefer to offer no bribe, then choose 0.

Какую сумму Вы хотите предложить «чиновнику»? Если Вы вообще не хотите предлагать взятку, выберите 0.

	0	5	10	15	20	25	30	35
Сумма (в гривнах):	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Предыдущая страница

Следующая страница

### Script for Public Official Role (English Translation)

In this game, you are in an interactive decision-making situation between a citizen and a public official. You have been randomly selected to play the role of the *public official*. After the study concludes, you will be matched with another participant, who has randomly been assigned the role of the *citizen*. Neither you nor the other participants will learn each other's identities. Although your interaction with the citizen is not taking place in real time, please make decisions as if it were.

You (the public official) begin the game with 35 hryvnia. The citizen also begins the game with 35 hryvnia. The citizen needs to acquire from you a permit, such as the type of permit needed to open a restaurant or register a real estate transaction. If the citizen obtains this permit, then he will receive an additional 45 hryvnia.

In order to obtain this permit, the citizen must complete the proper forms, compile the necessary documents, and so on. You – the public official – check these documents and notice a mistake: The citizen filled in several lines that should have been left blank. According to the regulations of your agency, you must reject the application and the citizen must wait a month before applying again for the permit.

*When you are ready, click “Next page” to proceed.*

When you inform the citizen about his mistake, he might seek to offer you a bribe so as to receive the permit without the additional delay. The size of the bribe can range from 5 to 35 hryvnia. If you (the public official) accept the bribe, you are obligated to give the citizen the permit.

There is a cost, however, to bribery. If you accept a bribe, then you will be fined. In reality fines for bribery are large – much larger than the size of the bribe itself. However, bribery does not always lead to punishment. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that if you give a bribe you get fined 15 hryvnia, but you can think about this as the “expected value” of a fine, taking into account the size of the punishment and the probability of getting caught.

Similarly, if the citizen offers a bribe, then he will be fined 10 hryvnia. Again, you can think about this as the “expected value” of facing a large fine but with a small probability of getting caught. The public official’s fine is larger than the citizen’s fine because more harm is done to society when officials engage in corrupt behavior.

Bribery is also costly to society. If you offer and the official accepts a bribe, then two randomly chosen participants in the study will lose 5 hryvnia each. You may interpret this as the harm imposed on society by the citizen obtaining a permit for an activity for which he or she did not demonstrate the necessary qualifications, or as the broader economic and social costs resulting from government officials’ acceptance of bribes.

*When you are ready, click “Next page” to proceed.*

Before beginning, let’s consider a couple of examples.

Example 1: The citizen does not offer a bribe. Both the citizen and the public official keep the 35 hryvnia with which they each began the game. Since no bribe was offered, no other participants in the study incur a loss.

Example 2: The citizen offers a bribe of 20 hryvnia. The public official accepts. The citizen starts the game with 35 hryvnia and then earns an additional 45 hryvnia for obtaining the permit, but the citizen also pays the official 20 v and gets fined 10 hryvnia. The citizen’s final payoff is  $35 + 45 - 20 - 10 = 50$  hryvnia. The official begins the game with 35 hryvnia and then receives 20 hryvnia from the citizen, but the official gets fined 15 hryvnia. The official’s final payoff is  $35 + 20 - 15 = 40$  hryvnia. Because a bribe was offered and accepted, two randomly chosen participants in the study each lose 5 hryvnia.

Example 3: The citizen offers a bribe of 20 hryvnia. The public official rejects the offer and so the citizen does not receive the permit. The citizen starts the game with 35 hryvnia and then gets fined 10 hryvnia for offering a fine. The citizen’s final payoff is  $35 - 10 = 25$  hryvnia. The official did not accept the bribe and thus keeps the 35 hryvnia with which he started the game. Because the official did not accept the bribe, no other participants in the study incur a loss.

*When you are ready, click “Next page” to proceed.*

If the citizen decides not to offer a bribe, then you (the “public official”) and he both finish the game with 35 hryvnia, the amount with which you began. Otherwise, the table below lists all possible payoffs contingent upon the offer the citizen makes to the official and whether or not the official accepts. Take a moment to study these payoffs.

Let’s begin. If the citizen offers a bribe, please indicate for each possible offer whether you would accept or reject. If you would not accept a bribe of any amount, then choose “reject” for all offers.

## Script for Public Official Role (Russian Version)

В третьей интерактивной игре моделируется ситуация взаимодействия «гражданина» и «чиновника». Путём случайного выбора Вам выпала роль «чиновника». По завершению исследования ответы всех участников будут скомбинированы таким образом, чтобы составить пары взаимодействия: Ваши ответы будут использованы в паре с другим участником исследования, которому выпала роль «гражданина». Ни Вам, ни другим участникам не будут известны имена и личности партнёров по игре. Хотя Ваше взаимодействие с «гражданином» будет происходить не в режиме реального времени, пожалуйста, принимайте решения так, как будто всё происходит в реальном времени.

Вы («чиновник») начинаете игру с 35 гривен. «Гражданину» также будет выдано 35 гривен. «Гражданину» необходимо получить от Вас официальное разрешение, например, для открытия нового ресторана либо для получения водительских прав. Если «гражданин» получает разрешение, он выигрывает дополнительные 45 гривен.

Чтобы получить разрешение, «гражданин» должен заполнить пакет документов, пройти экспертизу и т.д. Вы – «чиновник», проверяющий правильность заполнения документов. Получив документы, Вы замечаете ошибку: «гражданин» заполнил часть формы, которая должна была остаться пустой. Согласно правилам Вашего учреждения, гражданин может подать повторное заявление только через месяц после отказа.

*Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.*

Когда Вы сообщите об этой ошибке «гражданину», он может попробовать дать Вам взятку для того, чтобы всё же получить разрешение. Размер взятки может варьироваться от 5 до 35 гривен. Если Вы («чиновник») берёте взятку, то Вы должны выдать «гражданину» разрешение.

В тоже время, если Вы принимаете взятку, то Вас штрафуют. В реальности штрафы за взятки являются большими и могут на порядок превышать размер самой взятки. Однако, как известно, не все случаи коррупции выявляются. Для простоты в этой игре в случае принятия взятки Вас автоматически штрафуют на 15 гривен (Вы можете рассматривать это как математическое ожидание штрафа и отнести это на счёт расходов, связанных с риском уличения и наказания).

Аналогично, «гражданин», предложивший взятку, также будет оштрафован – на 10 гривен. Вы можете еще раз рассматривать это как математическое ожидание штрафа в условиях высоких штрафов и низкой вероятности выявления взятки. «Чиновника» штрафуют на большую сумму, нежели гражданина, поскольку коррупционные действия «чиновников» наносят больший вред обществу.

Взятка наносит ущерб и другим участникам игры. Если «гражданин» предлагает, а Вы («чиновник») принимаете взятку, то два участника исследования, определенных методом случайного отбора, понесут убытки на сумму 5 гривен каждый. Вы можете истолковать это как случай причинения вреда обществу гражданином, получающим разрешение на вид деятельности, для которого у него нет необходимой квалификации. Однако возможен и более широкий взгляд – «чиновники», беря взятки, наносят существенный экономический и социальный урон обществу.

*Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.*

Прежде чем Вы примете решение, давайте рассмотрим несколько примеров.

Пример 1. «Гражданин» решает не предлагать взятку. У «гражданина» и у «чиновника» остаётся по 35 гривен, с которыми они начали игру. При этом никакие другие участники не потерпят убытков.

Пример 2. «Гражданин» предлагает взятку в размере 20 гривен (сумма для примера). «Чиновник» соглашается. Таким образом, «гражданин» начинает игру с 35 гривнами и зарабатывает ещё 45 гривен после получения разрешения, однако он при этом платит «чиновнику» 20 гривен, а в наказание за взятку вынужден заплатить штраф размером еще в 10 гривен. Итог для «гражданина»:  $(35 + 45 - 20 - 10 =) 50$  гривен. «Чиновник» начинает игру с 35 гривнами и получает 20 гривен от «гражданина», однако наказан штрафом в размере 15 гривен за коррупцию. Итог для «чиновника»:  $(35 + 20 - 15 =) 40$  гривен. Поскольку взятку и предложили, и приняли, два случайно выбранных участника игры потеряют по 5 гривен каждый.

Пример 3. «Гражданин» предлагает взятку в размере 20 гривен (сумма для примера). «Чиновник» отказывается, и «гражданин» не получает разрешения. Таким образом, «гражданин» начинает игру с 35 гривнами, а затем ему выписывают штраф на сумму 10 гривен. Итог для «гражданина»:  $(35 - 10 =) 25$  гривен. «Чиновник» отказывается от предложенной взятки и таким образом остается с 35 гривнами, с которыми начал игру. Поскольку «чиновник» отказался от взятки, никакие другие участники не потерпят убытков.

Нижеприведённая таблица перечисляет все возможные варианты итога в зависимости от того, предлагает ли «гражданин» Вам («чиновнику») взятку и принимаете ли Вы её. Изучите эту таблицу не спеша. Нажмите на кнопку «Следующая страница», как только будете готовы продолжить.

#### *Варианты итога*

Если «гражданин» решает не предлагать взятку, то Вы («чиновник») и он заканчиваете игру с той же суммой (35 гривен), с которой начали. Если «гражданин» решает предложить взятку, то итог определяется следующими факторами:

Давайте начнём. Если «гражданин» предлагает взятку, пожалуйста, укажите для каждого такого случая, принимаете Вы её или нет. Если Вы вообще не хотите принимать взятку, выберите опцию «отклонить» для всех случаев.

## Screenshot of Payoff Matrix

### Варианты итога

Если «гражданин» решает не предлагать взятку, то Вы («чиновник») и он заканчиваете игру с той же суммой (35 гривен), с которой начали. Если «гражданин» решает предложить взятку, то итог определяется следующими факторами:

		<b>Чиновник решает:</b>			
		<b>Принять</b>		<b>Отклонить</b>	
		<i>Зарботок гражданина</i>	<i>Зарботок чиновника</i>	<i>Зарботок гражданина</i>	<i>Зарботок чиновника</i>
<b>Гражданин предлагает сумму в размере:</b>	<b>5 грн.</b>	65 грн.	25 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>10 грн.</b>	60 грн.	30 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>15 грн.</b>	55 грн.	35 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>20 грн.</b>	50 грн.	40 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>25 грн.</b>	45 грн.	45 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>30 грн.</b>	40 грн.	50 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
	<b>35 грн.</b>	35 грн.	55 грн.	25 грн.	35 грн.
		<i>Два участника, определенных методом случайного отбора, потеряют по 5 грн.</i>		<i>Никакие другие участники ничего не потеряют</i>	

## Screenshot of Public Official's Choice

Let's begin. If the citizen offers a bribe, please indicate for each possible offer whether you would accept or reject. If you would not accept a bribe of any amount, then choose "reject" for all offers.

Давайте начнём. Если «гражданин» предлагает взятку, пожалуйста, укажите для каждого такого случая, принимаете Вы её или нет. Если Вы вообще не хотите принимать взятку, выберите опцию «отклонить» для всех случаев.

	Принять	Отклонить
Гражданин предлагает 5 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Гражданин предлагает 10 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Гражданин предлагает 15 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Гражданин предлагает 20 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Гражданин предлагает 25 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Гражданин предлагает 30 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Гражданин предлагает 35 грн.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Предыдущая страница

Следующая страница

### A.3 Pro-Social Preferences Game

#### Pro-Social Preferences Game Instructions (English Translation)

For this first game, we are interested in how university students make decisions about charitable donations. You will be given 40 hryvnia with which to play. You may keep all of this money or you may make a donation to one of the following five organizations: the Charitable Foundation “Return Alive,” the Childhood Cancer Foundation “Crab,” or the International Charitable Foundation for Community Wellbeing.

You can donate any amount up to 40 hryvnia, including zero. We emphasize that whatever money you donate will actually be given to your chosen organization. Note that you will receive additional money with which to play the other games, so you should make this decision without consideration for the resources you might need later.

Any money you do not donate will become part of your earnings for this game. For example, if you donate 10 hryvnia, you will receive  $40 - 10 = 30$  hryvnia in earnings for this game.

How many hryvnia would you like to donate?

#### Screenshot of Pro-Social Preferences Game (Russian Version)

В первой игре нас интересует вопрос о том, как студенты вузов принимают решения о благотворительных пожертвованиях. Вы начинаете игру с суммой в 40 гривен. Вы можете либо оставить все деньги себе, либо пожертвовать их одной из следующих организаций:

- Благотворительный фонд помощи армии «Повернись Живим»
- Благотворительный фонд помощи онкобольным детям «Краб» при Национальном институте рака
- Международный благотворительный фонд «Добробут громад»

Вы можете пожертвовать любую сумму от нуля до 40 гривен включительно. Обратите внимание, выбранная Вами сумма **действительно будет пожертвована** указанной Вами организации; другими словами, в этой игре Вы принимаете решения, касающиеся реальных денег. **Также обратите внимание на то, что для участия в последующих играх Вам выдадут дополнительные суммы, поэтому в первой игре принимайте решение, не думая о деньгах, которые могут понадобиться Вам позднее.**

Любая сумма денег, которую Вы не потратите на пожертвование, станет частью Вашего заработка с этой игры. Например, если Вы пожертвуете 10 гривен, то заработаете за эту игру  $(40 - 10 =)$  30 гривен.

Сейчас укажите, пожалуйста, сколько гривен Вы бы хотели пожертвовать.

	0	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40
Сумма пожертвования (в гривнах):	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Предыдущая страница

Следующая страница



## A.4 Risk Aversion Measurement

### Lottery Game Instructions (English Translation)

In this game you will need to make a series of decisions. For each of the rows below, you have to choose between Option A and Option B. For example, consider the first row. If you choose Option A, you will receive 2 hryvnia for sure. If you chose Option B, you will receive 0 rubles or 2 hryvnia, each with a 50% chance (like a coin flip). The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the amount you could win when you choose Option B changes.

If you choose Option A for all rows, you will receive  $2 \times 7 = 14$  hryvnia. If you choose Option B for all rows, you might earn as much as 35 hryvnia, but you also might receive nothing.

Whenever you are ready, please choose either Option A or Option B for each row.

### Screenshot of Risk Aversion Measure (Russian Version)

В предпоследней игре Вам предстоит принять ряд решений. В каждой строке Вы должны выбрать вариант А либо вариант Б. Например, посмотрите на первый ряд в таблице ниже. Если Вы выберете Вариант А, то Вы со 100% уверенностью выиграете 2 гривны. Если же Вы выберете Вариант Б, то с вероятностью в 50% Вы можете выиграть либо 0 гривен, либо 2 гривны. Принцип выигрыша в последующих рядах аналогичен, однако чем ниже строка, тем больше Ваша потенциальная сумма выигрыша в Варианте Б.

Если Вы выберете вариант А в каждой строке, Вы точно получите  $(2 \times 7 =)$  14 гривен. Если Вы выберете вариант Б в каждой строке, Вы можете выиграть до 35 гривен, а можете ничего не выиграть.

Как только Вы будете готовы, пожалуйста, выберите Вариант А или Вариант Б в каждом ряду.

	Вариант А	Вариант Б	
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 2 гривны
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 3 гривны
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 4 гривны
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 5 гривен
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 6 гривен
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 7 гривен
100% шанс выиграть 2 гривны	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	50% шанс выиграть 0 гривен 50% шанс выиграть 8 гривен

## A.5 Public Service Motivation Index

Please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements (1 to 5 scale, where 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”)

- a. I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community
- b. It is important to contribute to activities that tackle social problems
- c. Meaningful public service is very important to me
- d. It is important for me to contribute to the common good
- e. I think equal opportunities for citizens are very important
- f. It is important that citizens can rely on the continuous provision of public services
- g. It is fundamental that the interests of future generations are taken into account when developing public policies
- h. To act ethically is essential for public servants
- i. I feel sympathetic to the plight of the underprivileged
- j. I empathize with other people who face difficulties
- k. I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly
- l. Considering the welfare of others is very important
- m. I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society
- n. I believe in putting civic duty before self
- o. I am willing to risk personal loss to help society
- p. I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor, even if it costs me money

Пожалуйста, укажите, в какой мере вы согласны или не согласны со следующими высказываниями

- a. Я восхищаюсь людьми, которые инициируют мероприятия или участвуют в мероприятиях, направленных на улучшение жизни в нашем обществе или районе
- b. Участие в деятельности, направленной на решение социальных проблем, – важное дело
- c. Служение обществу наполняет работу смыслом, это важно для меня
- d. Мне важно вносить вклад в общее благо
- e. Считаю, что равенство возможностей для граждан – очень важное дело
- f. Важно, что граждане могут рассчитывать на непрерывное предоставление социальных услуг
- g. Формируя социальную политику, очень важно учитывать интересы будущих поколений
- h. Этичное поведение – основа основ для государственного чиновника
- i. Я сочувствую тем, кто живёт в плохих условиях
- j. Я сопереживаю людям, попавшим в трудное положение
- k. Я очень огорчаюсь, когда вижу, что с людьми поступают несправедливо
- l. Очень важно думать о благополучии других людей
- m. Я готов приносить жертвы на благо общества
- n. Я считаю, что служение обществу превыше заботы о себе
- o. Я готов рискнуть своим благосостоянием, чтобы помочь обществу
- p. Я приму хороший план улучшения жизни бедным людям, даже если мне придётся потратить свои деньги

## A.6 Dependent Variables

### Career Preference and Expectations Scales:

Imagine you are free to choose any job. With respect to careers in the legal profession, how likely would you be to choose each of the following?

Представьте еще раз, что Вы можете выбрать любую работу – без учёта того, насколько реалистичным Вы считаете получение этой работы. Думая о карьере в сфере юриспруденции, с какой долей вероятности Вы бы выбрали какой-либо из следующих вариантов?

Keeping in mind the distinction between the job you would like to have and the job you are most likely to have in the near future, please answer the following question: How likely is it that after graduating you will work as each of the following?

Работа, которую Вам хотелось бы иметь возможно отличается от работы, на которую Вы наиболее вероятно рассчитываете устроиться в ближайшем будущем. Имея это в виду, насколько велика вероятность того, что после получения диплома Вы будете работать в одной из нижеперечисленных вариантов в сфере юриспруденции?

Respondents were asked to respond on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very likely”:

- a. Prosecutor/Прокурор
- b. Investigator/Следователь
- c. Judge/Судья
- d. Government lawyer/Юридическое сопровождение государственных органов власти
- e. Bailiff/Судебный исполнитель
- f. Private practice lawyer/Адвокатская практика
- g. In-house commercial lawyer/Юридический консультант в компании
- h. Notary/Нотариат

## B Sample Selection and Representativeness

The effort made in this study to conduct random sampling sets it apart from nearly all studies focusing on the issue of whether individuals with a propensity for dishonesty or corruption self-select into the public sector, such as Hanna and Wang (2017) and Banerjee et al. (2015) in India, Gans-Morse et al. (2021) in Russia, or Alatas et al. (2009) in Indonesia, as well as related studies focused on prosocial motivation and self-selection such as Banuri and Keefer (2016) in Indonesia. Only Barfort et al. (2019) in the data-rich environment of Denmark conduct random sampling.

While Barfort et al. (2019) examine the representativeness of their sample and the issue of selective non-participation by comparing administrative university data on class year, field of study, completed classes, and gender among recruited students who did or did not participate in the study (see p. 120 and Section A.9 of their Online Appendix), a number of issues in the Ukrainian context make such analyses more complicated. First, such administrative data do not exist at most Ukrainian universities, including the one where this study was conducted, as confirmed via multiple correspondences with the university administration during and following the study. I was, however, as discussed more below, able to use the original hardcopy lists of students on which our sample frame is based to infer gender based on patronymics (for Ukrainian names, with few exceptions, male patronymics end in “ch” and female patronymics in “na”). Second, while these sample frame lists do provide data on the number of students in each department and each class year, this study’s reliance on stratified random sampling precludes the use of these variables for assessing selective non-participation. Such stratification was logistically necessary, for whereas Barfort et al. could use simple random sampling and recruit via the university email system, Ukrainian students rarely use university-provided emails. By stratifying on class year and department, however, it was possible to approach specific classrooms at a given time with knowledge of the list of students who should be in attendance. For each of the class year/department strata, it was then feasible to call out names in a randomized order and proceed until a quota had been meant, with the names of students who either were not present or unwilling to participate replaced with the next name on the list. The additional benefit to this approach was that it ensured the sample would include students from a wide number of departments, some more focused on public legal professions and some more focused on private legal professions.

Reassuringly, the gender ratio in the sample matches the gender ratio in the population reasonably well. In the sample ( $N = 576$ ), 60.9% of participants were female, 39.1% male. In the student body for the departments from which participants were drawn ( $N = 3587$ ), 58.7% were female, 41.3% male, which implies that of non-participants ( $N = 3011$ ), 58.3% were female and 40.7% were male. A test for equality of proportions shows that the difference in the ratio of females to males across the participants and non-participants is statistically insignificant ( $p = 0.26$ ).

Finally, while selection on unobservables cannot be ruled out, there are a number of reasons to expect that such selection is not affecting the results. First, as shown in Section 3.4 of the article, results are highly robust to controlling for observable covariates. Second, for the results to be a reflection of sample selection would require selective non-participation in such a way that among students preferring private sector legal careers participants with low levels of dishonesty and less propensity for corruption participated at higher rates, whereas among students preferring public sector legal careers participants with high levels of dishonesty and more propensity for corruption participated at higher rates. This seems unlikely to be the case.

## C Supplementary Analyses Discussed in Sections 3.1-3.4 of Article

### C.1 Regressions with Disaggregated Career Preference Variables

As discussed in Section 3.2 of the article, preferences for different types of public sector legal careers are highly correlated, as are preferences for different types of private sector legal careers. As can be seen in the factor analysis results shown in Table C.1, public and private sector careers load cleanly onto distinct factors, with the possible exception of the government lawyer category. The analyses in the article use two indices as the primary career preference measures, a public sector legal career preference index based on the unweighted average of the five career preference variables and a private sector legal career preference index based on the unweighted average of the three career preference variables. This section shows that results are substantively similar when all eight career preference variables are analyzed individually in place of the two index variables.

**Table C.1: Factor Analysis of Career Preferences**

(with varimax rotation)

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Judge	0.630	–
Prosecutor	0.747	–
Investigator	0.624	–
Bailiff	0.669	–
Government Lawyer	0.438	0.472
Private Practice Lawyer	–	0.625
In-House Commercial Lawyer	–	0.766
Notary	–	0.684
Eigenvalue	2.203	1.552
Variance Explained	0.275	0.194

Note: Only loadings of 0.400 or higher are shown.

Table C.2: Analyses Using Disaggregated Career Preferences

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Careers</b>										
	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM
Judge	0.022*** (0.006)	0.027** (0.009)	-0.021** (0.007)	0.022* (0.010)	0.012 (0.016)					
Prosecutor						0.016* (0.006)	0.025** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.026* (0.011)	0.007 (0.015)
Constant	0.269*** (0.033)	0.126** (0.046)	0.726*** (0.033)	0.359*** (0.052)	3.818*** (0.087)	0.303*** (0.035)	0.139** (0.042)	0.655*** (0.040)	0.343*** (0.058)	3.848*** (0.078)
Observations	568	567	568	568	567	568	567	568	568	567
$R^2$	0.018	0.013	0.014	0.006	0.001	0.011	0.013	0.002	0.010	0.000
<b>B. Private Sector Legal Careers</b>										
	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM
Investigator	0.013* (0.006)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.021** (0.008)	0.031** (0.009)	0.033* (0.013)					
Bailiff						0.029*** (0.007)	0.023* (0.010)	-0.023** (0.008)	0.018 (0.012)	0.022 <sup>†</sup> (0.012)
Constant	0.324*** (0.030)	0.259*** (0.043)	0.710*** (0.036)	0.336*** (0.045)	3.740*** (0.064)	0.279*** (0.030)	0.183*** (0.037)	0.701*** (0.028)	0.406*** (0.051)	3.803*** (0.052)
Observations	568	567	568	568	567	568	567	568	568	567
$R^2$	0.008	0.000	0.017	0.016	0.012	0.030	0.009	0.016	0.004	0.004
<b>C. Government Legal Careers</b>										
	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM
Gov. Lawyer	0.021** (0.007)	0.022* (0.010)	-0.018* (0.007)	0.003 (0.010)	0.013 (0.014)					
Constant	0.294*** (0.035)	0.169*** (0.041)	0.696*** (0.032)	0.457*** (0.049)	3.825*** (0.063)					
Observations	568	567	568	568	567					
$R^2$	0.015	0.008	0.010	0.000	0.002					
<b>D. Private Practice Legal Careers</b>										
	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM
Private Practice Lawyer	0.009 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.010)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.041* (0.018)					
In-House Comm. Lawyer						-0.011 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.006 (0.009)	0.013 (0.012)	0.024 (0.019)
Constant	0.337*** (0.039)	0.346*** (0.055)	0.591*** (0.037)	0.540*** (0.062)	3.670*** (0.100)	0.433*** (0.039)	0.293*** (0.051)	0.590*** (0.047)	0.408*** (0.056)	3.765*** (0.096)
Observations	568	567	568	568	567	568	567	568	568	567
$R^2$	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.014	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.005
<b>E. Notary Legal Careers</b>										
	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM	Cheat Rate	Bribe	Donations	Corruption Justifiable	PSM
Notary	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.006 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.015)					
Constant	0.403*** (0.037)	0.284*** (0.046)	0.634*** (0.036)	0.442*** (0.055)	3.956*** (0.075)					
Observations	568	567	568	568	567					
$R^2$	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003					

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## C.2 Regressions with Non-Experimental Dependent Variables

The analyses below replicate the analyses in Table 4 of the article but using a non-experimental indicator for beliefs in the justifiability of corruption in place of the corruption game indicator and the PSM index in place of the dictator game indicator. The results shown below demonstrate that the results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 of the article are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables. Moreover, even when including control variables the coefficient on the public preference index remains very similar to the coefficients in the bivariate regressions in Table 3.

**Table C.3: Non-Experimental Indicators of Corruption and Pro-Social Motivation Regressed on Career Preferences Conditional On Other Attributes**

A. Corruption Justifiable												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Public Preference Index	0.052** (0.016)	0.051** (0.016)	0.055** (0.017)	0.050** (0.016)	0.051** (0.016)	0.052** (0.016)	0.052** (0.016)	0.052** (0.016)	0.054** (0.017)	0.053** (0.017)	0.051** (0.016)	0.055** (0.017)
GPA	-0.010 (0.026)										-0.008 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.027)
Risk Aversion		-0.010 (0.012)									-0.009 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
Job Security			-0.015 (0.018)								-0.015 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.018)
Job Income				0.028 (0.023)							0.034 (0.023)	0.035 (0.024)
Male					0.030 (0.044)						0.019 (0.045)	0.018 (0.044)
Pub. Law Dep.						-0.015 (0.044)					-0.008 (0.043)	-0.012 (0.043)
Family Ties: Lawyer							-0.050 (0.053)				-0.063 (0.061)	-0.063 (0.061)
Family Ties: Courts								0.003 (0.045)			0.032 (0.050)	0.034 (0.049)
Cheat Rate									-0.048 (0.066)			-0.044 (0.073)
Donations										0.027 (0.063)		0.035 (0.070)
Constant	0.294* (0.146)	0.291** (0.091)	0.283** (0.087)	0.135 (0.116)	0.232** (0.077)	0.247** (0.081)	0.249** (0.075)	0.239** (0.077)	0.248** (0.075)	0.217* (0.092)	0.251 (0.192)	0.233 (0.212)
Observations	568	566	568	567	568	568	568	568	568	568	565	565
R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.018	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.022	0.023
B. Public Service Motivation (PSM) Index												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Public Preference Index	0.045† (0.024)	0.048† (0.025)	0.021 (0.023)	0.050* (0.025)	0.049* (0.024)	0.043† (0.024)	0.044† (0.024)	0.044† (0.024)	0.049† (0.025)	0.059* (0.024)	0.035 (0.023)	0.046* (0.023)
GPA	0.059* (0.029)										0.043 (0.033)	0.033 (0.032)
Risk Aversion		-0.022 (0.017)									-0.029† (0.016)	-0.032* (0.016)
Job Security			0.114*** (0.026)								0.118*** (0.025)	0.118*** (0.026)
Job Income				-0.078* (0.034)							-0.098** (0.033)	-0.082* (0.032)
Male					-0.169** (0.051)						-0.134* (0.051)	-0.108* (0.053)
Pub. Law Dep.						0.030 (0.046)					0.000 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.047)
Family Ties: Lawyer							-0.064 (0.085)				-0.042 (0.080)	-0.050 (0.080)
Family Ties: Courts								-0.070 (0.069)			-0.078 (0.064)	-0.053 (0.060)
Cheat Rate									-0.091 (0.087)			-0.012 (0.083)
Gave/Accepted Bribe										-0.313*** (0.052)		-0.265*** (0.054)
Constant	3.376*** (0.183)	3.765*** (0.119)	3.366*** (0.132)	3.972*** (0.160)	3.728*** (0.115)	3.670*** (0.114)	3.697*** (0.111)	3.705*** (0.107)	3.699*** (0.111)	3.701*** (0.109)	3.672*** (0.240)	3.690*** (0.238)
Observations	567	565	567	566	567	567	567	567	567	566	564	563
R <sup>2</sup>	0.015	0.013	0.042	0.021	0.027	0.008	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.061	0.090	0.127

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses.

† $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .



### C.3 Correlates of Outcome Variables and Career Preferences

This section presents correlates of dishonesty, corruption, and pro-social motivations on the one hand, and correlates of legal career preferences on the other.

**Table C.4: Correlates of Outcome Indicators**

	Estimated Cheat Rate								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	-0.010 (0.012)								-0.025 <sup>†</sup> (0.013)
Risk Aversion		0.010 (0.008)							0.010 (0.008)
Job Security			0.015 (0.014)						0.011 (0.014)
Job Income				0.020 (0.014)					0.021 (0.014)
Male					-0.042 (0.029)				-0.053 <sup>†</sup> (0.030)
Pub. Law Dep.						-0.005 (0.033)			-0.005 (0.033)
Family Ties: Lawyer							0.029 (0.033)		0.006 (0.035)
Family Ties: Courts								0.040 (0.035)	0.036 (0.037)
Constant	0.431*** (0.066)	0.334*** (0.036)	0.326*** (0.057)	0.300*** (0.059)	0.397*** (0.018)	0.384*** (0.028)	0.375*** (0.016)	0.369*** (0.017)	0.353** (0.114)
Observations	576	574	576	575	576	576	576	576	573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.021
	Gave/Accepted Bribe								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	-0.039 (0.026)								-0.027 (0.026)
Risk Aversion		-0.009 (0.011)							-0.007 (0.011)
Job Security			0.009 (0.019)						0.008 (0.019)
Job Income				0.071** (0.022)					0.073** (0.023)
Male					0.130** (0.041)				0.117** (0.042)
Pub. Law Dep.						-0.037 (0.043)			-0.030 (0.042)
Family Ties: Lawyer							0.012 (0.048)		-0.031 (0.056)
Family Ties: Courts								0.061 (0.039)	0.091 <sup>†</sup> (0.047)
Constant	0.473*** (0.138)	0.310*** (0.059)	0.236** (0.072)	-0.019 (0.087)	0.217*** (0.022)	0.293*** (0.037)	0.266*** (0.020)	0.251*** (0.018)	0.072 (0.187)
Observations	575	573	575	574	575	575	575	575	572
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.001	0.000	0.020	0.020	0.002	0.000	0.004	0.050

Table continued on next page

**Table C4: Correlates of Outcome Indicators (Continued)**

	Donations								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	0.025 (0.016)								0.021 (0.017)
Risk Aversion		-0.021* (0.009)							-0.023* (0.009)
Job Security			0.008 (0.015)						0.006 (0.014)
Job Income				-0.024 (0.017)					-0.023 (0.016)
Male					-0.090*** (0.025)				-0.081** (0.027)
Pub. Law Dep.						0.073* (0.034)			0.066† (0.035)
Family Ties: Lawyer							-0.000 (0.036)		-0.002 (0.040)
Family Ties: Courts								0.009 (0.033)	-0.005 (0.038)
Constant	0.491*** (0.090)	0.713*** (0.045)	0.591*** (0.058)	0.717*** (0.066)	0.655*** (0.016)	0.570*** (0.030)	0.620*** (0.017)	0.617*** (0.019)	0.675*** (0.138)
Observations	576	574	576	575	576	576	576	576	573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.012	0.001	0.004	0.018	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.046
	Corruption Justifiable								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	-0.005 (0.026)								0.000 (0.026)
Risk Aversion		-0.009 (0.013)							-0.008 (0.012)
Job Security			-0.003 (0.018)						-0.004 (0.017)
Job Income				0.035 (0.024)					0.037 (0.024)
Male					0.042 (0.043)				0.037 (0.043)
Pub. Law Dep.						-0.002 (0.045)			0.006 (0.044)
Family Ties: Lawyer							-0.046 (0.053)		-0.056 (0.061)
Family Ties: Courts								-0.001 (0.044)	0.027 (0.048)
Constant	0.498*** (0.139)	0.514*** (0.061)	0.482*** (0.067)	0.332*** (0.093)	0.456*** (0.028)	0.473*** (0.034)	0.481*** (0.026)	0.473*** (0.027)	0.359† (0.191)
Observations	576	574	576	575	576	576	576	576	573
R <sup>2</sup>	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.008
	PSM Index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	0.050 (0.030)								0.034 (0.034)
Risk Aversion		-0.023 (0.016)							-0.031† (0.016)
Job Security			0.124*** (0.026)						0.132*** (0.026)
Job Income				-0.075* (0.033)					-0.097** (0.032)
Male					-0.175*** (0.050)				-0.143** (0.050)
Pub. Law Dep.						0.040 (0.045)			0.004 (0.048)
Family Ties: Lawyer							-0.071 (0.081)		-0.052 (0.077)
Family Ties: Courts								-0.068 (0.068)	-0.078 (0.063)
Constant	3.617*** (0.161)	3.979*** (0.077)	3.422*** (0.097)	4.180*** (0.140)	3.946*** (0.035)	3.850*** (0.033)	3.891*** (0.030)	3.896*** (0.030)	3.827*** (0.241)
Observations	575	573	575	574	575	575	575	575	572
R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.004	0.042	0.012	0.020	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.092

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table C.5: Correlates of Legal Career Preferences**

	Public Law Preference Index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	-0.021 (0.066)								0.006 (0.070)
Risk Aversion		0.017 (0.032)							0.010 (0.031)
Job Security			0.284*** (0.050)						0.281*** (0.051)
Job Income				0.112† (0.063)					0.072 (0.063)
Male					0.161† (0.089)				0.202† (0.107)
Pub. Law Dep.						0.267* (0.126)			0.258* (0.120)
Family Ties: Lawyer							0.010 (0.129)		0.012 (0.138)
Family Ties: Courts								-0.037 (0.105)	-0.011 (0.108)
Constant	4.552*** (0.350)	4.372*** (0.159)	3.398*** (0.178)	3.995*** (0.254)	4.382*** (0.070)	4.265*** (0.103)	4.443*** (0.058)	4.454*** (0.067)	2.795*** (0.435)
Observations	568	566	568	567	568	568	568	568	565
$R^2$	0.000	0.001	0.055	0.007	0.004	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.077

	Private Law Preference Index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
GPA	0.201*** (0.053)								0.160** (0.058)
Risk Aversion		-0.009 (0.033)							-0.026 (0.033)
Job Security			0.137* (0.060)						0.122* (0.058)
Job Income				0.173** (0.060)					0.111† (0.061)
Male					-0.163 (0.111)				-0.075 (0.113)
Pub. Law Dep.						-0.436** (0.140)			-0.401** (0.135)
Family Ties: Lawyer							0.239† (0.136)		0.365** (0.127)
Family Ties: Courts								-0.236* (0.108)	-0.376*** (0.106)
Constant	3.798*** (0.276)	4.888*** (0.143)	4.338*** (0.241)	4.153*** (0.248)	4.907*** (0.081)	5.135*** (0.105)	4.798*** (0.074)	4.907*** (0.072)	3.565*** (0.382)
Observations	568	566	568	567	568	568	568	568	565
$R^2$	0.019	0.000	0.011	0.014	0.004	0.026	0.005	0.007	0.081

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Note: One drawback of the continuous public and private legal career preferences employed in the study is that correlates can potentially be positively or negatively correlated with both indices. As can be seen in Table C.5, this is the case for the variables about the extent to which students value job security and high incomes as attributes of the career they choose. However, in the case of the job security variable, the magnitude of the correlation with the public preference index is noticeably larger than the magnitude of the correlation with the private preference index, and the difference is statistically significant. Meanwhile, for the high income variable, the magnitude of the correlation with the private preference index is larger than the magnitude of the correlation with the public preference index, but this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

## C.4 Regressions with Alternative Measure of Ability

The analyses below demonstrate robustness of the results in Table 4 of the article when using scores on a national university entrance exam – the ZNO – in place of GPA. Because not all students take the ZNO, I use GPA as the primary indicator of ability to reduce missing observations. I additionally show the bivariate correlations between ZNO scores and experimental indicators, on one hand, and career preferences, on the other.

**Table C.6: Selection Conditional On Other Attributes with Alternative Measure of Ability**

	Estimated Cheat Rate		Gave/Accepted Bribe		Donations		Corruption Justifiable		PSM	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Public Preference Index	0.047*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.052** (0.015)	-0.046*** (0.013)	-0.048*** (0.013)	0.045* (0.017)	0.045** (0.017)	0.057* (0.024)	0.048* (0.022)
ZNO	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)
Constant	0.335* (0.158)	0.370* (0.182)	0.118 (0.279)	-0.307 (0.265)	0.765*** (0.216)	1.007*** (0.250)	0.402 (0.264)	0.346 (0.312)	2.698*** (0.282)	3.148*** (0.334)
Other Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	517	515	516	514	517	515	517	515	516	514
$R^2$	0.041	0.070	0.023	0.064	0.028	0.070	0.013	0.024	0.027	0.095

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table C.7: Correlates of ZNO Scores**

	<i>Indicators of Dishonesty, Corruption &amp; Pro-Social Motivation</i>					<i>Indicators of Career Preferences</i>	
	Cheat Rate (1)	Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)	Public Preference (6)	Private Preference (7)
ZNO	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)
Constant	0.610*** (0.162)	0.523* (0.244)	0.515* (0.214)	0.706** (0.231)	3.013*** (0.235)	6.422*** (0.695)	5.573*** (0.577)
Observations	524	523	524	524	523	517	517
$R^2$	0.005	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.016	0.018	0.002

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## C.5 Regressions Controlling for Class Year

Due to space constraints, the analyses in Section 3.4 of the article do not include controls for class year. The analyses below demonstrate robustness of the results in Table 4 of the article when dummy variables for year of study in university are included. I additionally show the bivariate correlations between class year and experimental indicators, on one hand, and career preferences, on the other.

**Table C.8: Selection Conditional On Year of Study**

	Estimated Cheat Rate		Gave/Accepted Bribe		Donations		Corruption Justifiable		PSM	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Public Preference Index	0.043*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.043** (0.015)	0.039* (0.016)	-0.042** (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.013)	0.054** (0.016)	0.053** (0.016)	0.042† (0.025)	0.031 (0.023)
2nd Years	-0.013 (0.048)	-0.008 (0.048)	0.009 (0.061)	0.010 (0.053)	-0.081 (0.051)	-0.091* (0.042)	0.004 (0.049)	0.005 (0.053)	-0.084 (0.099)	-0.088 (0.090)
3rd Years	-0.081† (0.042)	-0.070† (0.042)	-0.089 (0.058)	-0.079 (0.058)	-0.005 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.046)	0.075 (0.050)	0.081 (0.052)	0.047 (0.075)	0.019 (0.067)
4th Years	-0.101* (0.041)	-0.089* (0.042)	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.056 (0.049)	0.024 (0.054)	0.004 (0.049)	-0.040 (0.062)	-0.035 (0.065)	-0.055 (0.095)	-0.066 (0.086)
MA Students	-0.068 (0.047)	-0.044 (0.047)	-0.028 (0.053)	-0.027 (0.048)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.012 (0.044)	0.140* (0.060)	0.143* (0.063)	-0.074 (0.073)	-0.078 (0.073)
Other Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Observations	568	565	567	564	568	565	568	565	567	564
R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.069	0.023	0.066	0.037	0.081	0.034	0.040	0.014	0.095

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. Excluded category for the class year dummies is 1st Years. † p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table C.9: Correlates of Year of Study**

	<i>Indicators of Dishonesty, Corruption &amp; Pro-Social Motivation</i>					<i>Indicators of Career Preferences</i>	
	Cheat Rate (1)	Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)	Public Preference (6)	Private Preference (7)
2nd Years	-0.027 (0.051)	-0.010 (0.061)	-0.063 (0.053)	0.001 (0.053)	-0.086 (0.096)	-0.245 (0.159)	-0.381† (0.213)
3rd Years	-0.096* (0.044)	-0.113† (0.061)	0.014 (0.050)	0.054 (0.053)	0.035 (0.073)	-0.469** (0.163)	-0.050 (0.198)
4th Years	-0.133** (0.041)	-0.112† (0.057)	0.061 (0.055)	-0.081 (0.062)	-0.063 (0.093)	-0.730*** (0.176)	0.016 (0.198)
MA Students	-0.088† (0.046)	-0.064 (0.054)	0.022 (0.046)	0.111† (0.060)	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.529** (0.158)	0.040 (0.240)
Constant	0.451*** (0.034)	0.327*** (0.038)	0.611*** (0.042)	0.451*** (0.040)	3.920*** (0.061)	4.849*** (0.117)	4.907*** (0.157)
Observations	576	575	576	576	575	568	568
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.011	0.014	0.018	0.006	0.043	0.014

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. Excluded category for the class year dummies is 1st Years. † p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

## C.6 Subgroup Analyses by Field of Study

This section shows that the article’s primary results not only are robust to controlling for field of study, but that even when analyzing separately the sub-sample of students in departments focused on training judges, prosecutors, and investigators and the sub-sample of students in departments focused on training defense attorneys and commercial litigators, evidence of corrupt self-selection emerges in both subgroups. In other words, the self-selection results appear to occur on an individual level, not at the level of sorting into different tracks of academic specializations.

**Table C.10: Dishonesty, Corruption, Pro-Social Motivations & Legal Career Preferences – Public Law Oriented Fields of Study Only**

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Public Preference Index	0.045*** (0.012)	0.049* (0.019)	-0.033* (0.016)	0.054** (0.019)	0.064* (0.029)
Constant	0.176** (0.059)	0.027 (0.088)	0.791*** (0.074)	0.223* (0.087)	3.605*** (0.138)
Observations	381	380	381	381	380
$R^2$	0.032	0.019	0.014	0.017	0.015
<b>B. Private Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Private Preference Index	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.036 (0.032)
Constant	0.395*** (0.056)	0.320*** (0.068)	0.658*** (0.067)	0.477*** (0.094)	3.724*** (0.158)
Observations	381	380	381	381	380
$R^2$	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.006

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

**Table C.11: Dishonesty, Corruption, Pro-Social Motivations & Legal Career Preferences – Private Law Oriented Fields of Study Only**

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Public Preference Index	0.060*** (0.016)	0.052† (0.026)	-0.080*** (0.020)	0.048† (0.028)	0.000 (0.038)
Constant	0.132† (0.066)	0.072 (0.109)	0.913*** (0.081)	0.264† (0.135)	3.852*** (0.170)
Observations	187	187	187	187	187
$R^2$	0.054	0.018	0.085	0.013	0.000
<b>B. Private Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Private Preference Index	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.029)	0.043* (0.020)	0.020 (0.029)	0.019 (0.038)
Constant	0.439*** (0.109)	0.457* (0.168)	0.349** (0.114)	0.367* (0.151)	3.757*** (0.205)
Observations	187	187	187	187	187
$R^2$	0.001	0.006	0.022	0.002	0.001

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

## C.7 Estimating the Joint Distribution of Dishonesty and Career Preferences

This section employs the estimation strategy developed in the Appendix to Barfort et al. (2019) (see sections A.1.5 - A.1.6 and A.2) to examine the joint distribution of dishonesty and legal career preferences. Under the assumption that cheat rates for an individual are independent over time, they show that maximizing the following log likelihood function with respect to  $\lambda$  yields the Maximum Likelihood estimator for the full distribution of dishonesty  $F$ :

$$\log \mathcal{L}(\lambda) = \sum_{i=1}^N \log \left( \int_0^1 \binom{K}{Y_i} (p^* + (1-p^*)\theta_i)^{Y_i} (1-p^* + (1-p^*)\theta_i)^{K-Y_i} \right) \quad (1)$$

where  $K$  is the number of dice rolls,  $Y_i$  is the number of correct guesses reported by individual  $i$ ,  $p$  is the probability of a correct guess, and  $\theta_i$  is the true cheat rate for individual  $i$ .

As shown in Table C.12, I then estimate several models of the distribution of cheat rates. The first three models follow Barfort et al. (2019) and show, respectively, a parameterization of the distribution as a mixture of two Beta distributions with parameters and weights for means and variance to be estimated; an extension of the first model that includes a third Beta distribution in the mixture; and a different extension of the first model that instead includes a mass point in addition to the continuous two component Beta-mixture. To this I add two models, with model 4 using a single Beta distribution and model 5 adding a mass point to this single Beta distribution.

Beta distribution 1 in model 1 and model 3 has a weight of 0.053 and is therefore largely indistinguishable from the single distribution in model 4 with all of its mass at 0.39. Meanwhile, the included mass point in model 5 has a mass point of only 0.044. Eliminating models 1, 3, and 5, I then compare the fits of model 2 and model 4. Of these, model 2 has a higher log likelihood, but given it includes more free parameters the AIC or BIC may be more informative. The AIC is slightly lower for model 2 while the BIC is noticeably lower for model 4. The simplicity of model 4 is also appealing, and I therefore use model 4 in the analyses that follow. The estimate reported in Section 3.1 of the article of a 0.39 mean for the distribution of dishonesty is based on model 4. The estimates reported in Section 3.1 that 1% to 1.5% of individuals cheat more than 98 percent of the time while between 5% and 12% of individuals cheat less than 2 percent of the time refer to the lower and upper bounds of estimates from the five models. Model 4, the preferred model, indicates that 6.9% of individuals cheat less than two percent of the time and 1.0% of individuals cheat more than 98 percent of the time.

Barfort et al. (2019) additionally demonstrate that maximizing the following log likelihood function with respect to  $\lambda$  and  $\zeta$  yields the joint Maximum Likelihood estimator for the full distribution of dishonesty  $F$  and the probability of preferring a public sector career  $m$ :

$$\log \mathcal{L}(\lambda, \zeta) = \sum_{i=1}^N \log \left( \int_0^1 \binom{K}{Y_i} (p^* + (1-p^*)\theta_i)^{Y_i} (1-p^* + (1-p^*)\theta_i)^{K-Y_i} \right) \cdot (m(\theta; \zeta)^{X_i} (1-m(\theta; \zeta))^{1-X_i}) dF(\theta; \lambda) \quad (2)$$



**Table C.12: Distribution of Cheat Rates, Continuous Distribution**

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Beta Distribution 1	Weight	0.053	0.169	0.053	1	1
	Mean	0.952	0.839	0.952	0.390	0.357
	Variance	0.001	0.016	0.001	0.085	0.070
Beta Distribution 2	Weight	0.946	0.112	0.946		
	Mean	0.351	0.000	0.351		
	Variance	0.068	0.000	0.068		
Beta Distribution 3	Weight		0.717			
	Mean		0.332			
	Variance		0.036			
Mass at point				0.000		0.044
Mass location				0.932		0.961
# of Model Parameters		5	8	7	2	4
Log Likelihood		-2069	-2066	-2069	-2073	-2070
AIC		4148	4148	4152	4150	4148
BIC		4170	4183	4183	4159	4165

where  $X_i$  is an indicator for whether individual  $i$  prefers a public sector career and all other notation is the same as in Equation 1.


To impose a functional form on the probability of preferring public sector careers as function of the cheat rate while allowing for a flexible relationship between career preferences and dishonesty, Barfort et al. (2019) use a cubic polynomial in the cheat rate and apply the logistic function to restrict the probabilities to be between zero and one, such that:

$$P(X_i = 1|\theta_i) = m(X_i = 1|\theta_i) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left(-\sum_{j=0}^3 \kappa_j(\theta_i)^j\right)} \quad (3)$$

One consideration is that Barfort et al.'s (2019) primary indicator for career preferences is dichotomous, while the primary indicator employed in the Ukraine study is continuous. I therefore create a binary indicator by giving a value of 1 to individuals whose public preference index is higher than their private preference index and 0 otherwise. This indicator is less faithful to the data collection process, as students were not asked to make a dichotomous choice between public or private sector legal careers, but it facilitates the application of Barfort et al.'s estimator to the data at hand.

Figure C.1 shows the results from jointly modeling the full distribution of dishonesty and career preference probabilities. Barfort et al. (2019) find that their results are driven in particular by strong public sector preferences among the most honest subset of individuals, and that career preference rates are relatively stable for high levels of cheat rates. By contrast, for the Ukraine study the probability of preferring a public sector career rises across most of the cheat rate distribution, from a low point of around 35% preferring public sector legal careers among the most honest individuals and peaking with just under 50% of individuals preferring public sector careers among individuals who cheat around 75 percent of the time.

Figure C.1: Jointly Estimated Cheat Rate and Career Preference Distributions



## C.8 Comparison of Dishonesty Indicator With Previous Work

This section compares the findings for the Ukrainian law students sample to samples from previous studies employing similar dice task games with respect to the amount of dishonesty observed, as based on observed individual winnings, relative to the predicted distribution of winnings under full honesty. The approach used in this study – a dice guessing approach in which participants have the opportunity to lie about their own earlier guess – is directly comparable to that used by Barfort et al. (2019), whereas Hanna and Wang (2017) use a dice under a cup approach in which participants have the opportunity to lie about the outcome of the dice role. For the dice guessing game, the expected distribution of winnings under full honesty is distributed as a binomial random variable with 40 trials and a success probability of  $\frac{1}{6}$  multiplied by the difference in earnings for a correct or incorrect guess (2 DKK for Barfort et al. 2019, 1 UAH for the current study). In Hanna and Wang (2017) the distribution of points under full honesty is the sum of 42 discrete uniform variables on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 multiplied by 0.5 INR, the increase in payment received for reporting each higher value on the die (e.g., a 2 instead of a 1, a 3 instead of a 2, etc.). The levels of dishonest behavior at different percentiles of the distribution for the Ukraine sample are noticeably similar to those in the Danish sample, with the exception that, as discussed in Section 3.1 of the article, very few subjects in the Ukraine sample were fully dishonest, as defined by cheating every or nearly every time. Dishonesty in the Ukraine and Danish samples is more pervasive at higher ends of the distribution than the Indian sample, but as Barfort et al. (2019) discuss (Online Appendix, p. 28), this is in line with what is known about differences between the dice guessing and dice under a cup games.

**Table C.13: Comparing Cheating in Dice Game with Previous Studies**

	Hanna & Wang (2017) India	Barfort et al. (2019) Denmark	Current Study Ukraine
Share above 50th percentile of honest distribution	0.89	0.89	0.92
Share above 75th percentile of honest distribution	0.74	0.84	0.86
Share above 90th percentile of honest distribution	0.59	0.79	0.77
Share above 99th percentile of honest distribution	0.33	0.60	0.67

The rows of the table refer to different percentiles of the distribution of winnings that is expected under full honesty. The columns show the share of participants who had winnings above those percentiles. Data for the first two columns are from the Online Appendix to Barfort et al. (2019), Table 8 on p. 30.

## C.9 Logit Regressions

This section shows that employing logit in place of linear probability models for the analyses in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 in the article, in which the dependent variables are dichotomous, produces nearly identical results.

**Table C.14: Robustness Using Logit**

	Gave/Accepted Bribe (1)	Corruption Justified (2)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (3)	Corruption Justified (4)
Public Preference Index	0.049** (0.016)	0.052** (0.017)		
Private Preference Index			-0.016 (0.014)	0.004 (0.017)
Observations	567	568	567	568

Average marginal effects of logit regressions with standard errors in parentheses

† p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## D Robustness Checks Discussed in Sections 3.5-3.6 of Article

### D.1 Robustness Checks for Dice Task Game

A possible concern is that participants may become fatigued or distracted given the repetition involved in the dice game. To mitigate this concern, subjects were presented with 20 dice rolls early in the research instrument, then engaged in other games, and then were presented with another 20 dice rolls. Moreover, this section offers evidence that the results concerning the correlation between a preference for public sector legal careers and cheat rates in the dice task game are similar regardless of whether all 40 dice rolls are included in the analysis or just the first 10. Indeed, the results largely are similar across the first 10, second 10, third 10, and fourth 10 die rolls.

**Table D.1: Analyses of Dice Task Game by 10 Rolls**

	Estimated Cheat Rate For:				
	All 40 Rolls	1st 10 Rolls	2nd 10 Rolls	3rd 10 Rolls	4th 10 Rolls
Public Preference Index	0.049*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.009)	0.054*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.012)
Constant	0.164*** (0.044)	0.137** (0.042)	0.138** (0.048)	0.175** (0.051)	0.207*** (0.057)
Observations	568	568	568	568	568
$R^2$	0.038	0.039	0.043	0.024	0.022

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses.

†  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### D.2 Robustness Checks for Corruption Game

This section demonstrates that the results concerning the correlation between a preference for public sector legal careers and engaging in a bribe transaction in the corruption game are robust to separately analyzing subjects who participated in the citizen role (making a decision whether to offer a bribe) and subjects who participated in the bureaucrat role (making a decision whether to accept a bribe).

**Table D.2: Disaggregated Analyses of Corruption Game**

	Gave/Accepted Bribe	Gave Bribe	Accepted Bribe
	As Citizen/As Bureaucrat	As Citizen	As Bureaucrat
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Public Preference Index	0.048** (0.015)	0.060** (0.022)	0.035† (0.019)
Constant	0.052 (0.065)	0.028 (0.100)	0.078 (0.088)
Observations	567	287	280
$R^2$	0.017	0.024	0.010

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses.

†  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### D.3 Robustness Checks for Inattentive Subjects and Subjects with Knowledge of Games

This section shows that the article’s primary results in Table 3 are robust to removing inattentive subjects and subjects who reported familiarity with the use of experimental games in social science research. Subjects were coded as inattentive if they failed both of the following screener questions:

*Attention Check 1:* Before moving on, we would like to get a sense of your general preferences. Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables, can greatly impact the decision process. To demonstrate that you’ve read this much, just go ahead and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options.

What is your favorite color?

*Attention Check 2:* When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. To show that you’ve read this much, please ignore the question and select Liga.net and RBK as your two answers.

When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you would visit first? (Please choose only one)

**Table D.3: Primary Analyses With Inattentive Subjects Removed**

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Public Preference Index	0.045*** (0.009)	0.035* (0.017)	-0.036** (0.013)	0.041† (0.021)	0.054* (0.023)
Constant	0.162*** (0.044)	0.089 (0.072)	0.792*** (0.057)	0.289** (0.095)	3.656*** (0.106)
Observations	444	444	444	444	444
$R^2$	0.034	0.009	0.018	0.010	0.012
<b>B. Private Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Private Preference Index	0.000 (0.010)	0.001 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)	0.011 (0.019)	0.027 (0.029)
Constant	0.360*** (0.051)	0.237*** (0.067)	0.631*** (0.064)	0.419*** (0.095)	3.763*** (0.150)
Observations	444	444	444	444	444
$R^2$	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.003

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

**Table D.4: Primary Analyses With Subjects With Knowledge of Experimental Games Removed**

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Public Preference Index	0.054*** (0.009)	0.040* (0.016)	-0.042** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.052* (0.023)
Constant	0.127** (0.046)	0.083 (0.069)	0.808*** (0.061)	0.178* (0.079)	3.646*** (0.105)
Observations	470	469	470	470	469
$R^2$	0.047	0.012	0.023	0.025	0.012
<b>B. Private Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Private Preference Index	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.007 (0.012)	0.000 (0.019)	0.036 (0.028)
Constant	0.407*** (0.055)	0.339*** (0.070)	0.587*** (0.060)	0.468*** (0.093)	3.703*** (0.138)
Observations	470	469	470	470	469
$R^2$	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.006

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

#### D.4 Career Preferences and Career Expectations

This section shows that the main results shown in Table 3 of the article are robust when using the career expectations indices – measures of how likely students believe they will be employed in a given career – in place of the career preference indices, per the discussion in Section 3.6 of the article. I also show here that results are robust when removing students with weak preferences for a legal career in general, as defined by scores below the mean on both the public and private sector preference indices.

**Table D.5: Dishonesty, Corruption, Pro-Social Motivations & Legal Career Expectations**

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Expectations</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Public Expectations Index	0.050*** (0.010)	0.027† (0.016)	-0.027* (0.013)	0.030† (0.016)	0.044* (0.020)
Constant	0.174*** (0.044)	0.155* (0.064)	0.732*** (0.052)	0.346*** (0.073)	3.703*** (0.087)
Observations	566	565	566	566	565
R <sup>2</sup>	0.045	0.006	0.011	0.006	0.009

<b>B. Private Sector Legal Expectations</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Private Expectations Index	0.011 (0.010)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.038 (0.023)
Constant	0.328*** (0.050)	0.255*** (0.055)	0.671*** (0.045)	0.500*** (0.070)	3.706*** (0.115)
Observations	566	565	566	566	565
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.007

Note: OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

**Table D.6: Primary Analyses With Subjects With Weak Preferences for Legal Professions Removed**

<b>A. Public Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Public Preference Index	0.059*** (0.011)	0.053** (0.018)	-0.057*** (0.015)	0.046* (0.021)	0.052† (0.028)
Constant	0.106* (0.053)	0.029 (0.084)	0.887*** (0.068)	0.278* (0.110)	3.655*** (0.132)
Observations	427	426	427	427	426
R <sup>2</sup>	0.053	0.019	0.038	0.011	0.011

<b>B. Private Sector Legal Preferences</b>					
	<i>Experimental Indicators</i>			<i>Non-Experimental Indicators</i>	
	Estimated Cheat Rate (1)	Gave/Accepted Bribe (2)	Donations (3)	Corruption Justifiable (4)	PSM (5)
Private Preference Index	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.040* (0.017)	0.013 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.020)	0.017 (0.028)
Constant	0.481*** (0.067)	0.492*** (0.091)	0.546*** (0.080)	0.567*** (0.108)	3.815*** (0.150)
Observations	427	426	427	427	426
R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.010	0.002	0.001	0.001

OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at session level shown in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .



## E Pre-Analysis Plan

A pre-analysis plan was pre-registered with OSF on October 25, 2017 prior to the collection of data and is now publicly available at <https://osf.io/s6wex>. The pre-analysis plan demonstrates that:

- (1) There is no selective reporting of results from experimental games: The three games discussed in the article – and only these three games, along with an experimental measure of risk aversion – were pre-registered (see the section on “Measured Variables”).
- (2) There is no selective reporting of hypothesis testing: Four hypotheses were pre-registered (see the section on “Hypotheses”). The article focuses primarily on H1 and H2, finding support for the former and lack of support for the latter. Hypotheses H3 and H4 are considered in Section 3.4 of the article and Section C.3 of this appendix.

Note that whereas the pre-analysis plan proposed regressing career preferences on the experimental indicators, at the suggestion of referees this has been reversed. As discussed in Section 3.3 of the article, the cheat rate estimator from the dice task game exhibits classical measurement error, and therefore is better employed as an outcome variable to avoid attenuation bias. Note too that model specifications employed in Table 4 of the article reflect input from referees and suggestions received at seminars and workshops, and that these specifications are *more* demanding than the pre-registered model specifications (see section “Analysis Plan”), which consist of bivariate regressions and regressions including controls for gender, class year, and field of specialization. All findings are more robust in the less demanding specifications proposed in the pre-analysis plan.

Finally, it should be recognized that the pre-analysis plan reflects the initial intention to use this study to examine preferences for public versus private sector employment in general – and to compare these findings to research conducted in Russia using a similar research design – as well as preferences for legal professions in particular. As discussed in Section 2.1 of the article, this article focuses specifically on the legal profession aspect of the study. Accordingly, the most relevant discussion of outcome variables in the “Measured Variables” section of the pre-analysis plan pertains to the variables uniquely designed for students studying law.

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