Authors: Charles Frady, Samuel Gomez, Sandy Tecotzky

cdakotafrady@gmail.com, samuelgomez2027@u.northwestern.edu, sandytecotzky2027@u.northwestern.edu

Entering the 2023-24 offseason, the Seattle Mariners were in a precarious situation. With an 88-74 record, the Seattle Mariners had finished third in the American League West, two games back of the division-winning Houston Astros and the 2023 World Series Champion Texas Rangers. On the Wild Card front, the team finished a single game behind the Toronto Blue Jays. The postseason was in reach, but the organization had ultimately faltered like they have so often before. 

The Seattle Mariners have had one of the most dreadful 21st centuries in Major League Baseball. The organization has only made the postseason three times since the turn of the century, and there is a distinctive 21-year gap between their 2001 and 2022 postseason runs. Such performance has caused turmoil among the fanbase, and comments by Mariners General Manager Jerry Dipoto only fueled the flames. During a press conference, he went on record to establish a winning percentage goal of 54% over a ten-year stretch and doubled-down by saying “We’re actually doing the fan base a favor in asking for their patience to win the World Series.” Dipoto is an interesting figure within the baseball world due to his reputation as a transaction merchant. This stayed the same this past offseason, with Dipoto partially retooling the team.

Dipoto entered the offseason needing to evaluate an organization that had clear enemies in Texas. The Rangers look to be a solid organization for the next decade, having already won a World Series while also having an elite farm system that sports the likes of Evan Carter and Wyatt Langford. The Astros, on the other hand, have shown no signs of slowing down with an organizational structure that has a proven level of success. Both Texas organizations looked to have a clear direction, but the Mariners, on the other hand, had a unique 2023. The Major League club had the second most offensive strikeouts across the Major Leagues but had the ninth-best wRC+. On the pitching side, the club saw the most starting pitcher innings out of any ball club. Additionally, they were third in team ERA, sixth in bullpen ERA, and second in bullpen K/9. Additionally, the organization supported a Farm System ranked in the bottom half of the league, according to Fangraphs. The Mariners at the major league level seemed fine, but an organizational restructuring seemed like a necessity, especially with ownership reportedly wanting to cut payroll.

Within this article, we evaluated the Mariners’ offseason from two different analytical approaches. Firstly, we approached each transaction from a more critical analysis standpoint, with the goal of deep diving into the potential performances based on our own opinions, using quantitative evidence. The second approach involved assigning monetary value to players in various transactions to ultimately evaluate the cumulative value the Mariners acquired compared to how much they gave up. The process for the second approach is detailed in the following section. Holistically, we wanted to approach each trade with an understanding of each player’s potential impact on their respective organizations. Even with our monetary value approach, we are likely skewed from our evaluation techniques. Each organization will value each player differently, and it can depend on organizational needs and desires. By taking these two approaches, we hope to quantify such understandings to put perspective on the unique offseason the Seattle Mariners endured. 

Trade Evaluation Process

In our evaluation process for the Seattle Mariners trades, we wanted to implement a monetary value projection system. In this system, each player would be evaluated based on their 2023 performance in coordination with their contracts. Using a simple polynomial line of best-fit equation created by collected data for the general trends for starting pitchers, relief pitchers, and position players, we would simplistically project the trade values of each player acquired. Under this process, we would project their monetary value purely as performance players for the extent of the remainder of their current contract. Then, we would subtract the player’s projected salary across the contract to generate a true monetary trade value.

With these monetary projection models, on the pitching side, we utilized FanGraphs data, which provided WAR as our metric of value. Using a Python program, the players were separated based on their roles as either relievers or starters. Additionally, an innings pitched limit was introduced. Starters were required to have at least 50 innings of work to be included in the calculation, while relievers needed at least 20 innings. For pure calculations, we focused on the change in WAR value from 2022 to 2023. Below, you will find the value projections of starting pitchers and relief pitchers over the progression of their careers. These charts used a baseline of 1 Win Above Replacement before the first season of projection. These charts and polynomial lines of best fits are only the baselines we introduced; the actual projection for each player was adjusted to their specific outputs. 

A similar process was implemented in creating a projection model for position players, but due to limited data, an adjusted WAR formula was introduced. Below is the position player WAR formula generally used in calculations according to Fangraphs:

Due to limited data, we had to create different calculations for the feeding metrics. We created substitute calculations for Batting Runs, Base Running Runs, and Fielding Runs. We disregarded the Positional and League Adjustment, again due to limited data. We set a value for replacement runs at 25 for every 600 plate appearances, or in other words- 1 replacement run for each 24 plate appearances. We also set Runs Per Win at 10. The substitute calculations are as follows:

Similarly to the pitching model, we used a Python program to create a trend for WAR among position players with a baseline of 1 Win Above Replacement as well. These charts and polynomial lines of best fits are only the baselines we introduced; the actual projection for each player was adjusted to their specific outputs. 

For the value of one Win Above Replacement, we set that value at 6 million, as that was the value set by John Edwards, a correspondent of Fangraphs, in 2018. A more recent evaluation of the value of WAR by Kerry Miller (Bleacher Report) found that the value of a single Win Above Replacement is 5.7 for position players and 6.9 for pitchers. Based on this information, we will set 6 million as the baseline value for WAR. 

This evaluation process will allow us to create a quantitative analysis of the monetary value acquired for various Major League transactions, including trades and free-agent signings. The problem with the monetary value system is that in certain transactions, players of the prospect category are included. For our system, we defined these individuals as any player who had not exhausted their Rookie eligibility at the Major League level. If they hadn’t exhausted their Rookie eligibility, we would use their Fangraphs scouting grade to assign value. The prospect value table is as noted below:

Looking at this table, you will notice that the value of prospects isn’t that high compared to players at the Major League level. For example, a player like Gunnar Henderson, with five years of control and his current WAR output, would destroy even the most highly touted prospect in terms of our monetary trade value. This system is intentional, as proven players at the Major League level with a lot of years of control and solid projections should be considered more valuable than any minor league prospect as they are considered unproven. For the other loose end in our system, tradeable draft picks will retain their assigned bonus value. 

Campbell for Urias + Suarez for Zavala and Vargas Trades

On November 17th, the Mariners made their first notable offseason move by sending relief pitcher Isaiah Campbell to the Boston Red Sox in exchange for Luis Urias. This move was a surprise, considering Seattle already possessed considerable depth in the infield and Campbell was a solid controllable Major League reliever. Any confusion would be relieved just a week later as Seattle made another move, acquiring catcher Seby Zavala and right-handed pitcher Carlos Vargas in exchange for third-baseman Eugenio Suarez. By essentially flipping Suarez for Urias, Seattle was looking to cut strikeouts in favor of improved versatility, athleticism, and a more balanced, contact-oriented lineup. A comparison of Urias’ and Suarez’ metrics are as shown below (Note that for the defensive metrics, Urias played multiple positions, while Suarez only played Third Base defensively, with occasional starts as a Designated Hitter):

In Urias, Seattle is getting a cheap, versatile infielder who can hold his own offensively. He has a career 99 wRC+ and put up over 2 WAR in 2021 and 2022. However, it was a different story in  2023. His wRC+ slipped to a measly 83, and he struggled to stay on the field. He missed the first two months of the season due to a hamstring injury and was even optioned to Triple-A by Milwaukee before being sent to Boston. But again, Urias is a cheaper option than Suarez and strikes out over 7% less of the time. Urias’ lower price tag shouldn’t be understated, considering the previously mentioned desire by Mariners ownership to cut payroll. 

As for the other players involved in these trades, none are of significant value, but each has a chance to contribute at the Major League level in 2024. Vargas has an extremely lively arm as he touches 100 with a fastball. By pairing it with a low-90s slider, he possesses a vicious combo. However, it hasn’t always led to results in the minors. In 42 innings in Triple-A last season, he had a horrendous 1.9 K-BB% and would likely need to show command to earn a spot on Seattle’s Major League roster. Isaiah Campbell is a cutter/slider reliever who is much more polished than Vargas and will likely begin the year in Boston’s bullpen. Last season, he pitched to a 2.83 ERA in over 28 innings for Seattle. Finally, Zavala is a prototypical backup catcher and will serve as an organizational depth option in the catcher position. He is a solid framer with 7.5 Framing Runs this past season. 

For the monetary value in the Campbell and Urias trade, Campbell projects to accumulate more WAR for the remainder of his contract. This projection can be chalked up to Campbell performing better with the metric in 2023 and having an additional four years of control. In terms of the quantitative value, Campbell projects to be worth 19.284 Million Dollars, considering his projected performance within the metric and salary. Urias, on the other hand, is projected to have a negative trade value of -9.046 Million. The reason for this negative trade value is due to a weak performance in 2023, as his projections based on such a performance do not support the salary he will be paid in 2024 and, in coordination, the salary he will be paid in 2025. The charting of both WAR Projections for contract and player monetary values are as shown below:

Using the monetary value system, it appears that the Red Sox received more value, but holistically, the trade makes sense on the side of the Mariners. Dipoto needed to cut payroll in the infield, and the successive trade of Eugenio Suarez was no coincidence. The projection of Urias under our model focuses on his 2023 performance, while Dipoto could likely be focusing on the 2021 and 2022 versions of the player, which were quite solid. If Urias returns to such form in 2024, Dipoto will have surplus value in the position while having cut payroll. As stated at the beginning, the Mariners have solid pitching depth, meaning Campbell likely had more value for the Red Sox than the Mariners. Additionally, the Mariners needed a cheaper infielder than Suarez, and Urias fits that bill. Still, it seems like the Red Sox might have gained more value with the acquisition of Campbell as Urias’ expected metrics from the last few years (shown below) don’t indicate good progression for the player.

For the Eugenio Suarez trade, the Mariners didn’t do much better in terms of monetary value in our system yet again. Suarez is expected to accumulate close to 6 WAR over the final two years of his current contract. That equates to about 36 Million dollars in value, which is 10 more million than he will be paid in 2024 and 2025. Zavala, on the other hand, projects to be a serviceable backup, with his salary roughly matching his projected output, making his monetary value in our system less than a million dollars. The prospect in this deal, Carlos Vargas, projects to be worth roughly 1.5 million based on his Fangraphs scout grade of 35+ FV. This scout grade can mainly be attributed to Vargas’ command issues, as he sported a 6.8 BB/9 in Triple-A last year. The charting of the values in this trade are shown below:

Based on both evaluation processes, it appears that the Mariners didn’t get a particularly great haul for Eugenio Suarez. Zavala isn’t serviceable but doesn’t project to be anything particularly noteworthy. Vargas reportedly has an upside, but with the command issues, he could end up being a meaningless prospect. The main goal of this deal was to cut payroll for Dipoto, and this trade definitely fits that purpose, with both players making less than a million next year. Suarez may not meet the cumulative value of his contract, as he would need roughly 4.3 WAR over the next two years. In that scenario, this trade seems logical for the Mariners as they get solid value with controllable players. Outside of that scenario, Suarez seems to be a key piece in a Diamondbacks offseason that follows a run to the World Series. Under this evaluation process, the Diamondbacks likely acquired more value with this trade. 

Kelenic, Gonzales, and White for Kowar and Phillips Trade

Further cementing Seattle’s desire to cut payroll was the salary dump of Marco Gonzales and Evan White. Getting rid of these players will save Seattle roughly $29 million next season, but this influx of financial flexibility came at a cost: losing Jarred Kelenic. 

Many baseball fans will be familiar with Kelenic’s history. Drafted 6th overall in the 2018 draft by the Mets, he more than justified the selection as a prospect by becoming MLB’s 4th overall prospect in baseball in 2021. However, since his debut in 2021, he has held a career .656 OPS through roughly 250 games. So far, he hasn’t come anywhere near his status as a prospect, but at only 24, a new home in Atlanta may be just what he needs to finally break out at the Major League level. Likely serving as Atlanta’s left fielder, Kelenic will find himself sharing the diamond with one of the most talented rosters in baseball. 

Kelenic fell victim to some unfortunate luck throughout the 2023 season, with his expected stats easily outpacing his actual results. Additionally, he fell victim to some self-inflicted wounds when he broke his foot after kicking a water cooler in frustration. Kelenic showed signs of closing in on his supposed prospect ceiling, as in the first month of the season he sported a fantastic 169 wRC+. Kelenic showed many strides in 2023, with his percentage of soft contact dropping by over 20%. Kelenic’s indicators of progression are as shown below:

On the way to Seattle are right hander Jackson Kowar and prospect Connor Phillips, another right handed pitcher. Kowar, like Vargas, is unproven at the Major League level. For Seattle’s sake, let’s just hope that this deal is a small salary dump in hindsight and that Kelenic doesn’t turn out to be the star the baseball world thought he could be. 

This trade is particularly interesting as the driving source, however you approach it, is money. Kelenic had a solid amount of projection and monetary value within our system, but the player attached to Kelenic seems to somewhat even this out. Both White and Gonzales have monetary value in the negatives due to their current contracts and weak system projections. The Mariners clearly wanted to cut costs and were willing to do anything to make it happen, even trading the extremely valuable Kelenic. Going to the Mariners isn’t a lot of value. Kowar is an unproven reliever with limited projection attached to his name. Phillips, on the other hand, is a former second-round pick who has failed to stay on the field and, therefore, has a Fangraphs scouting grade of 35+. In terms of our monetary value system, this trade is somewhat sensible as the Mariners don’t get a ton of value but also cut two players whose contracts are way higher than their expected outputs would suggest they be paid. The charting of this data is as shown below:

From a more holistic standpoint, it seems like a relatively risky trade for the Mariners. Even though the Mariners limited the cumulative value given up by attaching bad contracts to Kelenic, the Braves might have received a player who could far surpass his value. With the added lineup protection, Kelenic could become a top-echelon player. The Mariners, on the other side, didn’t acquire anybody particularly special. Phillips is a project but could end up being a hidden piece in this deal long term.

Garver Signing

After nearly a month of dormancy they made a small splash in free agency by signing Mitch Garver to a two-year, $24 million deal. Garver will likely spend the majority of the 2024 season as a designated hitter, but does have the ability slot in behind the plate when Cal Raleigh rests, but Seattle didn’t acquire him for any defensive acumen, as he posts a -19 Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) at the position. Contrary to the Urias for Suarez swap, this deal limits roster flexibility and reclaims some of the offensive power and production lost from shipping away Suarez. Although Garver hasn’t eclipsed 100 games played in a season since 2018, he has proven to be an exceptional offensive weapon. He’s posted a wRC+ of over 130 in two of the last three seasons, and his process stats corroborate his on-the-field results; Garver was in the top echelon in terms of Barrel%, Chase%, and BB%, indicating a player who showcases an efficient approach at the plate. Next season will likely be much the same, and he may do it with significantly more at-bats.

Running the Garver contract through our projection model, the contract seems fair for its projected value. If you don’t include the third year, in which the Mariners have a team option, the deal seems even more fair for both sides. The Mariners got a solid player at the cost, and that is all you can ask for if you are Dipoto. The charting on the projections of WAR and monetary value are below:

Jose Caballero for Luke Raley Trade

Entering the new year, Dipoto would make another notable move, acquiring former Tampa Bay Rays outfielder Luke Raley in exchange for infielder Jose Caballero. The Rays received a versatile infielder who can easily slot into either middle infield position, which for a shortstop-depleted team was somewhat of a necessity. Caballero was a solid defender at both positions, sporting a 7 DRS and 7 Outs Above Average (OAA) at second base across 467 innings, while additionally posting 4 DRS and 2 OAA across 132.1 innings at shortstop. His versatility and talent on the defensive side of the ball were primarily what contributed to his respectable 2.2 Wins Above Replacement (WAR) this past season. 

In exchange, the Mariners received outfielder Luke Raley. Raley brings a consistent bat that posted a 130 wRC+ and additional outfield depth. With a -0.4 dWAR, Raley doesn’t offer much defensively, but Seattle just needs him to be a lineup centerpiece. However, a true assessment of Raley can’t end without an in-depth look at his expected stats, which were considerably less impressive than his on-field statistics. Additionally, Raley was a victim of post All-Star break woes, sporting a 93 wRC+ in the second half of the season. He is an enticing acquisition, but a defensive liability whose stats suggest future regression and who has been plagued with inconsistency. It would be unwise to peg him as a top contributor on a playoff team, but he will provide some security in the middle of the order. Representations of this data are as shown below:

According to these two evaluation processes, Raley could very well be another example of the Tampa Bay Rays selling high on a player. Raley doesn’t have any true defensive value, so if his offensive ability falls off, the Mariners will likely have lost value within this trade. Both players are on league minimum salary, so cash isn’t a defining factor within this transaction. Still, the Rays look to have gotten a player that, at worst, will have applicable defensive value. The Mariners, on the other hand, have a somewhat risky and sporadic bat-first talent. 

Looking through our monetary value system, the Rays are still favored. Even with the optimistic projections for Raley, the extra year of control for Caballero ultimately makes the deal more favorable to the Rays under this model. The charting of these models is as shown below:

Ray for Haniger and Desclafani + Desclafani, Topa, Gonzalez, and Bowen for Polanco Trades

Two of Seattle’s most significant moves this offseason include bringing back a familiar face, flipping a veteran pitcher, and solidifying the infield. The first transaction was trading former Cy Young award winner Robbie Ray to the San Francisco Giants for starting pitcher Anthony Desclafani and former Seattle fan favorite, third baseman Mitch Haniger. Nearly a month later, Desclafani was flipped to the Minnesota Twins alongside relief pitcher Justin Topa and prospects Gabriel Gonzalez and Darren Bowen in exchange for infielder Jorge Polanco. 

In bringing back Haniger, Seattle reclaims one of the stalwarts of their success over the past few seasons, despite his opting to leave for the bay in free agency. Although he played just 57 games in his contract year in 2022, he slashed .253/.318/.485 with 39 home runs in 2021 and had a wOBA (Weighted On Base Average) of over .360 in two-of-the-three priori seasons. With the Giants, Haniger was once again hampered by injuries and even posted a negative WAR in 61 games played. If he’s able to stay healthy, Haniger supplies Seattle with some needed stability in a volatile outfield. Seattle is banking on their young core of starters to keep improving, and on the continued regression of Ray considering he will be fresh off Tommy John surgery.

The addition of Polanco contributes to the vision of a well-rounded roster without any glaring weaknesses. Before the Polanco deal, the Mariners were relying on offensive liabilities Josh Rojas and Luis Urias to start in the infield. With Polanco in the mix, they can not only platoon Rojas and Urias but can also give star shortstop J.P. Crawford a bit more rest. Seattle has given themselves a degree of flexibility that could prove invaluable down the stretch as they seek to preserve their starters’ health for the postseason. Polanco himself has consistently posted an OPS above .750 in his career and is hardly a downgrade from Suarez at third. Furthermore, Polanco and Urias in tandem certainly are an upgrade from Suarez alone, and their acquisition illuminates the Mariners’ desire to improve on the margins to craft a roster devoid of any holes. 

While Topa had a solid season in Seattle’s bullpen last year, the Mariners’ depth at reliever made him expendable. Gonzalez and Bowen are not premier prospects by any means, but they certainly carry some value. Bowen is lagging developmentally as he’s now a 22 year old still in A-Ball but Gonzalez is a 20 year old outfielder in High-A that has a considerable bit of upside, especially offensively. According to Eric Longenhagen from FanGraphs, “I’m not inclined to project a ton on his raw power (108 mph max exit velo in 2023, good for a 19-year-old but below MLB average). He’s going to have to keep raking as he climbs to be an impact regular. It’s more likely he turns into a Harold Ramirez type of role player. 

In the trading of bad contracts, it appears that the Mariners may have won. At least in our monetary value model, the Mariners got the better deal by gaining Desclafani and Haniger. Both players are purely bad contracts but help get the worst of the three contracts out of the organization with Ray. Modeling of these models are as shown below:

Concerning the Polanco trade, it appears like the Mariners may have again lost value. Topa projects to put up similar WAR numbers to that of Polanco over the remainder of his contract, and Polanco is likely to be paid more than he is worth for 2024 and 2025. Additionally, the Twins may have gotten a couple of solid projects, which only adds to the value gained by the Twins. For a team that has Eduoard Julien and Brooks Lee taking up time at second base for the foreseeable future, this is a solid haul for an aging Polanco. 

Conclusion

The Seattle Mariners were in a precarious position going into the offseason. Lodged directly between the tiers of “Playoff Contender” and “Maybe Next Year” they had to make a decision: either go into 2024 with a nearly identical roster and hope for better luck to possibly secure a Wild Card spot, or make significant change to move the needle just slightly further in the right direction, albeit with limited financial resources. They opted for the latter, completely retooling their collection of position players, moving off many of their largest contracts and adapting a mindset of consistency over intermittent starpower. However, in baseball, sometimes less is more, and if various acquisitions due for regression do indeed fail to live up to their 2023 numbers and the young rotation pieces don’t make the jumps asked of them, the Mariners will look back at this offseason with disdain. If the Mariners succeed in 2024 it will be through their ability to outlast the competition. Their lineup will not outslug you, but they may ust score enough runs and put enough pressure on the opposition that their talented rotation and deep bullpen can match. From a projection standpoint, a majority of the Mariners moves lost value for the organization, but only time will tell how Dipoto’s 2023-24 offseason will age.