I am currently a PhD candidate in Economics at Northwestern University. I will be on the 2024-2025 job market.
Contact Information
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 872-203-3319
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2025 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2020
MA, Economics, Tel-Aviv University, 2019. Summa Cum Laude
BA, Economics, The Open University of Israel, 2018. Summa Cum Laude
Fields of Specialization
Research: Microeconomic Theory, Applied Microeconomics
Teaching: Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, Econometrics, Macroeconomics, Mathematics, Statistics
Curriculum Vitae
Job Market Paper
Robust Dynamic Contracts [Paper]
Abstract: Why are simple linear compensation schemes common in long-term relationships, even though complex contracts could potentially mitigate moral hazard? To address this question, I study a dynamic principal-agent model in which the principal faces uncertainty about the agent’s set of available actions and is ambiguity-averse. In response to this uncertainty, the principal offers the agent a contract in each period to maximize the former’s worst-case payoff. I characterize conditions under which simple linear contracts are dynamically optimal when the principal can learn new information about the actions available to the agent, thereby providing a new explanation for the prevalence of linear contracts in practice. Additionally, I characterize the optimal way for the principal to revise the first-period contract and find that it may take one of two forms: the optimal linear contract that would arise in a static environment or a convex combination between the first-period contract and a new linear contract. The latter also includes repetition of the previous contract.
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Working Papers
Not So Cheap-Talk: Communication with Receiver’s Learning [Paper]
Abstract: I study a communication game between a non-committed sender and a receiver who can acquire additional information at a cost after receiving the sender’s message. The sender has state-independent utility, while the receiver aims to choose an action that matches the state of nature. This assumption allows me to simplify the problem significantly and solve for the sender’s optimal communication strategy and the receiver’s optimal learning choices and actions in equilibrium. I characterize conditions under which the sender opts for a babbling strategy and refrains from providing meaningful communication. Furthermore, I show that the receiver chooses to acquire information on the equilibrium path under mild conditions. Finally, I demonstrate that the quality of information (in the Blackwell sense) depends non-monotonically on the receiver’s ability to learn. In particular, when “there is much at stake” for the sender, she prefers to be more informative when the receiver’s ability to learn is limited, making learning and communication “substitutes”. In terms of welfare consequences, it is shown that a totally uninformative equilibrium can be the ex-ante Pareto superior equilibrium.
The Effect of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic on Education Attainment in 20th-Century Spain [Paper]
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the 1918 influenza pandemic on educational attainment in Spain, focusing on changes in student enrollment growth across different fields. The findings reveal a short-term decline in fields with weaker connections to the labor market, such as philosophy and literature, as well as in teacher training programs. This decline suggests a potential shortage of teachers in primary and secondary education in the years following the pandemic. However, the analysis shows that this effect was temporary, as within one to three years, enrollment growth rates returned to pre-pandemic levels. These results highlight the disruption caused by the pandemic but also demonstrate the system’s ability to recover within a relatively short period.
Works in Progress
Experimentation with Voluntary Disclosure (Draft Coming Soon!)
Abstract: I study a dynamic mechanism design in environments where agents can selectively disclose verifiable evidence over time, introducing new strategic considerations for the principal. In many real-world settings, such as contract negotiations or research grant applications, hard evidence may emerge gradually, and agents can strategically withhold or reveal it to influence outcomes. I explore how the availability and disclosure of such evidence shape optimal allocations over multiple periods, given that the designer can experiment with the first-period allocation in order to affect the quality of the evidence the agent possesses. My findings reveal that the designer prefers to smooth the low-type allocations across periods, insulating them from changes in evidence, while high-type agents see their allocations increase with stronger evidence but only above a quality cutoff. Below the cutoff, evidence is being interpreted by the designer as if the agent did not disclose at all. In the first period, I find conditions under which the allocation is distorted in order to induce more informative evidence in the sequel.
Bitcoin: A Mechanism Design Approach
Teaching Experience
Teaching Assistance –
Graduate Microeconomic Theory, ECON 410-3, Spring 2022, Spring 2023, Northwestern University. (Professor Wojciech Olszewski 2022, Professor Alessandro Pavan 2023)
Graduate Microeconomic Theory, ECON 410-2, Winter 2021, Winter 2022, Winter 2023, Winter 2024. Northwestern University. (Professor Marciano Siniscalchi)
Foundations of Mathematical Social Science, MMSS-300, Fall 2021 Northwestern University. (Professor Eddie Dekel)
Intermediate Microeconomics, ECON 310-2, Northwestern University.
Managerial Economics, Kellogg-Recanati Executive MBA Program, Northwestern and Tel Aviv-University, 2019
Intermediate Microeconomics, Tel Aviv University, 2018-2019
Banking and Money, Tel-Aviv University, 2019
European Economic History, Tel-Aviv University, 2019
Graduate Microeconomic Theory, Tel-Aviv University, 2018
Teaching Kickoff Session Leader- Northwestern University, 2023
Kickoff Session Leaders are a dedicated group of graduate students who help introduce incoming TAs, graduate student instructors, and postdoc instructors to learning and teaching at Northwestern University during the Academic Kickoff.
Lecturer –
Intermediate Microeconomics I, Intermediate Macroeconomics II, Econometrics, The Open University of Israel at Ramat-Gan College, 2018-2019
Research Experience
Research Assistant – Professor Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University.
Research Assistant – Professor Harry Pei, Northwestern University.
Research Assistant – Professor Zvika Neeman, Tel-Aviv University.
Awards and Fellowships
Graduate Fellowship, Department of Economics, Northwestern University. 2019-2020.
Distinguished Teaching Assistant Award, Department of Economics, Northwestern University. 2020-2021, 2021-2022.
Distinguished Teaching Award, Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences, nomination by the Economics Department, Northwestern University, 2024
Excellence Scholarship for Academic Achievements, Tel-Aviv University, 2018-2019
President’s List, The Open University of Israel , 2014-2018
References
Professor Alessandro Pavan (Committee Co-Chair)
Professor Marciano Siniscalchi (Committee Co-Chair)
Professor Eddie Dekel (Teaching Reference)
Professor Piotr Dworczak
Professor Yingni Guo