Contact Information
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 847-644-4953
E-mail: ninafluegel@u.northwestern.edu
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2026 (expected)
M.A. , Economics, Northwestern University, 2021
M.Sc., Economics and Social Sciences, Bocconi University, 2020
B.Sc., European Economic Studies, University of Bamberg, 2017
Primary Field of Specialization
Microeconomic Theory
Curriculum Vitae
Job Market Paper
Incentivizing Collaboration
Collaboration has a fundamental incentive problem: Even if teamwork produces synergies, the fruits of one’s labor must typically be shared between team members. Information frictions can lead to collaboration not being incentive compatible even if it would be efficient. In this paper, we study how a mechanism designer can act as a matchmaker of teams to maximize efficient collaboration when agents’ outcome-relevant characteristics are private information. The mechanism designer cannot use transfers, but can propose (possibly stochastic) matchings over two periods. Agents have the outside option of working alone. When the synergy from teamwork is sufficiently high, the optimal mechanism achieves full collaboration. When synergy is low, full collaboration is infeasible. In this case, the optimal mechanism specifies that some agents work alone in the first period with positive probability. Our main result shows that the probability of working in a team in the first period decreases in type, while all types are matched positive assortatively in the second period. The average partner quality types receive in the first period depends on the level of synergy: increasing in type when synergy is moderate, and inverse U-shaped when synergy is very low.
Working Papers
The Commitment Value of Human Capital Investment in Dynamic Contracts
Firms spend vast amounts on on-the-job training, much of which appears ineffective. This paper offers an explanation beyond managerial naivete: limited commitment by employers. We study a two-period adverse selection model in which a principal (employer) can pay a fixed cost to improve an agent’s (employee’s) type, interpreted as providing training. With full commitment, the employer’s willingness to pay for training exceeds the efficient level. Under renegotiation-proof contracts, it can be even higher. The key mechanism is that training operates as a commitment device: by promising future information rents to initially less productive agents, it helps the principal discipline her future self against inefficient renegotiation.
Work in Progress
What Kind of Information Disclosure in Financial Stress Tests
Teaching
Northwestern University
Game Theory I, Undergraduate (MMSS) – Prof. Rogerson, Winter 2024, Winter 2023, Winter 2022
Intermediate Microeconomics, Undergraduate – Prof. Dworczak, Prof. Hornsten, Fall 2024, Fall 2021
Mathematical Methods of Economics Theory, Graduate – Prof. Olszewski, Fall 2024, Fall 2023
Environmental Economics, Undergraduate – Prof Witte, Spring 2022
Monopoly, Competition & Public Policy, Undergraduate – Prof. Hornsten, Winter 2022
University of Bamberg
Intermediate Microeconomics, Undergraduate – Prof. Sahm, Spring/Summer 2016
Download Teaching Evaluations (PDF)
Download Teaching Dossier (PDF)
References
Prof. Jeff Ely (Committee Co-Chair)
Prof. Alessandro Pavan (Committee Co-Chair)
Prof. Wojciech Olszewski
Prof. Bill Rogerson (Teaching)