Contact Information
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
megumi.murakami@u.northwestern.edu
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2024 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2020
MS, Economics, University of Tokyo, 2017
BA, Economics, University of Tokyo, 2015.
Primary Fields of Specialization
Economic History, Game theory
Curriculum Vitae
Job Market Paper
Supply and Demand of Medical Knowledge, Megumi Murakami
This paper studies two millennia of medical history and its stagnant development compared to other natural sciences, using a signaling game. Upon observing signals, two physicians (or the senders) choose either old or new technologies. Then, a unit mass of patients (or the receivers) select one of the two physicians. Depending on parameters, there are three types of pure strategy equilibria, corresponding to the three stages in the evolution of medical technology. Our results identify three contributing factors to the stagnant development of medicine: bias in patients’ beliefs toward the old method, the limited accuracy of physicians’ signals, and intense competition. In particular, intense competition is detrimental to the dissemination of medical knowledge because the physicians tend to stick to the old technology to attract biased patients.
Published paper
Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
Matsui, Akihiko, and Murakami, Megumi. (2022). Mathematical Social Sciences, 120, 50-65.
We study deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrade by formulating a two-stage model where DA is played in the first stage, and a decentralized market opens in the second. Both non-monetary and monetary retrades are considered. Perfect market equilibrium (PME) is defined: market equilibrium prevails in the second stage both on and off the path, and Nash equilibrium is played in the first stage game induced by the second-stage markets. In the economies with no money, the stable and Pareto optimal allocation is the truthful PME allocation if and only if the priority structure is acyclical. A pure PME object allocation is unique if and only if the priority structure is unreversed. In the economies with money, an efficient PME allocation exists if and only if the minimum demand across tangible objects exceeds a certain threshold. A pure PME object allocation is always unique.
Working paper
The Role of An Expert in the Evolution of Conventions
Murakami, Megumi. International Journal of Game Theory, revise and resubmit
This paper explicitly introduces one expert, who makes public recommendations, and analyzes this expert’s influence on the evolution of conventions in a two-by-two coordination game. An equilibrium concept, E-BRD, is defined by utilizing the best response dynamics to study a stable convention. The combination of the expert’s recommendations and the belief updates of individuals leads to unique outcome, in which emerged the Pareto superior convention.
References
Professor Joel Mokyr (Committee Chair)
j-mokyr@northwestern.edu
Professor Walker Hanlon
whanlon@northwestern.edu
Professor Kiminori Matsuyama
k-matsuyama@northwestern.edu