Contact Information
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: 858-666-5265
Email: jinyang2025@u.northwestern.edu
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2025 (expected)
M.A., Economics, Northwestern University, 2021
B.A., Economics, University of California San Diego, 2019
B.S., Probability & Statistics, University of California San Diego, 2019
Primary Fields of Specialization
Industrial Organization
Curriculum Vitae
Job Market Paper
“Price Discrimination and Regulation on a Network: the Case of US Rail Freight Industry”
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This paper studies price discrimination in rail freight transportation, where shippers subject to differential pricing are also interdependent due to economies of scale across the railroad network. Consequently, even shippers facing higher prices can benefit from the increase in demand among the discounted shippers, as it improves scale and decreases cost of shipping for everyone. To evaluate the equilibrium impacts of recently discussed regulations, I estimate a structural model of rail freight markets that incorporates various forms of price discrimination. Results show that a simple ban on third-degree price discrimination reduces overall scale economies by limiting railroads’ ability to offer discounts to their most price elastic shippers. In contrast, more tailored policies that permit selective discrimination can both preserve quantity and mitigate misallocation. In particular, a price benchmark policy that implements reference pricing between small price-taking and large contract-negotiating shippers with similar shipments proves most effective. These findings suggest that refined regulatory designs may better address price discrimination in markets with externalities.
Working Papers
“Hospital Mergers, Physician Allocation, and Matching Efficiency”, with Lydia Cao
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We study patterns in physician allocation following hospital mergers in the US and their implications on healthcare provision. Using Medicare data and the Florida Discharge database, we document that post-merger: (1) More physicians now work simultaneously at both acquiring and target hospitals as multi-homers, who in general see more patients than single-homers, and the change is likely due to the removal of firm boundaries. (2) More physicians move from one side of the merged hospitals to the other, with moves from acquiring to target hospitals occurring more frequently in specialties where the acquirer initially had relatively more physicians than the target. (3) The average number of patients seen per physician rises at target hospitals, and the increase is partially driven by the reallocation of physicians. These findings suggest that hospitals may reorganize their internal organizations post-merger to optimize physician hiring and improve matching efficiency.
Works in Progress
“Entry and Hassle Costs in Online Auctions”, with Junyan Guan
In online auctions, bidders often face both a one-time upfront entry cost, and a continuous hassle cost during the time and effort-consuming bidding process. Both costs reduce participation. Hassle costs also lead to bid shading, as bidders avoid sinking more costs when the auction progresses. This incentive intensifies when competition is stronger and a bidder is less confident of winning. Thus, auction designs that encourage initial participation to mitigate entry costs may inadvertently amplify hassle costs, discouraging continued participation. We develop an empirical model of online ascending auctions with costly entry and bidding that resembles a war of attrition, and apply it to an online used car auction platform. Preliminary estimates suggest that bidders on average incur hassle costs equivalent to 9.3% of their expected payoff. We will next examine counterfactual auction designs on reserve price and information revelation about competition.
“Connect the Dots with Invisible Hands: Early US Railroad Construction under Network Effect”
Free market entry of firms is often excessive due to business stealing externalities (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). However, when positive externalities exist among entrants of related markets, entry may be insufficient. This paper studies these externalities in the context of the private and fragmented early US railroad construction, where a new railroad would increase demand for other connected railroads through network effects. Using a stylized railroad demand model, I show how a railroad’s betweenness centrality within the network affects its profitability and thus predicts entry. Moreover, each entrant also induces changes in the centralities of other railroads, which can reveal the extent of spillover internalization, such as through mergers or Coasean bargaining between private companies. The next step is to estimate this entry model using digitized historical transportation map data.
Teaching
Award: Distinguished Teaching Assistant Award, 2022-2023
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References
Prof. Robert Porter (Committee Chair)
Prof. Vivek Bhattacharya
Prof. Gaston Illanes