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Works in Progress

Can Norm-Based Information Campaigns Reduce Corruption? (with Aaron Erlich)
Under review

Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption? Such campaigns use messaging about how people typically behave (descriptive norms) or ought to behave (injunctive norms). Drawing on survey and lab experiments in Ukraine, we unpack and evaluate these two types of social norms' distinct effects. Four findings emerge: First, injunctive-norm campaigns produce consistent but modest, temporary effects. These may serve as moderately effective, low-cost anti-corruption tools but are unlikely to inspire large-scale behavioral transformations. Second, contrary to recent studies, we find no evidence that either type of norm-based messaging “backfires” by inadvertently encouraging corruption. Third, descriptive-norm campaigns emphasizing corruption’s decline produce relatively large and long-lasting effects—but only among subjects who find these messages credible. Fourth, both types of norm-based messaging have a substantially larger effect on younger citizens. These findings may have broader implications for messaging campaigns, especially those targeting social problems that, like corruption, require mitigation of collective action dilemmas.

Selective Bribery: When Do Citizens Engage in Corruption?” (with Aaron Erlich and Simeon Nichter)
Under review

Corruption often persists not only because public officials take bribes, but also because many citizens are willing to pay them. Yet even in countries with endemic corruption, few people always pay bribes. Why do citizens bribe in some situations but not in others? Integrating insights from both principal-agent and collective action approaches to the study of corruption, we develop an analytical framework for understanding selective bribery. Our framework reveals how citizens' motivations, costs, and risks influence their willingness to engage in corruption. A conjoint experiment conducted in Ukraine in 2020 provides substantial corroboration for 10 of 11 pre-registered predictions. By shedding light on conditions that dampen citizens' readiness to pay bribes, our findings offer insights into the types of institutional reforms that may reduce corruption.

“Corruption and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Commercial Court System” (with David Szakonyi)

Corruption is often rampant within state bureaucracies and judicial systems, yet we know little about its micro-level consequences on policymaking and the provision of public goods. In this paper, we investigate how corruption shapes property rights protection in one prominent autocracy: Russia. First, we use income and asset disclosures to construct novel individual-level measures of corruption for 366 commercial court judges working in and around Moscow. Then, drawing on data from more than 400,000 court cases heard between 2011-2018, we leverage random assignment of cases to judges to show that corrupt judges are much more likely to find in favor of private firms in their disputes with government agencies. Not only are these decisions of lower judicial quality, but they tend to favor disreputable firms. In contrast to existing studies’ emphasis on political pressure’s impact on Russian court cases, we show that judicial corruption enables firms to capture the state, depriving it of financial resources and undermining the rule of law.

“The Effects of International Educational Exchange Programs on Attitudes About the United States, Democracy, and Corruption

US government-sponsored international educational exchanges are a key tool of public diplomacy. By providing high school or university students from other countries with the opportunity to reside in the U.S., these programs have the potential to favorably shape attitudes about the American people and about democracy more broadly. Additionally, for students from regions with endemic corruption, cross-cultural immersion in an environment where bribery and graft are less common may shift expectations about corruption's inevitability, catalyzing anti-corruption efforts upon return to their home countries. To date, however, empirical evidence about international exchanges' impact on the attitudes of program participants is limited. Leveraging similarities between Eurasian high school students selected for a highly competitive State Department-funded exchange program to spend a year in the U.S. and students who reached the final round of the program's selection process but ultimately were not selected, this paper analyzes the impact of such programs on attitudes toward the U.S., democracy, and corruption. The findings indicate that program participants returned to their home countries with more favorable views of America and of democratic political systems, as well as a greater willingness to engage in efforts to curb corruption.

“Citizen Perspectives of Corruption Harms: Evidence from Armenia” (with Aaron Erlich, Arne Holverscheid, and Simeon Nichter)

In nearly all countries, the majority of citizens believe that corruption is harmful. But corruption takes many forms — e.g., involving police vs. healthcare, high-level vs. low-level officials, and bribery vs. embezzlement — and their effects may differ. Different forms of corruption also may cause distinct types of harms. Citizens may perceive some corruption to be particularly harmful to their families, and other corruption to be especially pernicious for the economy, political institutions, or the moral fabric of society. Drawing on a conjoint experiment in Armenia, this paper distinguishes between key features of corruption and examines how citizens perceive their specific types of harms. Our preliminary results demonstrate the fruitfulness of disaggregated analyses, both for scholars seeking to better conceptualize corruption and its consequences, and for policymakers seeking to identify and target the types of corruption their citizens find most damaging. Our research design points to the feasibility of developing diagnostic tools that facilitate the formulation of customized anti-corruption strategies.

“The Triple Threat to Property Rights: Credible Commitment Dilemmas, Principal-Agent Problems, and Private Coercion”

Although prominent studies portray predatory rulers as the primary threat to property rights, lower-level state officials and unlawful private actors pose equally severe challenges. Secure property rights require mechanisms that (1) credibly constrain rulers, (2) resolve principal-agent problems between rulers and bureaucrats, and (3) reduce firms’ reliance on private coercion. Analyzing a formal model of this “triple threat” reveals three key findings. First, rulers’ credible commitment to respect property is insufficient to deter threats from lower-level officials and private actors. Second, lower-level officials’ predation and private actors’ coercion not only directly threaten property rights but also exacerbate rulers’ credible commitment dilemmas. Third, property security frequently depends more on state capacity than on constraining rulers. These findings suggest that a narrow focus on credible commitment underestimates threats to property rights, shedding light on why many countries struggle to secure property and build rule of law, even when rulers are institutionally constrained.

Ongoing Data Collection Projects

“War’s Impact on the State, Civil Society, and Democratic Governance: A Panel Survey in Wartime Ukraine” (with Timothy Frye and Oleksandra Keudel)

“The ‘New’ Area Studies: The Role of Regional Expertise in Contemporary Political Science” (with Daniel Gingerich and Tom Pepinsky)