Upcoming Presentations
- Applied Epistemology Workshop, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, NC), August, 2024
- Exploring and Realizing the Right to Be Known, Canadian Museum for Human Rights (Manitoba, CA), September, 2024
- World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research Conference, University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA), September, 2024
- Sellars Lecture, Bucknell University (Lewisburg, PA), October, 2024
- University of California (Berkeley, CA), October, 2024
- Ohio State University (Columbus, OH), November, 2024
- Conference on Epistemic Injustice (Tokyo, Japan), December, 2024
- Tulane University (New Orleans, LA), January, 2025
- University of Texas (Austin, TX), January, 2025
- Stanford University (Palo Alto, CA), February, 2025
- Epistemic Reparations and Carceral Injustice (Evanston & Chicago), March, 2025
- Spinoza Chair Lectures (Amsterdam, Netherlands), April & May, 2025
Selected Publications
Authored Books
Criminal Testimonial Injustice (2023). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Epistemology of Groups (2021). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (2008, hardback; 2010, paperback). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reviewed in Mind, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, The Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, and Philosophy Now
Edited Books
Applied Epistemology (2021). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volume of all new articles on a range of issues in applied epistemology. This collection includes papers by Karen Frost-Arnold; Kristie Dotson and Ezgi Sertler; Mylan Engel Jr.; Alexander Guerrero; Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Bianca Crewe; Veronica Ivy; Michael Patrick Lynch and Hanna Gunn; Quill R. Kukla; Jennifer Lackey; Lauren Leydon-Hardy; Hallie Liberto; Aidan McGlynn; José Medina and Tempest Henning; Charles Mills; and Geoff Pynn.
Academic Freedom (2018). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volume of all new articles on the topic of academic freedom. This collection includes papers by David Estlund; Michael Patrick Lynch; Mary Kate McGowan; Michele M. Moody-Adams; Martha C. Nussbaum; Philip Pettit; John Protevi; Jennifer Saul; Robert Simpson and Amia Srinivasan; and Brian Weatherson.
Essays in Collective Epistemology (2014). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volume of all new articles in collective epistemology. This collection includes papers by Alexander Bird; Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden Fitelson; David Christensen; Margaret Gilbert and Daniel Pilchman; Alvin I. Goldman; Jennifer Lackey; Christian List; Philip Pettit; Ernest Sosa; and Sarah Wright.
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (2013), co-edited with David Christensen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of disagreement. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi; David Christensen; Stewart Cohen; Bryan Frances; Sanford Goldberg; John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan; Thomas Kelly; Jonathan Kvanvig; Jennifer Lackey; Ernest Sosa; and Brian Weatherson.
The Epistemology of Testimony (2006), co-edited with Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of testimony. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi; C. A. J. Coady; Elizabeth Fricker; Richard Fumerton; Sanford Goldberg; Peter Graham; Jennifer Lackey; Keith Lehrer; Richard Moran; Frederick Schmitt; Ernest Sosa; and James Van Cleve.
Selected Papers
“Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2022).
“Norms of Criminal Conviction,” Philosophical Issues (2021): DOI: 10.1111/phis.12199.
“Eyewitness Testimony and Epistemic Agency,” Noûs (2021). DOI: 10.1111/nous.12380.
“Preemption and the Problem of the Predatory Expert,” Philosophical Topics (2021) 49: 133–50.
“When Should We Disagree About Politics?,” in Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 280–96.
“Echo Chambers, Fake News, and Social Epistemology,” in Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree, and Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 206–27.
“False Confessions and Subverted Agency,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 89 (2021): 11–35.
“Sexual Consent and Epistemic Agency,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021): 321–47.
“Epistemic Duties Regarding Others,” in Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford (eds), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. (Routledge, 2020): 281–94.
“Punishment and Transformation,” in Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020): 230–53.
“Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (2020): 185–208.
“False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 110 (2020): 43–68.
“Assertoric Quality,” in Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.45.
“The Duty to Object,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2018): doi: 10.1111/phpr.12563.
“Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods,” in Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. (Springer Publishing, 2018): 145–168.
“Academic Freedom,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 3–20.
“Silence and Objecting,” in Casey Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. (Routledge, 2018): 82–96.
“Group Lies,” in Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018: 262–284).
“Experts and Peer Disagreement,” in Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 228–245.
“Group Assertion.” Erkenntnis (2018): 21–42.
“Collective Epistemology,” in Kirk Ludwig and Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality (Routledge, 2017): 196–208.
“The Epistemology of Testimony and Religious Belief,” in William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 203–220.
“Norms of Credibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2017): 323–337.
“What Is Justified Group Belief?” The Philosophical Review 125 (2016): 341–396.
“Assertion and Expertise.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2016): 509–517.
“Socially Extended Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 24 (2014): 282–298.
“Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously,” in Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 299–316.
“A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 64–94.
“Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce.” Analysis 73 (2013): 236–248.
“Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 243–268.
“Deficient Testimonial Knowledge,” in Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work (New York: Routledge, 2013): 30–52.
“Group Knowledge Attributions,” in Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 243–269.
“Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge,” in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 251–275.
“Disagreement, Epistemology of,” Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2010).
“Acting on Knowledge.” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 361–382.
“A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 298–325.
“What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 274–293.
“Knowledge and Credit.” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 27–42.
“What Luck Is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 255–267.
“Norms of Assertion.” Noûs 41 (2007): 594–626.
“Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158 (2007): 345–361.
“Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 209–219.
“Learning from Words.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 77–101.
Winner of the 2005 Young Epistemologist Prize.
“It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 160–189.
“The Nature of Testimony.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 177–197.
“Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.” Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 163–190.
“Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 636–658.
“A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Noûs 37 (2003): 706–723.
“Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471–490.