Research

Upcoming Presentations

• Epistemic Injustice in the Aftermath of Collective Wrongdoing (Bern, Switzerland), December 2019

• University of Zurich (Zurich, Switzerland), December 2019

• Epistemic Injustice and Blame Workshop (Glasgow, Scotland), December 2019

• Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (Philadelphia, PA), January 2020

• Royal Institute of Philosophy (London, England), January 2020

• University of Lisbon (Lisbon, Portugal), February 2020

• University of Leeds (Leeds, England), March 2020

• Chicagoland Graduate Conference (Chicago, IL), April 2020

• Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop (Orange Beach, AL), May 2020

• Social Epistemology Network Events (SENE) Conference, Yale University (New Haven, CT), June 2020

• Cross-Linguistic Disagreement Conference (Kanazawa, Japan), June 2020

• European Epistemology Network (Glasgow, Scotland), June 2020

• Aristotelian and Mind Association Joint Sessions (Canterbury, England), July 2020

• German Philosophy Association, Epistemology of Fake News Colloquium (Erlangen, Bavaria), September 2020

• Princeton Project in Philosophy and Religion (Princeton, NJ), October 2020

• University of Miami (Miami, FL), November 2020

• New Mexico State University (Las Cruces, NM), March 2021

Selected Publications

Authored Books

• The Epistemology of Groups (under contract). Oxford University Press.

• Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, (2008, hardback; 2010, paperback). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Reviewed in Mind, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, The Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, and Philosophy Now

Edited Books

• Applied Epistemology (under contract). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Volume of all new articles on a range of issues in applied epistemology. This collection includes papers by Karen Frost-Arnold; Kristie Dotson and Ezgi Sertler; Mylan Engel Jr.; Alexander Guerrero; Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Bianca Crewe; Michael Patrick Lynch and Hanna Gunn; Rebecca Kukla; Jennifer Lackey; Lauren Leydon-Hardy; Hallie Liberto; Aidan McGlynn; Rachel McKinnon; Ishani Maitra; José Medina and Tempest Henning; Charles Mills; and Geoff Pynn.

• Academic Freedom (2018). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Volume of all new articles on the topic of academic freedom. This collection includes papers by David Estlund; Michael Patrick Lynch; Mary Kate McGowan; Michele M. Moody-Adams; Martha C. Nussbaum; Philip Pettit; John Protevi; Jennifer Saul; Robert Simpson and Amia Srinivasan; and Brian Weatherson.

• Essays in Collective Epistemology (2014). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Volume of all new articles in collective epistemology. This collection includes papers by Alexander Bird; Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden Fitelson; David Christensen; Margaret Gilbert and Daniel Pilchman; Alvin I. Goldman; Jennifer Lackey; Christian List; Philip Pettit; Ernest Sosa; and Sarah Wright.

•  The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (2013), co-edited with David Christensen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of disagreement. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi; David Christensen; Stewart Cohen; Bryan Frances; Sanford Goldberg; John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan; Thomas Kelly; Jonathan Kvanvig; Jennifer Lackey; Ernest Sosa; and Brian Weatherson.

•  The Epistemology of Testimony (2006), co-edited with Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of testimony. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi; C. A. J. Coady; Elizabeth Fricker; Richard Fumerton; Sanford Goldberg; Peter Graham; Jennifer Lackey; Keith Lehrer; Richard Moran; Frederick Schmitt; Ernest Sosa; and James Van Cleve.

Selected Papers

• “False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice,” forthcoming in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.

• “The Total Evidence View of the Epistemology of Sexual Consent,” forthcoming in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

• “Punishment and Transformation,” forthcoming in Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler (eds.), New Essays on Transformative Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

• “Assertoric Quality,” forthcoming in Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

• “When Should We Disagree about Politics?” forthcoming in Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology.

• “The Duty to Object,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2018): doi: 10.1111/phpr.12563.

• “Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods,” in Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. (Springer Publishing, 2018): 145–168.

• “Academic Freedom,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 3–20.

• “Silence and Objecting,” in Casey Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. (Routledge, 2018): 82–96.

• “Group Lies,” in Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018: 262–284).

• “Experts and Peer Disagreement,” in Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 228–245.

• “Group Assertion.” Erkenntnis (2018): 21–42.

• “Collective Epistemology,” in Kirk Ludwig and Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality (Routledge, 2017): 196–208.

• “The Epistemology of Testimony and Religious Belief,” forthcoming in William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 203–220.

• “Norms of Credibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2017): 323–337.

• “What Is Justified Group Belief?” The Philosophical Review 125 (2016): 341–396.

• “Assertion and Expertise.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2016): 509–517.

• “Socially Extended Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 24 (2014): 282–298.

• “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously,” in Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 299–316.

• “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 64–94.

• “Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce.” Analysis 73 (2013): 236–248.

• “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 243–268.

• “Deficient Testimonial Knowledge,” in Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work (New York: Routledge, 2013): 30–52.

• “Group Knowledge Attributions,” in Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 243–269.

• “Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge,” in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 251–275.

• “Disagreement, Epistemology of,” Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2010).

• “Acting on Knowledge.” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 361–382.

• “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 298–325.

• “What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 274–293.

• “Knowledge and Credit.” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 27–42.

• “What Luck Is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 255–267.

• “Norms of Assertion.” Noûs 41 (2007): 594–626.

• “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 158 (2007): 345–361.

• “Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 209–219.

• “Learning from Words.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 77–101.
  • Winner of the 2005 Young Epistemologist Prize.

• “It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 160–189.

• “The Nature of Testimony.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 177–197.

• “Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection.” Philosophical Studies 126 (2005): 163–190.

• “Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 636–658.

• “A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Noûs 37 (2003): 706–723.

• “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 471–490.