Download my papers here. ORCID ID.

Work in Progress:

Living with Doubt

Considers problems that arise for fallibilism having to do with epistemic possibility and the relation between knowledge and action; presents new arguments for skepticism; and offers a new perspective on the value of knowledge, the nature of the epistemic goal, the nature of doubt, and our best prospects for living with ineliminable doubts.

Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere (co-editor with AK Flowerree), under contract with Routledge

New essays on the nature of the epistemic from a variety of perspectives, including traditional, social, formal, and normative epistemology. Contributors include Jessica Brown, Stewart Cohen, Kenny Easwaran and Reuben Stern, AK Flowerree, Richard Fumerton, Hilary Kornblith, Jennifer Lackey, Michael P. Lynch, Miriam McCormick, Kate Nolfi, Baron Reed, Martin Smith, Deborah Perron Tollefsen, Daniel Whiting, and Timothy Williamson.


“Epistemic Psychology” (For Towards an Expansive Epistemology)

Published Work:

     Edited Volumes:

Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (co-editor with Diego Machuca), Bloomsbury (2018). 55 new essays on skepticism, representing both historical and contemporary approaches. Includes essays on Ancient, Medieval, Early Modern, Modern, and Twentieth-Century figures, both Western and non-Western, as well as essays on contemporary arguments for, and reactions to, skepticism.

Epistemic Agency (Philosophical Issues 23), Wiley-Blackwell (2013): new essays on epistemic agency, the epistemic goal, value of truth, etc.


“Skepticism as a Way of Life,” The Mystery of Skepticism, ed. by Kevin McCain and Ted Poston (2019), Brill: 63–80.

“General Introduction” (with D. Machuca), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (2018), Bloomsbury, xiii–xvi.

“Introduction to Modern Philosophy,” Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (2018), Bloomsbury, 273–282.

“Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy,” Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. by Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (2018), Bloomsbury, 523–534.

“Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief” Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, ed. by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting (2018), Oxford University Press, 200–220.

“Having to Do with Knowledge,” Episteme 13 (2016): 549–554.

“Who Knows?” Performance Epistemology, ed. by Miguel Ángel Fernández (2016), Oxford University Press, 106–123.

“Reasons for Reasons,” Episteme 12 (2015): 241–247.

“Skepticism and Perception,” Oxford Handbook of Perception, ed. by Mohan Matthew (2015), Oxford University Press, 106–123.

“Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know,” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd ed., ed. by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell (2014), pp. 95–106.

“Historical Reflections: Sosa’s Perspective on the Epistemological Tradition,” Virtuous Thoughts: Essays on the Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, ed. by John Turri, Springer (2013), pp. 205–224.

“Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency,”Epistemic Agency (Philosophical Issues 23) (2013): 40–69.

“Knowledge, Doubt, and Circularity,” Synthese 188 (2012): 273–287.

“Resisting Encroachment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 465–472.

“Fallibilism,” Philosophy Compass 7/9 (2012): 585–596.

“Skepticism, History of,” Oxford Bibliographies Online (2011). doi: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0110.

“A Defense of Stable Invariantism,” Noûs 44 (2010): 224–244.

“Self-Knowledge and Rationality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2010): 164–181.

“A New Argument for Skepticism,” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 91–104.

“Certainty,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

“The Long Road to Skepticism,” The Journal of Philosophy 104 (2007): 236–262.

“Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 186–197.

“Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless,” Synthese 148 (2006): 303–308.

“Accidentally Factive Mental States,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 134–142.

“The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23 (2002): 147–180.

“How to Think about Fallibilism,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 143–157.

“Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001): 507–526.

“Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification,” The Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 57–67.


Review of Linda Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority (Oxford University Press, 2013), Philosophical Review 124 (2015): 159–162.

Review of Stephen Hetherington’s How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2015): 616–619.

Review of Bryan Frances’s Scepticism Comes Alive (Oxford, 2005), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (April 2006).

Review of N.M.L. Nathan’s The Price of Doubt (Routledge, 2001), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2005): 735–739.