Contact Information
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
Email: anastasiiaE@u.northwestern.edu
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2025 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2021
BS.c., Economics, Cum Laude, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 2019
Primary Fields of Specialization
Industrial Organization
Secondary Fields of Specialization
Health Economics
Curriculum Vitae
Job Market Paper
“Information Distortion in Label Design in the Over-the-Counter Drugs Market: ”
This paper integrates a randomized controlled trial and structural analysis to investigate how misconceptions about drug efficacy distort consumer decisions in the over-the-counter market and how clearer information can improve consumer welfare. A key challenge is that beliefs about efficacy are unobservable, which complicates the assessment of consumers’ initial perceptions and responses to new information. To address this, I gathered pairwise product comparisons from a control group and three treatment arms to develop product-level measures of efficacy beliefs. The first two treatments modify product labels to indicate whether drugs share the same active components or offer equivalent efficacy, while the third provides consumers with a brochure outlining both aspects before making purchase decisions. To document consumer choice responses to each information treatment, I first use control group data, supported by NielsenIQ data, to estimate a structural demand model that separately identifies the weight consumers place on beliefs about efficacy while accounting for heterogeneous preferences. I then incorporate the revised beliefs to document demand and supply responses to the information treatments. The results show that all treatments reduce information distortions and enhance welfare by increasing substitution between products with same and different active components. The most effective treatment—emphasizing equivalent efficacy—increases substitution elasticities by on average 22%, saves the average consumer $1.09 and generates a welfare gain of $1.20 per consumer. It results in $6.5 million annually savings across the 50 largest markets. However, this approach also leads to second-degree price discrimination based on the symptom label preferences, highlighting the need for careful policy.
Other Papers
“Does the Internet Improve Health Behavior? Costly Information Acquisition Under Heterogeneity in Risk Perception”
No one can remain neutral regarding health information about their conditions. While some focus on the worst-case scenario, others seek justifications for not visiting the doctor. The complexity and diversity of current online health information (OHI) cater to both groups. This paper explains this behavior through the modification of the information acquisition model and further examines its relationship with healthcare utilization. It introduces a rational inattention model with a modified cost function that accounts for individual heterogeneity in perceiving the absence of illness. The model demonstrates that information acquisition costs are influenced by individuals’ concerns about overlooking signs of illness, causing information sources to act as thought accelerators rather than purely educational material. Empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework. First, the data shows that OHI usage generally leads to higher healthcare utilization. Second, OHI users who are concerned about missing illness signs use healthcare services more than those less worried. Third, the statistically insignificant difference in how OHI affects healthcare usage between groups that might benefit from increased concern and those that do not suggests that patients’ overconfidence, rather than knowledgeable worry, drives higher healthcare use. These findings raise critical policy questions about managing OHI-induced overconfidence and offer recommendations for enhancing physician–patient interactions in the context of OHI.
Work in Progress
”Innovation Acquisition and Conflict of Interest in the VI Healthcare Systems”, with Zakaria El Amrani El
This study aims to investigate the potential market failure caused by physician-hospital integration, specifically the roll-out of new beneficial procedures for Medicare patients, and suggest potential changes to Medicare’s new technology reimbursement system. Our hypothesis is that unequal reimbursement policies may lead to conflicts of interest, where the party with greater negotiating power—often the hospital—becomes the dominant decision maker. If a procedure is unprofitable for the hospital, its implementation may be slow down or its costs redistributed across other consumers.
”Promotional Activity Under Information Smattering”
This paper discuss theoretically and empirically second degree price discrimination under the condition when companies use pricing strategies to prevent consumers form learning about equivalence in quality.
References
Prof. David Dranove (Committee Chair)
Prof. Gaston Illanes
Prof. Molly Schnell