by Lamin Kieta, graduate student in political science, Northwestern University
Gambian president Adama Barrow won a second term in the December 4, 2021, presidential election. According to
results released by the chair of the Independent Electoral Commission late on December 5, Barrow’s National People’s
Party (NPP) received 457,519 votes—or 53 percent—of the 859,567 total votes cast. The two leading opposition candidates, who polled at 27.7 percent and 11 percent, respectively, immediately disputed the results, claiming irregularities. Gambia’s electoral results reflect a broader trend in African elections in which incumbent presidents win more than Barrow’s 53 percent of the overall vote. Looking at results like these, it is easy to see why African elections are often critiqued as expensive exercises in political theater, where the highest bidder takes all, denying any real hope that voters will see any substantive change in leadership.
However, elections can have significant positive and negative effects, whether or not they result in a new president. By way of explanation, I will depart from anecdotes and depend on data and science to theorize on what helps an incumbent president succeed and why the opponents fail. As I discussed in “President Barrow Is a Corporatist-Strategist,” my 2021 interview in The Standard, Barrow and his NPP political allies moved expeditiously to respond to challenges. Their political ideology advocates a complex system of close-knit corporate groups in business, labor, the security forces, and grassroots associations that hold common interests.
This corporatist-strategic approach helped Barrow leverage and exploit the country’s endemic poverty. For example, he raised the hopes of average Gambians—who can barely afford two square meals a day—by promising to raise wages to 3,000 dalasi (US$57.31) per month and provide ambulances, milling machines, rice, and other foodstuffs. Meanwhile, he deflected the opposition’s criticism by co-opting more moderate groups from among both minority and majority ethnic groups. The strategic procedures started shortly before voter registration and continued throughout the electoral campaign. Thus, Barrow exploited infrastructural powers that allowed him to be involved in massive voter registration efforts as well as in mobilizing the vote, especially in opposition strongholds. In addition, his ability to dole out out new cars to his supporters and the security force demonstrated his embeddedness within the population. The outcome of the election demonstrates why journalists and researchers must focus on the entire electoral process—from voter registration to vote tallying. We need to pay more attention to how elections drive controversy and change the focus of government policy even in situations where the opposition never wins. A free and fair electoral process does not stop at counting the votes; other factors worthy of scrutiny include the incumbent’s unparalleled access to the state media and his misuse or misappropriation of state vehicles and government patronage resources. This effectively means that the opposition parties are fighting with one hand tied behind their backs. This explains why the crowds at events sponsored by the United Democratic Party and other major opposition groups do not translate into equitable votes. What went wrong?
African elections are confusing, and presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Uganda have likely played out like Gambia’s. The more popular the opposition leaders become, the more tricks and complex electoral maneuvers governments will deploy. It may be said that if electoral manipulation were a sport, the marble system—Gambia’s archaic voting method—would be the Olympic champion. Nevertheless, even though Barrow won reelection, the electoral engagement can still profoundly affect Barrow’s policy. Barrow must understand that staying in power is far easier and cheaper if he gets some votes legitimately. At the same time, the opposition parties need to bolster their political organization, means of communication, and embeddedness in the communities—assets that are essential in any democratic multiparty system for boosting legitimacy and
chances of success. If future elections are conducted under the climate of genuine democratic process, then Gambia should set a stage that replicates an electoral process that is transparent, free, and fair.
Lamin Keita, a political science graduate student whose dissertation research focuses on the local politics of radicalization in
West Africa, served as an election observer in last year’s Gambian presidential election.
This piece ran in the PAS Newsletter Winter 2022, 32.2