I am a PhD candidate in economics at Northwestern University.  I am working with Prof. Asher Wolinsky, Bruno Strulovici, and Wojciech Olszewski.

I specialize in microeconomic theory.

I obtained my BA in economics and BS in math from Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2016 and my MS in economics from Toulouse School of Economics in 2018.  I worked with Prof. Takuro Yamashita there.

Here is my CV.

Contact: xiaoyun.qiu@u.northwestern.edu

I no longer update this website. Here is my personal website.

Linkedin     NBER    ResearchGate   Google scholar

Working papers

• Contests as optimal mechanisms under signal manipulation, with Yingkai Li  [paper(latest)]  [poster]  [slides] [arxiv]

  • presented at 34th Stony Brook Game Theory Conference

• Moral hazard in machine learning contests: model development vs parameter tuning, with Yingkai Li, Haifeng Xu, Yang Yu

• A Bang-Bang stochastic control problem with two dimensional state space (notes availbale upon request), revised on Feb 15, 2022

  • Previously titled `Learning and Communication in a Changing world’, presented in NW student research seminar

• Gender norms and collective action in ancient societies: theory and evidence, with Kaman Lyu, Nov 2021 (draft available upon request)

• Suppressing second opinion out of paternalistic motive, May 2021, presented in NW student research seminar (under revision, slides available upon request)

Publication

Estimating selection models without an instrument with Stata, Stata Journal 2020, vol. 20, issue 2, 297-308, with Xavier D’Haultfœuille, Arnaud Maurel, Yichong Zhang [paper]

Other work

• Optimal allocation with costly verification and correlated types, master thesis, advised by Prof. Takuro Yamashita, Jun 18, 2018

Abstract: This thesis considers the optimal mechanism under dominant strategy incentive compatibility and correlated types based on the mdoel setting in Ben-Porath et al. (2014), where they consider the Bayesian framework and independent types. Under dominant strategy, the framework is largely enriched by introducing the concept of shaded area of the favored agent, a set of reported types with which other agents have no chance to receive the object. We have shown that optimal mechanisms are randomizations over the class of optimal multi favored agents mechanisms. Assuming types are independent, we have derived that optimal multi favored agent mechanism is indeed solo favored agent mechanisms with single threshold, which is the so-called favored agent mechanism in Ben-Porath et al. (2014). The selection of optimal favored agents becomes more complicated with the dependence structure. When I=2, optimal multi favored agent mechanisms are solo favored agent mechanisms with possibly multiple thresholds.

My name

Xiaoyun represents two characters 晓云 in Chinese. It means morning cloud. The mandarin pronunciation can be found here.

An easier way is to call me Yun 云, which means cloud.