RESEARCH

COMPLETED WORKING PAPERS

“Information acquisition from extremely biased agents in a dynamic setting” with Yijun Liu, November 2023

“Equilibrium Existence in Independent Private-Value First- Price Auctions” with Philip Reny and Ron Siegel, December 2023 (on R&R for Econometrica)

“Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions” with Kala Krishna, Sergey Lychagin, Ron Siegel and Chloe Tergiman, January 2024 (resubmitted to the Review of Economics Studies)

You may wish to have a look at VOX EU column about this paper at

https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/reducing-college-admissions-stress

“A Tarski-Kantorovich Theorem for Correspondences” with Lukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Lukasz Woźny, June 2023

“Iterative Monotone Comparative Statics” with Lukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Lukasz Woźny, November 2023

“Efficient dynamic allocations in endowment economies with linear utilities and private information,” with Mikhail Safronov, December 2021

“Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games,” with Sidartha Gordon, Navin Kartik, Pei-yu Lo, and Joel Sobel, October 2023

“The Market for Narcotics. Is there a Case for Regulatory Policy?”, Mimeo, Princeton University, September 1998

PUBLISHED (OR FORTHCOMING) PAPERS

[45] “Robust Relational Contracts with Subjective Performance Evaluation” with V. Bhaskar and Thomas Wiseman, Theoretical Economics, conditionally accepted

[44] “Equilibrium Existence in Contests” with Ron Siegel, Journal of Mathematical Economics 104 (2023), Article 104804

[43] “Equilibrium Existence in Games with Ties,” with Ron Siegel, Theoretical Economics, 18 (2023), 481-502. An online appendix

[42] “A result on convergence of sequences of iteration, with applications to best-response dynamics,” Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2022), 2333-2343.

[41] “Demand Cycles and Heterogeneous Conformity Preferences,” with Leonie Baumann, Journal of Economic Theory 194 (2021), Article 105252 An online appendix

[40] “On sequences of iterations of increasing and continuous mappings on complete lattices,” Games and Economic Behavior 126 (2021), 453-459.

[39] “Preferences and Information Processing under Vague Information,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 94 (2021), Article 102461.

[38] “On convergence of sequences in complete lattices,” Order 38 (2021), 251-255.

[37] “A theory of citations,” Research in Economics (2020), 74, 193-212.

[36] “Large Contests without Single-Crossing”, with Ron Siegel, Economic Theory, forthcoming

[35] “Performance-Maximizing Large Contests,” with Ron Siegel, Theoretical Economics (2020), 15, 57-88.

[34] “Bid Caps in Large Contests,” with Ron Siegel, Games and Economic Behavior, (2019), 115, 101-112.

[33] “Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors,” with Mikhail Safronov, Theoretical Economics, (2018), 15, 951–978.

[32] “Efficient chip strategies in repeated games,” with Mikhail Safronov, Theoretical Economics, (2018), 15, 1191–1232.

[31] “Large Contests,” with Ron Siegel, Econometrica, (2016), 86, 835-854.

[30] “Search for an object with two attributes,” with Asher Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory, (2016), 161, 145-160.

[29] “Simultaneous Selection”, with Rakesh Vohra, Discrete Applied Mathematics, (2016), 200, 161-169.

[28] “A More General Pandora Rule?” with Richard Weber, Journal of Economic Theory, (2015), 160, 429-437.

An originally submitted version of the paper, which contains additional material can be found in arXiv.

[27] “Selecting a discrete portfolio”, with Rakesh Vohra, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014), 55, 69-73.

[26] “Attributes”, with Diego Klabljan and Asher Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, (2014), 88, 190-206.

[25] “Calibration and Expert Testing, a chapter for Handbook of Game Theorey, Volume IV”.

[24] “Effective Persuasion”, with Ying Chen, International Economic Review, (2014), 319-347.

[23] “Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall and (Almost) Perfect Monitoring”, with George Mailath, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 71, 174-192. An unpublished addendum

[22] “The principal-agent approach to testing experts”, with Marcin Peski, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 89-113.

[21] “A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2011), 3, 174-213.

[20] “Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal”, with Drew Fudenberg, Games and Economic Behavior, (2011), 72, 86-99.

[19] “Falsifiability”, with Alvaro Sandroni, American Economic Review, (2011), 101, 788-818.

[18] “A Model of Consumption-Dependent Temptation”, Theory and Decisions, (2011), 70, 83-93.

[17] “Manipulability of Comparative Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, (2009), 106, 5029-5034.

[16] “How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring?”, with Johannes Hörner, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2009), 124, 1773-1814.

[15] “Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Mathematics of Operations Research, (2009), 34, 57-70.

[14] “Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Econometrica, (2008), 76, 1437-1466.

[13] “A Non-Manipulable Test”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Annals of Statistics, (2009), 37, 1013-1039.

[12] “A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games”, Economics Bulletin, (2007), 58 (3), 1-16.

[11] “A Non-Differentiable Approach to Revenue Equivalence”, with Kim-Sau Chung, Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 469-487.

[10] “Contracts and Uncertainty”, with Alvaro Sandroni, Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 1-13.

[9] “Preferences over Sets of Lotteries”, Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007), 567-595.

[8] “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring”, with Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 74 (2006), 1499-1544.

[7] “Rich Language and Refinements of Cheap-Talk Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006), 164-186.

[6] “Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games” with Jeff Ely and Johannes Hörner, Econometrica 73 (2005), 377-415. An unpublished appendix “Dispensibility of Public Randomization Device”

[5] “Informal Communication”, Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 180-200.

[4] “Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods” with Howard Rosenthal, Journal of Public Economic Theory 6 (2004), 707-735.

[3] “Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Provision of Excludable Public Goods”, Games Econonic Behavior 46 (2004), 88-114.

[2] “A Simple and General Solution to King Solomon’s Problem”, Games Econonic Behavior 42 (2003), 315-318.

[1] “Perfect Folk Theorems. Does Public Randomization Matter?” International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 147-156.

OLDER MATHEMATICAL PUBLICATIONS

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