How we do things with declaratives
Every natural language can assemble words into a declarative sentence. We perform a variety of actions with these sentences. This book is about how. I identify four effects that the use of a declarative characteristically has, pinpoint the cognitive processes that cause these effects, and explain what we do with declaratives with respect to these effects and their causes. Along the way, new and familiar conclusions are drawn.
This book is under contract with Oxford University Press. If you are interested in taking a peek, feel free to email me for the latest draft.
Chapter 1, Introduction
I clarify what distinguishes declaratives. I defend that declaratives are distinct because they contribute a proposition as a result of semantic composition.
Chapter 2, Explaining effects, explaining causes
I clarify my methodology in investigating how we do things with declaratives. I argue that theorizing should not just consider conversational-level effects, but also consider the psychological causes that give rise to those effects.
Chapter 3, The eventuality effect
After a speaker’s use of a declarative, a hearer forms a representation of the speech event. This effect is the result of event cognition. It underwrites the interpretation of words that require the representation of the speech event.
Chapter 4, The attitude effect
In responding to the use of a declarative, a hearer attributes a propositional attitude to the speaker. This effect is the result of mindreading. I argue from empirical considerations that knowledge is the attitude attributed by default.
Chapter 5, The responsibility effect
Using a declarative renders a speaker responsible for what they say. This effect is the result of a social norm, a norm that is detected and reinforced through norm cognition. I argue that mindshaping produces a knowledge norm.
Chapter 6, The warrant effect
A hearer can be prima facie warranted in forming a belief in response to a speaker’s use of a declarative. This effect is also the result of a social norm. Hearers are warranted because speakers comply with the norm.
Chapter 7, An event-theoretic approach to using declaratives
I argue that event cognition is foundational among the relevant cognitive processes. It recruits mindreading and sets the stage for norm cognition by typing behavior. As a result, modifications in what we do with declaratives are, at bottom, alterations to the eventuality effect.
Chapter 8, Hedged declaratives
Appending a declarative with an epistemic term can weaken the strength with which a proposition is shared. I explain this weakening in terms of how the four effects are modified. In its basic form, hedging is about revealing to the hearer you don’t know.
Chapter 9, Performative declaratives
A declarative can be used to enact a non-default action such as I hereby promise to φ. I explain enactment with respect to how the four effects are updated and/or modified. The result is a new view that charts between the extreme views on which performatives either lack truth-conditions or have self-verifying truth-conditions.
Chapter 10, Theorizing about speech acts
In none of the previous chapters do I invoke or rely upon concepts like force, illocutionary act, or assertion. What we do with declaratives can be explained without using such concepts. As such, the event-theoretic approach enables a soft eliminativism of speech act concepts.
Chapter 11, Alternative frameworks
Popular frameworks deployed to explain what we do with declaratives appeal to constitutive rules, commitment, or iterative attitudes. These alternatives have serious theoretical or empirical issues that have gone unnoticed or unappreciated. Some are solved by the framework defended here. Some are serious enough that the alternative should be abandoned.
Chapter 12, Beyond declaratives
The event-theoretic approach can be extended beyond declaratives to other sentence types. In closing out the book, I briefly sketch how.