How we do things with declaratives
Every natural language can assemble words into a declarative sentence. We perform a variety of actions with these sentences. This book is about how. I identify four effects that the use of a declarative characteristically has, pinpoint the cognitive processes that cause these effects, and explain what we do with declaratives with respect to these effects and their causes. Along the way, new and familiar conclusions are drawn.
This book is under contract with Oxford University Press. Feedback is welcome. Feel free to contact me about any of the chapters below that are drafted.
Chapter 1, Introduction [In progress]
I clarify the syntactic and semantic assumptions I will be making about declaratives, and discuss the importance of mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of language.
Chapter 2, The eventuality effect [Drafted]
After a speaker’s use of a declarative, a hearer forms a representation of the speech event. This effect is the result of event cognition. It underwrites the interpretation of words that require the representation of the speech event.
Chapter 3, The attitude effect [Drafted]
In responding to the use of a declarative, a hearer attributes a propositional attitude to the speaker. This effect is the result of mindreading. I argue from empirical considerations that knowledge is the attitude attributed by default.
Chapter 4, The responsibility effect [Drafted]
Using a declarative renders a speaker responsible for what they say. This effect is the result of a social norm, a norm that is detected and reinforced through norm cognition. I argue that mindshaping produces a knowledge norm.
Chapter 5, The warrant effect [Drafted]
A hearer can be prima facie warranted in forming a belief in response to a speaker’s use of a declarative. This effect is also the result of a social norm. Hearers are warranted because speakers comply with the norm.
Chapter 6, Integrating the four effects [Drafted]
I argue that event cognition is foundational among the relevant cognitive processes. It recruits mindreading and sets the stage for norm cognition by typing behavior. As a result, modifications in what we do with declaratives are, at bottom, alterations to the eventuality effect.
Chapter 7, Hedged declaratives [Drafted]
Appending a declarative with an epistemic term can weaken the strength with which a proposition is shared. I explain this weakening in terms of how the four effects are modified. In its basic form, hedging is about telling the hearer you don’t know.
Chapter 8, Performative declaratives [Drafted]
A declarative can be used to enact a non-default action such as I hereby promise to φ. I explain enactment with respect to how the four effects are updated and/or modified. The result is a new view that charts between the extreme views on which performatives either lack truth-conditions or have self-verifying truth-conditions.
Chapter 9, Pragmaticalization
Languages can conventionalize some of the characterizing effects. This leads to interesting redundancy: the use of a declarative can have an effect because of the language’s grammar and the underlying cognitive processes. Redundancy requires us to rethink the semantics/pragmatics boundary.
Chapter 10, Theorizing about speech acts [Drafted]
In none of the previous chapters do I invoke or rely upon concepts like force, illocutionary act, or assertion. What we do with declaratives can be explained without using such concepts. As such, a mechanistic approach enables a soft eliminativism of speech act concepts.
Chapter 12, Alternative frameworks
Popular frameworks deployed to explain what we do with declaratives appeal to constitutive rules, commitment, or iterative attitudes. These alternatives have serious theoretical or empirical issues. Some are solved by the framework defended here. Some are serious enough that the alternative should be abandoned.
Chapter 13, Conclusion
I summarize the previous chapters. Some outstanding questions and avenues for further research are discussed.