Research articles

1. (Forthcoming). Hedging in discourse. Synthese.
2. (Forthcoming). Asking expresses a desire to know. The Philosophical Quarterly.
3. (Forthcoming). Hedging and the norm of belief (with Chris Willard-Kyle). Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
4. (Forthcoming). Metalinguistic apophaticism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
   Runner-up for the Sanders Prize in 2021.
5. (2023). Hedged testimony. Noûs 57 (2), 341-369.
6. (2023). Assertion remains strong (with Matthew Benton). Philosophical Studies 180: 27-50.
7. (2023). Expressing belief with evidentials: A case study with Cuzco Quechua on the dispensability of illocutionary explanation. Journal of Pragmatics 203: 52-67.
8. (2022). The linguistic basis for propositions. Routledge Handbook of Propositions. (eds.) C. Tillman, A. Murray. Routledge. pp. 57-78.
9. (2021). Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry (with Yasha Sapir). Synthese 199 (3-4): 5837–5859.
10. (2021). Reviving the performative hypothesis? Thought 10 (4): 240-248.
11. (2021). Why animalism matters (with Andrew Bailey, Allison Thornton). Philosophical Studies 178 (9): 2929-2942.
12. (2021). Generic animalism (with Andrew Bailey). The Journal of Philosophy 118 (8): 405-429.
13. (2021). Representing knowledge. The Philosophical Review 130 (1): 97-143.
14. (2020). Hedged assertion (with Matthew Benton). Oxford Handbook of Assertion. (ed.) S. Goldberg. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
15. (2020). That-clauses and propositional anaphors. Philosophical Studies 177 (10): 2861-2875.
16. (2020). Testimony and grammatical evidentials. Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. (eds.) M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. Pedersen, J. Wyatt. Routledge. pp. 135-144.
17. (2020). Deceiving without answering. Philosophical Studies 177 (5): 1157-1173.
18. (2020). What the metasemantics of know is not. Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1): 69-82.
19. (2019). Propositional anaphors. Philosophical Studies 76 (4): 1055-1075.
20. (2018). Contrast and constitution. The Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270): 158-174.
21. (2015). Humean laws and circular explanation (with Michael Hicks). Philosophical Studies 172 (2): 433-443.

Edited volume(s)

• (Forthcoming). Unstructured content (with Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Andy Egan, Dirk Kindermann). Oxford University Press.

Review(s)

• (2020). Review of Semantics for Reasons by Bryan Weaver and Kevin Scharp (with Daniel Fogal). Ethics 131 (2): 420-427.

Pedagogical article(s)

• (2013). Teaching philosophy through Lincoln-Douglas debate (with Jacob Nebel, Ryan Davis, Ben Holguín). Teaching Philosophy 36 (3): 271-289.

Dissertation

• (2018). Un/qualified declaratives. Rutgers University, New Brunswick.