Research

Recent and upcoming talks

  • TBD, Princeton University, March 2027
  • TBD, Theoretical Philosophy Workshop, Chicago Area Philosophy Exchange, January 2026
  • Linguistic communication and social cognition: an interdisciplinary survey (with Daniel Harris), NASSLLI, University of Washington, June 2025
  • Knowledge in the background, Background beliefs in the construction of meaning, University of Tübingen, January 2025
  • The representational format of questions and propositions, Propositions Network Group, December 2024
  • Rising intonation, University of Arizona, November 2024
  • The nature of questions, Vanderbilt University, June 2024
  • Event cognition and performative sentences, University of Iceland, June 2024
  • Social norms and taking responsibility for what we say, Marquette University, May 2024

Publications

  1. (Forthcoming). Dissolving the paradox of ineffability. Philosophers’ Imprint.
  2. (2025). Assertoric mindreading. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 111 (1): 173-194.
  3. (2025). Hedging and the norm of belief (with Chris Willard-Kyle). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (3): 718-739.
  4. (2025). Metalinguistic apophaticism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 11: 139–167.
  5. (2025). Veridicality and the acquisition of think. Linguistics and Philosophy 48 (2): 353-370.
  6. (2025). Asking expresses a desire to know. The Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1): 254-267.
  7. (2024). Hedging in discourse. Synthese 204 (98): 1-31.
  8. (2023). Hedged testimony. Noûs 57 (2): 341-369.
  9. (2023). Assertion remains strong (with Matthew Benton). Philosophical Studies 180: 27-50.
  10. (2023). Expressing belief with evidentials: A case study with Cuzco Quechua on the dispensability of illocutionary explanation. Journal of Pragmatics 203: 52-67.
  11. (2022). The linguistic basis for propositions. Routledge Handbook of Propositions. (eds.) C. Tillman, A. Murray. Routledge. pp. 57-78.
  12. (2021). Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry (with Yasha Sapir). Synthese 199 (3-4): 5837–5859.
  13. (2021). Representing knowledge. The Philosophical Review 130 (1): 97-143.
  14. (2021). Reviving the performative hypothesis? Thought 10 (4): 240-248.
  15. (2021). Generic animalism. (with Andrew Bailey). Journal of Philosophy 118 (8): 405-429.
  16. (2021). Why animalism matters. (with Andrew Bailey and A.K. Thornton). Philosophical Studies 179 (9): 2929-2942.
  17. (2020). Testimony and grammatical evidentials. Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. (eds.) M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, N. Pedersen, J. Wyatt. Routledge. pp. 135-144.
  18. (2020). Hedged assertion (with Matthew Benton). Oxford Handbook of Assertion. (ed.) S. Goldberg. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
  19. (2020). Deceiving without answering. Philosophical Studies 177 (5): 1157-1173.
  20. (2020). What the metasemantics of know is not. Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1): 69-82.
  21. (2020). That-clauses and propositional anaphors. Philosophical Studies 177 (10): 2861-2875.
  22. (2019). Propositional anaphors. Philosophical Studies 76 (4): 1055-1075.
  23. (2018). Contrast and constitution. Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270): 158-174.
  24. (2015). Humean laws and circular explanation. (with Michael Hicks). Philosophical Studies 72 (2): 433-443.

Review

Edited volume