1. “[…] an extended use of the adjectival form [cultural] in more specialist and academic languages. And whole fields of knowledge are now described as cultural. If cultural studies and cultural critique led the way here, the fields of cultural psychology, cultural history, cultural geography, and cultural evolution have followed in short order as part of the more general cultural turn in the humanities and social sciences.” (Bennett, 64)

2. “While criticism in its most general sense developed towards censure, criticism in its specialized sense developed toward taste, cultivation, and later culture and discrimination.” (Williams, 85)
“The notion that response was judgment depended, of course, on the social confidence of a class and later a profession. The confidence was variously specified, originally as learning or scholarship, later as cultivation and taste, later still as sensibility. […] Criticism becomes ideological not only when it assumes the position of the consumer but also when it masks this position by a succession of abstractions of its real terms of response.[…] The point would then be […] to get rid of the habit, which depends, fundamentally, on the abstraction of response from its real situation and circumstances: the elevation to ‘judgment,’ and to an apparently general process, when what always needs to be understood is the specificity of the response, which is not an abstract ‘judgment’ but even where including, as often necessarily, positive or negative responses, a definite practice, in active and complex relations with its whole situation and context.” (Williams, 86)
3. Three broad active categories of usage [of culture]: (i) the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development, (ii) the independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general, and (iii) the independent and abstract noun which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity. (Williams, 90)
4. “[…] involving claims to superior knowledge, refinement, and distinctions between ‘high’ art (culture) and popular art and entertainment.” (Williams, 92)
5. “Criticism is or ought to be a cognitive activity and that it is a form of knowledge.” (Said, 224)
6. “What matters is the criticism to which such an ideological complex is subjected by the first representatives of the new historical phase. This criticism makes possible a process of differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate, even incidental, is now taken to be primary- becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex. The old collective will dissolve into its contradictory elements since the subordinate ones develop socially.” (Samuel, 237)
7. “Or should we rather bring the sword of criticism to criticism itself and do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really after when we were so intent on showing the social construction of scientific facts? Nothing guarantees, after all, that we should be right all the time. There is no sure ground even for criticism. Isn’t this what criticism intended to say: that there is no sure ground anywhere?” (Latour, 227)
8. “If this were possible then we could let the critics come ever closer to the matters of concern we cherish, and then at last we could tell then: ‘Yes, please, touch them, explain them, deploy them.’” (Latour, 248)
9. “These ideas have a special interest for critics today who may wish to place themselves skeptically between culture as a massive body of self-congratulating ideas and system or method, anything resembling a sovereign technique that claims to be free of history, subjectivity, or circumstance. […] If it is not to be merely a form of self-validation, criticism must intend knowledge and, what’s more, it must attempt to deal with, identify, and produce knowledge as having something to do with will and with reason.” (Said, 202)

 

WHAT: A Broad Topic, but Concrete Talks

Williams discusses culture and criticism separately, but the discussions when taken together can help us shed new lights on cultural criticism as a whole. On the one hand, he redefines “culture” by investigating its genealogy, and on the other hand, he sets up requirements for “criticism.”

As for culture, Williams traces its usage to the 17th century when it still meant the tending of natural growth, and summarizes three main definitions of “culture” that derived throughout time, from the general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development, to a particular way of life, to the work and practices of intellectual activity.

More importantly, after delineating the development of what the term “culture” refers to, Williams points out that we are not to favor one definition over another by choosing the one that is “true,” “proper,” or “scientific,” but should note and take into account the range and overlap of meanings. In understanding the term “culture,” he highlights the importance of acknowledging its complexity, such as its indication in the duality in material and symbolic production, and the significance of studying the relations between the different meanings.

That said, Williams broadens the subject of cultural criticism by pointing out the complexity that lies in the term “culture.” As a result, criticism of “culture” would not be limited to the usual sense, that is on the artistic activities and products, but also the ways of lives that people lead, and even the general process of human development.

As for criticism, Williams criticizes how criticism is conducted as an abstract judgement, and proposes that it should be about the “specificity […] in active and complex relations with its whole situation and context.”

That is, Williams requires criticism to be specific to both the subject itself and its context, and accordingly provide concrete responses instead of vague judgments.

 

HOW: One Name, Multiple Jobs

A critic is a teacher, a proxy, a criticizer, a coordinator, and more. With knowledge and taste, he leads its readers into the world of literature, music, and drama (Mendelsohn). With time and attention, he set up connections with the pieces, and convey his private experience to his readers (Ventura). With guts and insights, he points out the faults and pushes the development in the field where his passion lies (Garner). With his presence, as the representative of the spectator, he completes the art work (Schwabsky).

What I would like to elaborate here, however, is the critic as a philosopher. While Said acknowledges neither Derrida and Foucault is a literary critic, he introduces their ideas to explain literary criticism, which pursue philosophical inquiries.

Both Derrida and Foucault describe culture as influenced by some dominant force. Derrida’s idea of the “culture” in discussion is the Western culture which forms a “cultural domination” centering “metaphysics and its hierarchies,” manifested in “texts” ranging from Plato to Heidegger. Foucault sees the production of culture governed by “discourses,” which he describes as “impersonal, systematic, and highly regulated by enuciative formations.” (Said, 186)

Their criticism of culture, then, serves to challenge the authorities and influences exerted on it, whether it is the “metaphysics,” or the “discourses”. For Derrida, it is to uncover the “silent complicity between the superstructural pressures of metaphysics and an author’s ambiguous innocence about a detail at base level.” He stands up to challenge logocentric fallacies, such as “the nostalgia for presence,” (Said, 190) pointing out that language can never bring about presence, but is always representation. For Foucault, it is to make the text “assume its affiliation with institutions, offices, agencies, classes, academics, corporations, groups, guilds, ideologically defined parties and professions” by “redefining and reidentifying the particular interests that al texts serve.” (Said, 212) That is, he points out that the author is not isolated as he or she produces a text, but placed in a specific historical, social, and political context, all of which influences him or her. Thus it is not sufficient to understand the text in isolation, but should take into account the context, examine the influences, and decipher the meanings hidden due to these influences.

Both Derrida’s and Foucault’s stances encourage cultural critics to detach themselves from the dominate culture, challenge the orthodox way of thinking, and produce knowledge, which is contentious. In this sense, when producing a description of the original text, the critic, stripping away or at least acknowledging the forces acted upon the text, gets closer to the meaning of the original text than the original text itself, as if he or she deciphers it.

 

AND THEN: The Power of Words

The articles provide a broad range of understandings of culture, including subjects from literature (Said) to social conditions (Latour). While addressing different subjects, they all point out the radical power in criticism: Instead of cultivating “taste” on high arts, or arguing to favor some preferences over others, they describe criticism as a way to inform, as an intellectual inquiry in search of the true meanings of texts, and even as a weapon to bring about revolutions.

That said, the articles all convey the idea that words and understandings have power, and criticism has the capacity to alter, form, and communicate understandings. Just as orthodox beliefs constrain the way people think, criticism challenging these beliefs liberates them, or at least make them conscious about the restraint. From the words of critics, then, readers are taught, connected, and even intellectually challenged.

 

Key words
1. Authority: Authority bear different senses in the discussions. On the one hand, critics need to possess some sort of “authority,” that is, trust based on credential, in order to present their ideas to the viewers. On the other hand, critics, as Derrida and Foucault would argue, challenges the authorities, that is the established ideas.
2. Power: Critics, at least in idea, have the power of words. They make judgments or claims, which exerts influence on people given critics have the authority, and the people in turn carry out activities. In short, the production of authoritative ideas has the power to influence actions.
3. Knowledge: On the one hand, critics need knowledge in order to make judgments and provide responses. On the other hand, critics produce knowledge in their judgments and responses.