Tag Archives: congestion pricing

Mitigating TNC-induced traffic congestion

While the e-hail service offered by TNCs is widely credited for boosting productivity and enhancing level of service, its adverse traffic impact in already-congested city centers has drawn increased scrutiny.   Several cities have started to implement  policies aiming to mitigate the traffic impact induced by excessive TNC operations.   The purpose of this study is to support such policy analysis by developing a model that captures the complex interactions among various stakeholders (riders, drivers and the platform) and those between them and the regulator.   Please read the abstract below for main findings.

The paper was recently published in Transportation Research Part A.   A preprint can be downloaded here.


Abstract: This paper analyzes and evaluates several policies aiming to mitigate the congestion effect a Transportation Network Company (TNC) brings to bear on an idealized city that contains a dense central core surrounded by a larger periphery. The TNC offers both solo and pooling e-hail services to the users of public transport. We develop a spatial market equilibrium model over two building blocks: an aggregate congestion model describing the traffic impact of TNC operations on all travelers in the city, including private motorists, and a matching model estimating the TNC’s level of service based on the interactions between riders and TNC drivers. Based on the equilibrium model, we formulate and propose solution algorithms to the optimal pricing problem, in which the TNC seeks to optimize its profit or social welfare subject to the extra costs and/or constraints imposed by the congestion mitigation policies. Three congestion mitigation policies are implemented in this study: (i) a trip-based policy that charges a congestion fee on each solo trip starting or ending in the city center; (ii) a cordon-based policy that charges TNC vehicles entering the city center with zero or one passenger; and (iii) a cruising cap policy that requires the TNC to maintain the fleet utilization ratio in the city center above a threshold. Based on a case study of Chicago, we find TNC operations may have a significant congestion effect. Failing to anticipate this effect in the pricing problem leads to sub-optimal decisions that worsen traffic congestion and hurt the TNC’s profitability. Of the three policies, the trip-based policy delivers the best performance. It reduces traffic congestion modestly, keeps the TNC’s level of service almost intact, and improves overall social welfare substantially. The cruising cap policy benefits private motorists, thanks to the extra congestion relief it brings about. However, because other stakeholders together suffer a much greater loss, its net impact on social welfare is negative. Paradoxically, the policy could worsen the very traffic conditions in the city center that it is designed to improve.

A-PASS for Travel Demand Management

Auction-Based Permit Allocation and Sharing System (A-Pass) for Travel Demand Management, co-authored by Ruijie Li and Xiaobo Liu (both at Southwest Jiaotong University, China).

This is a follow up to another paper related to the mechanism design problems arising from ridesharing.  In this paper, we try to show the promise of integrating ridesharing with quantity-based travel demand management.  One of the main insights is that by auctioning out permits (e.g., to use a road facility), we can eliminate the deficits that are otherwise unavoidable in classical  Vickrey-Clark-Gloves mechanism.  The paper just came out in Transportation Science. You may read the abstract below and download a preprint here.


We propose a novel quantity-based demand management system aiming to promote ride-sharing. The system sells the permit to access a facility (conceptualized as a bottleneck) by auction but encourages commuters to share the permits with each other. The permit is classified according to access time and the commuters may be assigned one of the three roles: solo driver, ride-sharing driver, or rider. At the core of this auction-based permit allocation and sharing system (A-PASS) is a trilateral matching problem (TMP) that matches permits, drivers and riders. We formulate TMP as an integer program, and prove it can be reduced to an equivalent linear program. A pricing policy based on the classical Vickrey-Clark-Gloves (VCG) mechanism is proposed to determine the payment for each commuter. We prove, under the VCG policy, different commuters will pay exactly the same price as long as their role and access time are the same. We also show A-PASS can eliminate any deficit that may arise from the VCG policy by controlling the number of shared rides. Results of numerical experiment suggest A-PASS strongly promote rider-sharing. As ride-sharing increases, all stake holders are better off: the ride-sharing platform receives greater profits, the commuters enjoy higher utility, and the society benefits from more efficient utilization of infrastructure.