The song of Achilles

I read The song of Achilles about two years ago, wrote a short review then but never got the chance to post it here.  This is one of the few fiction books I have read cover to cover  since I turned 40 – thanks to my daughter’s recommendation.


My 11-year-old daughter fell in love with Greek mythology lately and has filled her bookshelf with the likes of Percy Jackson and Trials of Apollo.  Frustrated with my complete ignorance of the subject, she tried repeatedly to get me to read some of her books.  She marveled at The Song of Achilles all the time and insisted I must read the book because it is simply “too good” to pass over.  Eventually, I caved in despite my reluctance—novels have largely ceased to interest me, let alone a novel about Achilles, whose story has become a cultural cliché, even in China. Who could forget about the heels that his mom famously failed to wash in the magic spring?

It turns out I enjoyed the book more than I thought I could.  Madeline Miller made me constantly guess the theme of the book, but she managed to outwit me at every turn.  Initially, it seems that the book is about the love between two young men: Achilles and I the narrator (Patroclus). Then, I thought the focus is the insanity of the Trojan war, and how it transforms an innocent boy into a monstrous killing machine.   At one point, Miller mocked nationalism and advocated humanitarian principles, when she proclaimed through Chiron (a centaur) “nations were the most foolish of mortal inventions” and “no man is worth more than another, wherever he is from”. Eventually, I realize the central plot may be the ancient conflict between a jealous mother and her son’s spouse (a son-in-law in this case).  Achilles’s mom, Thetis, refused to endorse his relationship with Patroclus till the very end, even after they are buried together.   In the eyes of the jealous mom, Patroclus is an unattractive mortal unworthy of Achilles, a man who cannot bear an offspring for him, and above all someone who committed the unforgivable sin of sharing the love of her son.  But more fundamentally, Thetis and Patroclus fought hard to bring about a different Achilles in the book: Thetis wants a god-like, ruthless warrior, while Patroclus prefers an empathetic, creative human.  It seems to me this discrepancy, not the Prophecy, finally sealed the tragic fate of the couple.

Having finished the book, I must say I don’t quite understand why my daughter and her friends like it so much.  It is a book written for adults, with contents that I imagine some parents might find objectionable for kids of her age.  I know for a fact in my generation such a book would be considered off limits for 11-year-old. But, hey, we live in a different age, don’t we?

Is competition for losers in bikesharing?

The rise and fall of the bikesharing industry in China offers a cautionary tale about the risks of an unregulated market with a low entry barrier. It is well known that, while low entry barriers can promote competition and innovation, they may also lead to higher market volatility and potential challenges in achieving profitability due to intensified rivalry . There are also limited economies of scale to be had, making it exceedingly difficult to establish a monopoly. As Peter Thiel noted, “competition is for losers”‘ in such markets and good entrepreneurs should simply stay away from them.   However, writing off the bikesharing industry as unprofitable cannot be the only story here. After all, bikesharing has a genuinely positive societal impact and should have its place in many of our cities that are haunted by the disease of auto-dependency. The question is what, if anything, can be done to foster a healthy bikesharing market that is attractive to both users and private investors.  We set up to answer this question here.  You may download a preprint here, or read the abstract below.


Abstract: We model inter-operator competition in a dockless bikesharing (DLB) market as a non-cooperative game. To play the game, a DLB operator sets a strategic target (e.g., maximizing profit or maximizing ridership) and makes tactical decisions (e.g., pricing and fleet sizing). As each operator’s payoff and decision set are influenced by its own decisions as well as those of its competitors, the outcome of the game is a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). To analyze how competition may shape the choice of strategic targets, we further augment the game framework with a ranking scheme to properly evaluate the preference for different targets. Using a model calibrated with empirical data, we show that, if an operator is committed to maximizing its market share with a budget constraint, all other operators must respond in kind. Otherwise, they would be driven out of the market. When all operators compete for market dominance, Moreover, even if all operators agree to focus on making money rather than ruinously seeking dominance, profitability still plunges quickly with the number of players. Taken together, the results explain why the unregulated DLB market is often oversupplied and prone to collapse under competition. We also show this market failure may be prevented by a fleet cap policy, which sets an upper limit on each operator’s fleet size.