

Do or Do Not, There is No Withholding

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Introduction

Belief Consistency:

Rationality requires that [if one believes **P**, and believes **P** only if \neg **Q**, then one does not believe **Q**].

Intention Consistency:

Rationality requires that [if one intends to **X**, and believes that if one will **X** then one will \neg **Y**, then one does not intend to **Y**].

Doxastic Attitude (Narrow)

A doxastic attitude is any member of the tri-attitudinal complex consisting in believing **P**, disbelieving **P**, and withholding **P**.

Praxistic Attitude (Narrow)

A praxistic attitude is any member of the bi-attitudinal complex consisting in intending to do **X** and intending not to do **X**.

Praxistic Attitude (Non-Question-Begging)

A praxistic attitude is any member of the multi-attitudinal complex that includes intending to do **X**.

Evidential Norms for Doxastic Attitudes

Evidential Norm for Believing P

If one's total evidence conclusively supports **P**, then rationality requires that one does not disbelieve **P** or withhold **P**.

Evidential Norm for Disbelieving P

If one's total evidence conclusively supports \neg **P**, then rationality requires that one does not believe **P** or withhold **P**.

Evidential Norm for Withholding P

If one's total evidence equally supports **P** and \neg **P**, then rationality requires that one does not believe **P** or disbelieve **P**.

Evidential Norms for Praxistic Attitudes

Evidential Norm for Intending to do X

If one has conclusive evidence that one ought to do **X**, then rationality requires that one does not intend not to do **X** (or practically withhold doing **X**).

Evidential Norm for Intending not to do X

If one has conclusive evidence that one ought to do **X**, then rationality requires that one does not intend to do **X** (or practically withhold doing **X**).

Evidential Norm for Withholding doing X (?)

If one's total evidence equally supports doing **X** and not doing **X**, then rationality requires that one does not intend to do **X** or intend not to do **X**.



Two Candidates for Practical Withholding

Practical withholding (Candidate 1) =^{def} refraining from intending to do **X** and intending not to do **X**.

Practical withholding (Candidate 2) =^{def} being indifferent towards doing **X** and not doing **X**.

Indifference =^{def} *S* is indifferent towards doing **X** iff *S*'s reasons, evidence, and/or preferences equally favours doing **X** and not doing **X**.



Implications for the Consistency Norm

Belief Consistency (Standard)

Rationality requires that [if one believes that **P**, and one believes that **P** only if \neg **Q**, then one does not believe **Q**].

Belief Consistency (Triad)

Rationality requires that [if one believes that **P**, and one believes that **P** only if \neg **Q**, then one does not disbelieve \neg **Q** or withhold \neg **Q**].

Intention Consistency (Standard)

Rationality requires that [if one intends to do **X**, and one believes that one will **X** only if one will not do **Y**, then one does not intend to do **Y**].

