Department of Economics
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: (646) 269-7484
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2017 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2012
BA, Mathematics, Princeton University, 2011.
Primary Field of Specialization
Secondary Field of Specialization
Job Market Paper
Abstract: Many important economic situations can be modelled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types. In this paper, we extend the results of Athey (2001) and Reny (2011) from static Bayesian games to dynamic environments, providing conditions that guarantee the existence of monotone equilibria in types in such games. A feature that distinguishes this environment from those of previous results is the endogeneity of beliefs, which can complicate continuity of payoffs, needed to find a fixed point. To address this, we define an auxiliary static game which pins down beliefs while preserving continuity of payoffs. We also provide conditions which guarantee that there will exist monotone best-replies to monotone strategies of one’s opponents in a dynamic environment. Applications are given to signaling games and stopping games such as auctions, wars of attrition, and joint research projects.
Other Research Papers
“Monotone Persuasion” (Revise and Resubmit, Theoretical Economics)
Abstract: We explore when it is optimal in Bayesian persuasion environments for senders to commit to signal structures which induce the receiver to take higher actions when the underlying state is higher. Building on the literature on monotone comparative statics, we provide a technique to compute the optimal monotone signal structure. We also identify primitive conditions that guarantee that these are optimal among all (possibly non-monotone) signal structures. When the action space is binary, supermodularity of the sender’s and receiver’s preferences suffices for the optimal signal to have a monotone structure. With a continuum of actions, the conditions are more intriguing. We identify a novel single-crossing condition using a virtual utility representation of the sender’s payoff. Applications are given to quadratic loss functions with biases and to credit ratings.
Abstract: The Coase conjecture states that, when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with varying valuation for a durable good, the monopolist cannot exploit his monopoly power if he cannot commit not to make future offers. This paper examines whether this is true when the monopolist can endogenously contract on the quality of the good, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). We find that the monopolist retains full commitment power, as any other solution unravels: all consumers are afraid of having the lowest remaining valuation in any future period, and so will accept any offer that gives them positive payoff immediately.
“Flexible Information Acquisition in Monotone Decision Problems”
Prof. Alessandro Pavan (Committee Co-Chair)
Prof. Marciano Siniscalchi (Committee Co-Chair)
Prof. Wojciech Olszewski
Prof. Asher Wolinsky