Contact Information:
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208
Phone: (+1) 872-985-5086
hanszhu2024@u.northwestern.edu
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2025 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2020
BA, Economics (Honours) w Diploma in Mathematical Sciences, University of Melbourne, 2015
Primary Fields of Specialization
Industrial Organization
Secondary Fields of Specialization
Health Economics, Digital Economics
Curriculum Vitate
Job Market Paper
“Limiting For-profit Provision in Nursing Home Markets”, with Hyein Cho
Download Job Market Paper (PDF)
Last updated 14th November 2024
We examine whether policies that affect the extent of for-profit versus not-for-profit provision in regulated markets such as health and education can be effective at addressing quality shortfalls. We consider the US nursing homes industry, where significant quality shortfalls have been persistent for many decades. Our motivating evidence suggests that not-for-profit providers choose higher-quality inputs but are more prevalent in higher socioeconomic markets and serve less needy residents. Thus, for-profit providers play an important role in providing access. To explain these facts and explore counterfactual policies we estimate a structural model of nursing home demand and supply which allow firms to have non-pecuniary motives and cost functions that differ systematically across different types of providers. Costs play a large role in explaining the observed quality and access patterns. Not-for-profit providers choose higher quality as they have a cost advantage at serving higher quality. For-profit providers have a significant cost advantage at serving less profitable patients and can therefore survive better in lower socioeconomic markets. Banning for-profit providers, even when allowing for takeovers by not-for-providers, is unlikely to improve consumer surplus as not-for-profits are overall more costly than for-profit providers.
Other Research Papers
“Could it be Better to Refund than Recommend? The Role of Ex-post Match Values in Digital Entertainment Markets”
Digital entertainment markets are characterised by many niches and the ‘long tail’ of consumption. I argue that the size of these tails may be dramatically underestimated if ex-post match values – match values realised only after consumption – are not taken into account. I collect a novel individual-level dataset on the Steam platform and interpret playtime data as directly informative about ex-post match values. The playtime data reveal patterns of consumption starkly different to those inferred from purchases. I then examine the policy relevance of ex-post match values, by studying a unique series of policy changes on the Steam platform. The introduction of personalised stores followed by the introduction of refunds. Personalised stores should improve consumer matches on average, but are unable to recommend on the basis of realised ex-post match values. Refunds allow consumers to realise ex-post match values before committing to the purchase. I find that sales increase following the introduction of refunds by around 5 times the increase following the introduction of personalised stores. In addition, the sales patterns following the introduction of refunds are dramatically different compared to those with the introduction of personalised stores. These results suggest that the effects of personalised stores alone are limited. Whether personalised stores matter or are complementary to refunds will be investigated using a structural model which I describe.
References
Prof. Robert Porter (Co-Chair)
Prof. David Dranove (Co-Chair)