Graduate Course on Dynamic Games and Learning (Spring 2021):
Lecture 1: Commitment payoff theorem: Perfect monitoring.
Lecture 2: Commitment payoff theorem: Imperfect monitoring.
Lecture 3: Lack of identification.
Lecture 4: Sustainability of reputations.
Lecture 5: Interdependent values.
Lecture 6: Long-run medium-run models.
Lecture 7: Long-run long-run models.
Lecture 8: Reputational bargaining.
Lecture 9: Repeated games with contracts.
Lecture 10: Repeated incomplete information games without discounting.
Lecture 11: Repeated incomplete information games with discounting.
Lecture 12: Social learning with a countable number of agents.
Lecture 13: Social learning with a continuum of agents.
Lecture 14: Social Learning with naive agents.
Lecture 15: The efficiency of social learning.
New Material for Spring 2022 and Spring 2023:
Reputation Effects under Observational Learning
Limited Memory and Purification
Repeated Games with Coarse Information about History
Community Enforcement Models: Complete Information
Community Enforcement Models: Incomplete Information