Robust Implementation with Costly Information

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We construct mechanisms that can robustly implement any desired social choice function when (1) agents may incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (2) with small probability, agents' preferences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the mechanism designer, and (3) the mechanism designer does not know agents' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another's preferences. The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation and do not require the mechanism designer to be able to verify the state *ex post*. We also establish impossibility results for stronger notions of robust implementation.

Key words: Robust implementation, partial implementation, critical path lemma

JEL codes: D82, D83

1. INTRODUCTION

Theories of robust implementation study whether a state-contingent social choice function can be implemented when information about the state must be elicited from agents whose objective may be misaligned with the social choice function, and the mechanism designer faces uncertainty about agents' preferences and their beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another's preferences.

Whether a social choice function can be *robustly* implemented depends on the notion of robustness considered. When robustness is required to hold *globally*, in the sense that agents' preferences and beliefs may be arbitrary, Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that a social choice function is robustly implementable only if it is *ex post* incentive compatible. Oury and Tercieux (2012) consider a less demanding notion of robust implementation, which concerns *local* perturbations of agents' preferences and beliefs in an *interim* sense. They require that the desired social choice function be approximately implemented for all profiles of agent types *close* to a given type profile. They show that robustly implementable social choice functions must satisfy Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999)—a demanding property that is violated in a number of settings.

This paper contributes to the literature on robust implementation by proposing a novel *ex ante* notion of robust implementation based on the concept of robust equilibrium in Kajii and Morris (1997). We construct mechanisms that robustly—according to our notion—implement

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any desired social choice function when the mechanism designer can use monetary transfers and agents may need to incur some costs to learn the state.[1] Our proofs build on Kajii and Morris' (1997) "critical path" lemma, which provides the key technical step to connect our theory of robust implementation to their theory of robust predictions in games. We also show that robust implementation is impossible for several stronger notion of robustness. Taken together, these results suggest that our notion of robustness provides a middle ground, for which robust implementation is possible yet non-trivial.

To fix ideas, consider the CEO of a firm deciding whether to sign a contract offered by another party. The CEO's objective is to sign the contract when it is legally sound and to reject it when the contract is flawed. However, the CEO does not possess the expertise to learn *the state of the world* (*i.e.* whether the contract is sound). She must therefore hire experts to review the contract.[2]

Reviewing the contract is costly to the experts. To incentivize them, the CEO provides a mechanism that maps experts' reports to (1) an *outcome* (*i.e.* whether to accept the offer) and (2) *bonuses* for the experts.[3]

Our notion of robust implementation is motivated by the CEO's concern that some of the experts may be biased or incompetent. For example, some experts may hold a private bias or stake in favour or against the contract, and some experts may face prohibitively high costs of reviewing the contract. The CEO may also be concerned about experts' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about other experts' biases and competence. The CEO wishes to design a mechanism that is *robust* in the sense of implementing the desired outcome with high probability as long as the experts are biased or are incompetent with low enough probability.[4]

Our notion of robust implementation builds on the concept of robust equilibrium introduced by Kajii and Morris (1997). According to this concept, a Nash equilibrium of some complete information game is robust if it can be approximated by some equilibria in *every* incomplete information game where players' payoffs match those of the complete information game with probability close to one. In these incomplete information games, players can have arbitrary payoffs with small probability and arbitrary beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another's payoffs as long as these beliefs are consistent with a common prior.

Building on this concept of robust equilibrium, we will say that a mechanism *robustly implements* a social choice function if for every perturbation in which agents' payoffs differ from those of the unperturbed environment with small probability, there exists an equilibrium in which conditional on every state of the world, the desired outcome is implemented with probability close to one. This *local* and *ex ante* notion of robust implementation relaxes some of the restrictive requirements of the global and interim notions, which either allow perturbations in which agents'

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1. Our mechanisms also work when agents' costs of learning are zero. Chen *et al.* (2021) provide a sufficient condition under which a social choice function is robustly implementable when the learning costs are zero. We discuss the connections between their paper and ours by the end of Section 3.

2. We construct mechanisms that robustly implement any desired social choice function when there are *two experts*. These mechanisms can easily be modified to account for the presence of three or more experts, for example by applying them to two of the experts and ignoring the reports of remaining experts. In Supplementary Appendix E, we use an example with three agents to explain why the desired social choice function cannot be robustly implemented by simply applying majority rule.

3. We focus on settings in which the bonuses paid to the experts *do not* directly depend on the realized state, and show that the mechanism designer can robustly implement the desired outcome *even when she cannot verify the state ex post*. We view this feature as a merit of our results since it may be hard in practice to condition payments on the state, for example, when the CEO does not have the expertise to verify whether experts' reports are correct and the true state of the world (*e.g.* the legal consequences of signing a bad contract) takes a long time to realize.

4. The CEO's objective is to implement her desired outcome without regard to the expected bonuses paid to the experts. We provide justifications for this objective by the end of this section.

payoffs are different from those of the unperturbed environment with high probability, or require that the desired outcome to be approximately implemented under every nearby type.[5]

Our notion of robust implementation departs from Kajii and Morris (1997) by imposing a key restriction on the set of perturbations considered by the mechanism designer: We do not allow for perturbations in which agents' payoffs depend *directly* on the messages they send to the mechanism. In our example, each expert submits a private report to the CEO that is not publicly observed, so it is reasonable to assume that the experts do not have intrinsic preferences about which report to send *per se*; rather, they care about the reports only through the decisions and bonuses that these reports affect. This restriction is also common in other mechanism design problems, since "*the messages of the mechanism are not primitives but are endogenous objects to be chosen by the mechanism designer*" (Aghion *et al.*, 2012, p. 1846).

We construct mechanisms that robustly implement the desired social choice function in two situations: First, when agents' learning costs are uniformly bounded above across all perturbations considered by the mechanism designer. In our example, this might correspond to situations in which the CEO is confident that experts can review the contract within a given time frame. Second, when there exists a state whose ex ante probability of occurrence is strictly greater than that of any other state. This condition holds generically. In the CEO–experts example, it holds when the probability that the contract is sound is not exactly equal to $1/2$.[6]

We now describe the mechanism obtained in Theorem 2 for the special case of the CEO–experts example. To fix ideas, suppose that the probability that the contract is sound is strictly less than $1/2$ (*i.e.* the offer made by the other party is more likely to be flawed than sound). Each expert is given a message space with *three* messages. The first message corresponds to the ex ante most likely state (*i.e.* the contract is not sound) and is called the *status quo message*. The second message is a *confident message* which may be interpreted as saying that the expert is confident that the contract is sound. The third message is a *confession message*, and may be interpreted as saying that the expert confesses that he is biased and wants the CEO to sign the contract.

The implemented outcome is as follows: the CEO abstains from signing the contract when at least one expert sends the status quo message, and signs the contract otherwise. Therefore, under our mechanism, the confession message and the confident message lead to the same outcome for each possible message coming from the other expert.

In terms of transfers, both experts receive the highest bonuses when both of them send the confident message, but they both receive no bonus when one of them sends the confident message and the other one does not. By contrast, sending the confession message or the status quo message results in a smaller but positive bonus as long as the other expert does not send the confident message.

In the more general case in which there are n states, each agent is given a message space with $2n - 1$ messages. One of these messages corresponds to the ex ante most likely state, and is called the status quo message. The remaining $2n - 2$ messages are divided into pairs that are associated with each of the $n - 1$ remaining states. The two messages corresponding to state θ have the following interpretations: One of them is a confident message which means "I am confident that the state is θ," and the other message is a confession message which means "I confess

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5. In our paper, "robust implementation" refers to our notion of *locally* robust implementation. In Section 5.1, we consider the stronger notion of globally robust implementation, according to which players' payoffs may differ from those of the unperturbed environment with significant probability.

6. This condition is required only when the state space is finite. Supplementary Appendix A extends our robust implementation results to a continuum of states without imposing this condition.

that I am biased in favor of the outcome implemented in state θ." The implemented outcome and transfers are similar to the two-state example and are described explicitly in Section 4.2.

We then turn our attention to other notions of robust implementation found in the literature, and show that robust implementation according to these notions is often impossible.

First, we consider the case of implementation that is *global* in the sense that we allow agents' preferences and costs to be differ from those of the unperturbed environment with probability bounded away from zero. We show that even if we require only *approximate* partial implementation, it is impossible to robustly implement *any* non-constant social choice function in this global sense.

Second, we examine the possibility of full (or more precisely, virtual) implementation, that is, of approximately implementing the desired social choice function for all, rather than some, equilibria following the choice of a mechanism by the designer. We show that if either (1) agents' costs of learning in the unperturbed environment are above some cut-off that depends only agent's utility functions in the unperturbed environment or (2) agents' payoff functions in the unperturbed environment are state-independent, then under every finite mechanism, there exists an equilibrium in which no agent learns the state. This result implies that under each of these two conditions, no finite mechanism can virtually implement any non-constant social choice function.[7] We also provide a sufficient condition for virtual implementation: When at least one agent's preference and the social choice function jointly satisfy a strict version of Rochet's (1987) cyclical monotonicity condition and this agent's cost of learning is small enough, the mechanism designer can virtually implement that social choice function by ignoring the report of the other agent.

Third, we examine the possibility of robust partial implementation in an *interim* sense. Adapting to our setting the notion of robust interim implementation used by Oury and Tercieux (2012),[8] we show that no finite mechanism can robustly implement any non-constant social choice function when agents' costs of learning the state in the *unperturbed environment* are above some cut-off, even when the mechanism designer is allowed to use unbounded monetary transfers.

Although we construct mechanisms that robustly implement desired social choice functions, we do not compute the lowest transfer needed to achieve robust implementation. Although it would be valuable to determine the lowest cost of implementation, computing it seems challenging because it would require precise knowledge of the set of *all* mechanisms that can robustly implement the desired social choice function, which to the best of our knowledge, remains an open question.

We view our results showing that it is *possible* to robustly implement the desired outcome via mechanisms with relatively few messages as an important first step for the study of robust implementation.[9] Our results stand in contrast to impossibility results under interim notions of robust implementation, such as our Theorem 6 and the results in Oury and Tercieux (2012).

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7. This result echoes Strulovici (2021), who shows in a sequential model of learning that when agents' preferences are state independent, implementation is impossible even in a partial sense when signals about the state of the world are subject to an information attrition condition.

8. Oury and Tercieux (2012) consider environments without costly learning and with bounded utilities, which stands in contrast to our setting where agents need to learn the state at some cost and agents' utilities are unbounded.

9. This first step is, in spirit, similar to the results of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves, who show that the socially efficient outcome is dominant-strategy implementable but leave open the question of finding the lowest cost to implement the socially efficient outcome. Similarly, in the dynamic mechanism design literature, one of Pavan *et al.*'s (2014) main contributions is to provide a necessary condition for an allocation to be implementable.

We also compute the expected transfers made to the agents under our mechanisms. These expected transfers provide an *upper bound* on the minimum cost to achieve robust implementation. In the CEO–experts example, the upper bound on the bonuses under our mechanism is a linear function of the experts' costs of reviewing the contract in the *unperturbed environment* (see equation (4.14)). Therefore, if the experts' costs of reviewing the contract is small relative to the value of signing a good contract and the cost of signing a flawed contract, our assumption that the CEO focuses exclusively on robustly implementing the right outcome (as opposed to also taking explicitly into account the cost of implementation) may be reasonable as a first-order approximation.

Outline

Section 2 presents an example in which we explain, first, why mechanisms that (1) reward agents a fixed amount when their reports match and (2) give agents no transfer and randomize across outcomes when their reports mismatch, *cannot* robustly implement the desired outcome. We then introduce new mechanisms in the context of this example and provide intuition for why these mechanisms are robust against types that are biased in favour of certain outcomes and types that have high costs of learning. The general model is then introduced in Section 3, and our main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents impossibility results for stronger notions of robust implementation. Section 6 reviews the related literature. Extensions and other robustness results are given in the Supplementary Appendix.

2. EXAMPLE

Suppose there are two outcomes $y \in Y \equiv \{y^1, y^2\}$ and two states of the world $\theta \in \Theta \equiv \{\theta^1, \theta^2\}$. Let $q \in (0, 1)$ be the prior probability that the state is θ^2. The mechanism designer knows q but not θ. Her objective is to implement y^1 in state θ^1 and to implement y^2 in state θ^2.

The designer commits to a mechanism $\mathcal{M} = \{M_1, M_2, g, t_1, t_2\}$ in order to elicit information from two agents, where M_i is a finite set of messages for agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$, $g : M_1 \times M_2 \to [0, 1]$ is a mapping from messages to the probability of implementing y^1, and $t_i : M_1 \times M_2 \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is the transfer to agent i. Importantly, t_1 and t_2 depend only on the messages, not on the realized state.

Each agent decides whether to learn the state at cost c. His learning decision and the information he obtains are both private: they are observed neither by the designer nor by the other agent. Agent i's payoff is $t_i - cd_i$, where $d_i \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes his decision of whether to learn the state.

2.1. *Partial implementation without robustness*

When agents' payoffs are common knowledge, the designer can implement the desired social choice function (y^1 in state θ^1 and y^2 in state θ^2) via a *Maskin mechanism*: Each agent is asked to report the state. The outcome and the transfers are:

outcome	θ^1	θ^2	transfers	θ^1	θ^2
θ^1	y^1	y^1 with prob $1/2$	θ^1	R, R	$0, 0$
θ^2	y^1 with prob $1/2$	y^2	θ^2	$0, 0$	R, R

where the first table specifies the mapping from messages to lotteries over outcomes and the second table specifies the mapping from messages to transfers.

When the reward $R > 0$ is large relative to agents' cost of learning c, there is an equilibrium in which both agents pay the learning cost and report the state truthfully.

2.2. *Failure of maskin mechanisms with biased agents*

Maskin mechanisms fail to implement the desired social choice function—*even approximately*—when agents can have biases over outcomes with small but positive probability.

We illustrate such failures with a class of perturbations inspired by Rubinstein's (1989) email game. Suppose that nature draws a random variable ω from a countable set $\Omega \equiv \{\omega_0, \omega_1, \omega_2, \ldots\}$ according to the geometric distribution $\Pr(\omega = \omega_t) = \eta(1 - \eta)^t$ for every $t \in \mathbb{N}$, where $\eta > 0$ is a parameter close to 0. We assume that ω is independent of the state θ.

Agent 1 observes which element of the partition $\{\omega_0\}, \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}, \{\omega_3, \omega_4\}, \ldots$ the realized ω belongs to before deciding whether to learn θ and what message to send. Likewise, agent 2 observes which element of the partition $\{\omega_0, \omega_1\}, \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}, \ldots$ the realized ω belongs to before deciding whether to learn θ and what message to send. An agent's *type* is the partition cell that he observes. After observing his own type, each agent updates his belief about the other agent's type according to Bayes rule.[10] The distribution of ω has the property that, whenever an agent observes a cell $\{\omega_k, \omega_{k+1}\}$ of his partition, this agent assigns strictly higher probability to $\omega = \omega_k$ than to $\omega = \omega_{k+1}$.

Agent 2's payoff is $t_2 - cd_2$ at every $\omega \in \Omega$. Agent 1's payoff is $t_1 - cd_1$ at every $\omega \neq \omega_0$. When $\omega = \omega_0$, agent 1's payoff is $t_1 - cd_1 + B \cdot \mathbf{1}\{y = y^1\}$, that is, he receives a benefit $B > 0$ if outcome y^1 is implemented. This perturbation is *small* when η is close to 0 in the sense that agents' payoffs coincide with those in the unperturbed environment when $\omega \neq \omega_0$, and $\Pr(\omega \neq \omega_0) = 1 - \eta$.

We show that Maskin mechanisms fail to implement the desired social choice function even when η is arbitrarily close to 0: For any reward $R \in \mathbb{R}_+$, there exists a bias $B > R$ such that no matter how close η is to 0, the perturbed game has a unique equilibrium in which no agent learns the state and both agents report θ^1 regardless of the realized state.[11] As a result, in the unique equilibrium, outcome y^1 is implemented regardless of the realized state.

This conclusion comes from the following contagion argument. When $\omega = \omega_0$, agent 1 is biased in favour of implementing y^1. If B is large enough, he has an incentive to report θ^1 regardless of the realized θ. When $\omega \in \{\omega_0, \omega_1\}$, agent 2 is unbiased, but he believes that agent 1 is biased with probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$, so he believes that agent 1 will report θ^1 with probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ for every realized θ. Since agent 2 maximizes his expected transfer minus his cost of learning, he has a strict incentive to report θ^1 regardless of the realized θ. By induction, all types of both agents will report θ^1 regardless of the realized θ in the unique equilibrium of the perturbed game.

In general, agents may be biased in either direction: some agent types may benefit from implementing y^1 while others may benefit from implementing y^2, and these biases may have

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10. For example, the type of agent 2 who knows that $\omega \in \{\omega_0, \omega_1\}$ assigns probability $\frac{1}{2-\eta}$ to agent 1 being type $\{\omega_0\}$, the type of agent 1 who knows that $\omega \in \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$ assigns probability $\frac{1}{2-\eta}$ to agent 2 being type $\{\omega_0, \omega_1\}$, etc.

11. For Maskin mechanisms to fail, we do not need type ω_0's bias B to be arbitrarily large. Our contagion argument applies when agent 1's payoff when $\omega = \omega_0$ is $-cd_1 + b \cdot \mathbf{1}\{y = y^1\}$, that is, type ω_0 of agent 1 is *purely outcome-driven* in the sense that he does not care about the transfers, and receives a strictly positive benefit $b > 0$ from implementing outcome y^1. Maskin mechanisms fail even when b is arbitrarily small. Our *augmented status quo rule with ascending transfers* can robustly implement the desired social choice function when perturbations can also affect agents' marginal utilities from transfers. The details are available upon request.

arbitrary magnitudes. The mechanism designer faces uncertainty about the direction and magnitude of these biases as well as about agents' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about each other's biases. The mechanism designer aims to design a mechanism that can approximately implement the desired social choice function under every perturbation where agents are unbiased with probability close to 1, but may have arbitrary biases with small probability and may entertain arbitrary beliefs and higher-order beliefs about these biases, as long as those beliefs can be derived from a common prior.

2.3. *Status quo rule with ascending transfers*

We propose a mechanism that implements the desired social choice function when the mechanism designer does not know the direction and magnitude of agents' biases. From now on, we assume that agents' costs of learning are commonly known and equal to some constant c. We later introduce mechanisms to address the case in which the mechanism designer also faces uncertainty about the cost of learning.

Our mechanism asks each agent to report the state, either θ^1 or θ^2. Recall that q is the prior probability that $\theta = \theta^2$. The outcome (first table) and the transfers (second table) are:

outcome	θ^1	θ^2	transfers	θ^1	θ^2
θ^1	y^1	y^1	θ^1	R^1, R^1	$0, 0$
θ^2	y^1	y^2	θ^2	$0, 0$	R^2, R^2

where the magnitude of transfers R^2 and R^1 satisfy $R^2 - R^1 > \frac{2c}{q}$ and $R^1 > \frac{c}{1-q}$.

Our mechanism features a status quo outcome, y^1, which is implemented as long as one agent reports θ^1. Outcome y^2 is implemented if and only if both agents report θ^2. Agents receive strictly positive transfers if and only if their reports coincide. They receive a larger transfer when they both report θ^2 than when they both report θ^1.

To see why this mechanism is robust to the existence of biased types, let us revisit the email game perturbations introduced above: Nature draws a random variable ω from $\Omega = \{\omega_0, \omega_1, \omega_2, \ldots\}$ according to distribution $\Pi \in \Delta(\Omega)$ independently of θ. Agent 1's information partition is $\{\omega_0\}, \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}, \{\omega_3, \omega_4\}, \ldots$ Agent 2's information partition is $\{\omega_0, \omega_1\}, \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}, \ldots$ Agent 2's payoff is $t_2 - cd_2$ at every ω. Agent 1's payoff is $t_1 - cd_1$ at every $\omega \neq \omega_0$. Therefore, every email game perturbation is characterized by the distribution Π and by agent 1's payoff at ω_0.

(1) Suppose first that type ω_0 of agent 1 receives a large benefit from outcome y^1. This type can guarantee y^1 by reporting θ^1 regardless of the realized state. Since $R^2 - R^1 > \frac{2c}{q}$, however, there exists $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ such that $\Pi(\omega_1)$ needs to be less than $\lambda \Pi(\omega_0)$ in order for type $\{\omega_0, \omega_1\}$ of agent 2 to have an incentive to report θ^1 regardless of the realized state. Likewise, $\Pi(\omega_2)$ needs to be less than $\lambda \Pi(\omega_1)$ in order for type $\{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$ of agent 1 to have an incentive to report θ^1 regardless of the realized state, and so on. The upper bounds on these probabilities form a decaying geometric sequence, so the total probability of types that are *infected* by type ω_0 is at most $\sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \lambda^t \Pi(\omega_0) = \frac{1}{1-\lambda} \Pi(\omega_0)$. This expression vanishes to 0 as $\Pi(\omega_0) \to 0$.

(2) Suppose now that type ω_0 of agent 1 receives a large benefit from outcome y^2. If $\Pi(\omega_t) = \eta(1 - \eta)^t$ for every $t \in \mathbb{N}$ and type ω_0 reports θ^2 regardless of the state, then all types of both agents have a strict incentive to report θ^2 regardless of the state, because $R^2 > R^1 > 0$.

However, according to our mechanism, outcome y^2 is implemented only if both agents report θ^2. Therefore, an agent *cannot* implement y^2 when (1) θ^1 is the realized state and (2) the other agent never reports θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1. In this case, paying the cost of learning and reporting θ^1 when the realized state is θ^1 will lead to a strictly positive transfer. The expected value of this transfer exceeds the cost of learning c when $R^1 > \frac{c}{1-q}$.

The above argument only shows why the mechanism we propose may be able to avoid some type of contagion for some specific perturbations. In order to address the general case, we show in the proof of Theorem 1 that under our mechanism, for every perturbation in which both agents are unbiased with probability close to 1, which includes but is not limited to email game perturbations, there always exists an equilibrium in which (1) agents never report θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1 and (2) both agents report the state truthfully with probability close to 1. This equilibrium approximately implements the desired social choice function.

In terms of the connections with Kajii and Morris (1997), in the normal-form game induced by our mechanism where each agent has four strategies, both agents reporting θ^2 regardless of the realized state is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < 1/2$, which implies that under every small perturbation in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997), there exists an equilibrium where with probability close to 1, both agents report θ^2 regardless of the realized state. Under an email game perturbation where type ω_0 of agent 1 directly benefits from reporting θ^2, both agents reporting θ^2 regardless of the realized state is the unique equilibrium of this perturbed game.

We show that in the *restricted game* where agents *cannot* report θ^2 when the state is θ^1, reporting truthfully is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < 1/2$. This implies that under every small perturbation in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997), there exists an equilibrium *in the restricted game* where agents report truthfully with probability close to 1. Once we *rule out* perturbations where agents' payoffs depend directly on their messages, such as the email game perturbation where type ω_0 directly benefits from reporting θ^2, every equilibrium in the restricted game remains to be an equilibrium in the unrestricted game since no type has any incentive to report θ^2 when the state is θ^1 provided that all other types will not report θ^2 when the state is θ^1.

2.4. *Uncertainty about agents' costs of learning*

The mechanism designer may also face uncertainty about agents' costs of learning the state. In addition, one or both agents may be "inept" in the sense of being unable to learn the state. We show that, as long as the prior belief about the state q is not exactly equal $\frac{1}{2}$, there exists a mechanism that approximately implements the desired social choice function when, with probability close to 1, agents are unbiased and have cost of learning c, but with some small probability can have arbitrary biases and costs of learning.

We start by explaining why the *status quo rule with ascending transfers*, which was introduced earlier to address agents' biases, is unable to deal with inept types. For any $0 < R^1 < R^2$, consider an email game perturbation where agent 1's payoff at ω_0 is $t_1 - \widetilde{c}d_1 + B \cdot \mathbf{1}\{y = y^2\}$. We consider perturbations where his benefit from implementing outcome y^2, given by $B > 0$, and his cost of learning $\widetilde{c} > 0$ are large relative to the transfers promised by the mechanism.

When this *high-cost biased type* of agent 1 believes that agent 2 reports θ^2 when the realized state is θ^2, he prefers to report θ^2 when the realized state is θ^2, since he receives a large benefit B from implementing outcome y^2. If this type wants to report θ^1 when the realized state is θ^2, then he needs to pay the cost of learning, but his cost $\widetilde{c}$ outweighs the highest transfer promised by the mechanism. Hence, this type prefers to report θ^2 regardless of the realized state even when he believes that agent 2 will report truthfully. Since $R^2 > R^1$, this causes contagion when the distribution of ω satisfies $\Pi(\omega_t) = \eta(1-\eta)^t$ for every $t \in \mathbb{N}$, no matter how close η is to 0.

2.5. *Augmented status quo rule with ascending transfers*

We propose another mechanism called the *augmented status quo rule with ascending transfers* that solves the problem caused by high-cost biased types. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case in which $q < \frac{1}{2}$. Under this new mechanism, each agent has a third message, which we denote by $-\theta^2$, and which we interpret as the agent *confessing* that he is biased in favour of the desired outcome in state θ^2. Under this new mechanism, the outcome and transfers are given by

outcome	$-\theta^2$	θ^1	θ^2	transfers	$-\theta^2$	θ^1	θ^2
$-\theta^2$	y^2	y^1	y^2	$-\theta^2$	R^0, R^0	R^0, R^0	$0, 0$
θ^1	y^1	y^1	y^1	θ^1	R^0, R^0	R^1, R^1	$0, 0$
θ^2	y^2	y^1	y^2	θ^2	$0, 0$	$0, 0$	R^2, R^2

where $\frac{R^0}{R^2} \approx 1$, and $R^2 - R^1$, $R^1 - R^0$, and R^0 are bounded below by some linear function of c.

According to our new mechanism, the confession message $-\theta^2$ implements the same outcome as message θ^2 regardless of the other agent's message; each agent can unilaterally implement the status quo outcome y^1 by reporting message θ^1; and coordinating on the confession message $-\theta^2$ leads to a lower transfer R^0 than coordinating on any other message, but reporting the confession message leads to a positive transfer as long as the other agent does not report θ^2. By contrast, reporting θ^2 leads to a positive transfer if and only if the other agent also reports θ^2.

We now explain why including the confession message makes the mechanism robust to high-cost biased types. First, we note that if agent 1 believes that agent 2 will never send message θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1 (but agent 2 may send messages $-\theta^2$ and θ^1), then regardless of agent 1's preference over outcomes and his cost of learning, agent 1 prefers sending $-\theta^2$ in both states to sending θ^2 in both states. The reason is that (1) both strategies induce the same outcome regardless of agent 2's message, (2) none of the two strategies requires any cost of learning, and (3) agent 1's expected transfer for sending $-\theta^2$ in both states equals $R^0 \Pr(m_2 \neq \theta^2)$ and agent 1's expected transfer for sending θ^2 in both states equals $R^2 \Pr(m_2 = \theta^2)$. As long as agent 2 does not send message θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1, we have $\Pr(m_2 \neq \theta^2) \geq \Pr(\theta = \theta^1) = 1 - q$ and $\Pr(m_2 = \theta^2) \leq \Pr(\theta = \theta^2) = q$. Since $q < \frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{R^0}{R^2} \approx 1$, reporting $-\theta^2$ in both states leads to a higher expected transfer than reporting θ^2 in both states. Hence, the high-cost biased type prefers sending message $-\theta^2$ in both states over sending message θ^2 in both states.

The second key observation is that when a type sends $-\theta^2$ in both states, the total probability of types that it can infect is bounded above by a linear function of the probability of this type. This is because sending message $-\theta^2$ leads to a transfer of at most R^0, while coordinating on message θ^1 or coordinating on message θ^2 results in strictly greater transfers R^1 and R^2. Every type of agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$ whose payoff is $t_i - cd_i$ prefers to pay the learning cost and to report the state truthfully, as long as he believes that (1) no type of the other agent reports θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1 and (2) with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, the other agent reports the state truthfully.

Our proof, which covers perturbations in which agents may have arbitrarily high learning costs, generalizes the above argument and shows that under every perturbation in which, with probability close to 1, agents are unbiased and have costs of learning equal to c, there is an equilibrium in which (1) agents never send θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1 and (2) with probability close to 1, agents send θ^2 when the realized state is θ^2 and send θ^1 when the realized state is θ^1. Such an equilibrium implements the desired social choice function with probability close to 1.

Similar to the status quo rule with ascending transfers, in the normal-form game induced by the augmented status quo rule, both agents reporting θ^2 regardless of the realized state is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < 1/2$. Under an email game perturbation where type ω_0 of agent 1 directly benefits from reporting θ^2, both agents reporting θ^2 regardless of the realized state is the unique equilibrium. However, in the *restricted* game where agents *cannot* report θ^2 when the realized state is θ^1, reporting truthfully is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < 1/2$. This implies that under every small perturbation in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997), there exists an equilibrium *in the restricted game* where agents report the state truthfully with probability close to 1. Once we *rule out* perturbations where agents' payoffs depend directly on their messages, every equilibrium in the restricted game remains to be an equilibrium in the unrestricted game since every type strictly prefers to report $-\theta^2$ in both states than to report θ^2 in both states.

3. MODEL

3.1. *Unperturbed environment*

A designer wants to implement a social choice function $f : \Theta \to \Delta(Y)$ where Θ is a finite set of states and Y is a set of outcomes.[12] The typical elements in these sets are $\theta \in \Theta$ and $y \in Y$. Let $n \equiv |\Theta|$ be the number of states. Let $q \in \Delta(\Theta)$ be the objective distribution of θ, with $q(\theta)$ the probability of state θ. We assume that $q(\theta) > 0$ for every $\theta \in \Theta$.

The designer knows q but does not know θ. She commits to a mechanism $\mathcal{M} \equiv \{M_1, M_2, t_1, t_2, g\}$ in order to elicit θ from two agents, where M_i is a *finite* set of messages for agent i, $t_i : M_1 \times M_2 \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is the transfer to agent i, and $g : M_1 \times M_2 \to \Delta(Y)$ is the implemented outcome. Our restriction to finite mechanisms makes our robust implementation results stronger. It is also motivated by the fact that mechanisms with infinitely many messages have undesirable properties.

After observing $\mathcal{M}$, agents simultaneously and independently decide whether to observe θ at some cost. Let $d_i \in \{0, 1\}$ be agent i's decision to obtain information, where $d_i = 1$ represents agent i obtaining information about θ and vice versa. Let $c_i \geq 0$ be agent i's cost of learning.[13] We assume that learning is *covert* in the sense that neither agent $-i$ nor the designer can observe d_i.

Agents then simultaneously send messages $(m_1, m_2) \in M_1 \times M_2$ to the designer, after which the designer makes transfers and implements an outcome according to $\mathcal{M}$. Agent i's payoff is

$$u_i(\theta, y) - c_i d_i + t_i. \tag{3.1}$$

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12. Agents' ability to learn the state of the world may be limited, creating a discrepancy between what agents can learn and what the designer cares about. In this case, we interpret θ as what agents *can* learn, since it is the only information that can be elicited from any mechanism. Supplementary Appendix C shows that our results extend when agents observe noisy private signals about the state after paying their costs of learning. Our main result also holds when there is a continuum of states, as shown in Supplementary Appendix A, under the assumption that the social choice function f and agents' payoff functions in the unperturbed environment (u_1, u_2) are continuous with respect to θ.

13. In our baseline model, each agent either fully learns the state or learns nothing. In Supplementary Appendix B, we generalize our result by allowing agents to choose any partition of the state space as their information structures, and different partitions may incur different costs. In Supplementary Appendix C, we generalize the main result to situations in which agents can only observe *noisy signals* about the state after paying their learning costs.

3.2. *Robust implementation*

We examine whether the designer can *robustly* implement f when agents' preferences over outcomes, their costs of learning the state, and their beliefs and higher-order beliefs about each other's payoffs can differ from those of the baseline setting.

Following Kajii and Morris (1997), a *perturbation* $\mathcal{G} \equiv \{\Omega, \Pi, Q_1, Q_2, \widetilde{u}_1, \widetilde{u}_2, \widetilde{c}_1, \widetilde{c}_2\}$ consists of a countable set of *circumstances* Ω, a distribution $\Pi \in \Delta(\Omega)$ over the set of circumstances which we assume is independent of θ, a partition Q_i of Ω such that agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$ knows which element of the partition Q_i the realized ω belongs to, as well as mappings $\widetilde{u}_i : \Omega \times \Theta \times Y \to \mathbb{R}$, and $\widetilde{c}_i : \Omega \to [0, +\infty]$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$, where $\widetilde{c}_i(\omega) = +\infty$ means that agent i does not have the ability to learn θ at ω. Agent i's payoff under perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ is

$$\widetilde{u}_i(\omega, \theta, y) - \widetilde{c}_i(\omega)d_i + t_i. \tag{3.2}$$

For given $\overline{c} > 0$, we say that $\mathcal{G}$ is a $\overline{c}$-*bounded perturbation* if $\widetilde{c}_i(\omega) \leq \overline{c}$ for every i and ω.

For every $\omega \in \Omega$, let $Q_i(\omega)$ be the partition element of Q_i that contains ω, which we call agent i's *type*. Type $Q_i(\omega)$ is a *normal type* if $\widetilde{u}_i(\omega', \theta, y) = u_i(\theta, y)$ and $\widetilde{c}_i(\omega') = c_i$ for every $\omega' \in Q_i(\omega)$, that is, type $Q_i(\omega)$ of agent i knows that his payoff in the perturbed environment coincides with his payoff in the unperturbed environment. We introduce our notion of *small perturbations*:

η-Perturbation. For every $\eta \in (0, 1)$, we say that $\mathcal{G}$ is an η-perturbation if

$$\Pi \text{ (both agents are normal types)} \geq 1 - \eta. \tag{3.3}$$

We say that $\mathcal{G}$ is a $\overline{c}$-bounded η-perturbation if $\mathcal{G}$ is an η-perturbation and is $\overline{c}$-bounded.

Intuitively, a perturbation is *small* if agents' payoffs coincide with those in the unperturbed environment with probability close to one, but their payoffs can be very different from the unperturbed environment with small but positive probability. Even though every normal-type agent's payoff coincides with his payoff in the unperturbed environment, he may believe that the other agent is not normal, and may believe that the other agent thinks that he is not normal, and so on. The email game perturbations considered in Section 2 are η-perturbations since both agents are normal types when $\omega \in \Omega \backslash \{\omega_0\}$, and the event $\Omega \backslash \{\omega_0\}$ occurs with probability $1 - \eta$ under Π.

The designer faces uncertainty about the perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ when she designs the mechanism. After observing the perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ and the mechanism $\mathcal{M}$, the two agents are playing an incomplete information game, which we denote by $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$. A typical strategy profile of this game is denoted by σ. Let $g_\sigma(\theta) \in \Delta(Y)$ be the implemented lottery over outcomes conditional on the state being θ when the designer commits to outcome function g and agents behave according to σ.

Like Oury and Tercieux (2012), we focus on *partial* implementation: the designer requires only that f be implemented in at least *one* equilibrium, not necessarily all equilibria. Our main results in Section 4 examine whether the designer can design a mechanism that approximately implements f for *all* small enough perturbations.[14]

(1) We say that $\mathcal{M}$ *robustly implements* f if for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$ such that for every η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ of the game induced by $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$,

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14. Using the results in Morris *et al.* (2023), our theorems can be extended to a stronger notion of robust implementation: Mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ robustly implements f if for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$ such that for every perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ under which agents' payoffs are η-close to those in the unperturbed environment with probability at least $1 - \eta$, there exists an equilibrium that implements $f(\theta)$ with probability more than $1 - \varepsilon$ for every $\theta \in \Theta$.

such that

$$\max_{\theta \in \Theta} \|g_{\sigma(\mathcal{G})}(\theta) - f(\theta)\|_{\mathrm{TV}} < \varepsilon, \tag{3.4}$$

where $\|\cdot\|_{TV}$ is the total variation distance between two distributions.

(2) We say that $\mathcal{M}$ *robustly implements* f for all $\bar{c}$-*bounded perturbations* if for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$ such that for every $\bar{c}$-bounded η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ of the incomplete information game induced by $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$ such that inequality (3.4) holds.

We do not characterize the lowest expected transfer needed to robustly implement f. Doing so would likely require knowing the set of games for which there exist robust equilibria that implement f, which to the best of our knowledge, remains an open question. However, we do compute the expected transfer that is needed to robustly implement f under the mechanisms we propose. This transfer may be viewed as an *upper bound* on the cost needed to robustly implement f.

Formally, we say that mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ robustly implements f with cost no more than $T \in \mathbb{R}_+$ if for every $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\xi > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$ such that for every η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ of the game induced by $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$ such that inequality (3.4) is satisfied and, moreover, $\mathbb{E}[t_1(m_1, m_2) + t_2(m_1, m_2)|\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G}, \sigma(\mathcal{G})] \leq T + \xi$.

3.3. *Two remarks on the modelling assumptions*

First, we assume that the realized perturbation is common knowledge among the agents but is unknown to the designer. This assumption is standard in the robust mechanism design literature (*e.g.* Chung and Ely, 2007). It fits applications in which (1) the designer sets rules in advance without knowing the specific circumstances that the firm or the society will be facing, but (2) agents do know the particular circumstances they are facing when they decide on how to react to the mechanism.

Since both agents can observe the perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, one may wonder whether the designer could ask both agents to report $\mathcal{G}$, and punish both agents if their reports do not coincide (*e.g.* by implementing a particular outcome or by giving them negative transfers).

Although this possibility would be worth exploring, we make two observations. First, our focus on *finite mechanisms* precludes such a possibility, since there are infinitely many perturbations. Soliciting information about the realized perturbation requires the use of infinite mechanisms. Moreover, asking agents to report complicated objects such as the realized perturbation may be difficult and intractable in practice. Second, when only two agents can learn the state, it is unclear whether there exists a mechanism that can induce all agent types to report the realized perturbation truthfully. The reason is that agents' preferences in the perturbed environment can be arbitrary, so it is impossible to design a punishment that deters all types from lying. For example, the outcome that punishes some types may constitute an arbitrarily large reward for other types who are strongly biased in favour of this outcome, and may encourage these latter types to lie about the perturbation they observed just for the sake of getting this outcome implemented. Moreover, agents' coordination motives would then imply that a type's incentive to lie about the perturbation may encourage other types to lie as well.

Second, while our mechanisms achieve robust implementation with positive learning costs, we are unaware of similar results even when agents have zero learning cost. If $c_1 = c_2 = 0$ *and* $u_1(\theta, y)$ and $u_2(\theta, y)$ are independent of θ, there is a trivial solution to the robust implementation problem: The designer promises agent 1 a transfer of $-u_1(y)$ and agent 2 a transfer of $-u_2(y)$ whenever she implements outcome y. The normal type of each agent is indifferent between all messages, so there exists an equilibrium where all normal types learn the state and report it

truthfully. However, this solution does not work when u_1 or u_2 depends on θ, or when agents have positive costs of learning.

When $c_1 = c_2 = 0$, and (f, u_1, u_2) satisfies a Maskin monotonicity* condition, which is strictly stronger than the Maskin monotonicity condition in Maskin (1999) and Chen *et al.* (2021) show that there exists a finite mechanism that fully implements f under the solution concept of correlated rationalizability, which implies that their mechanism can fully implement f under the solution concept of correlated equilibrium. According to Proposition 3.2 in Kajii and Morris (1997), the mechanism in Chen *et al.* (2021) can robustly implement f when (f, u_1, u_2) satisfies Maskin monotonicity*. By contrast, our results in Section 4 construct a different class of finite mechanisms that can robustly implement f without any restriction on (f, u_1, u_2).

4. MAIN RESULTS

Theorem 1 shows that every f is robustly implementable when agents' costs of learning are uniformly bounded from above across all the perturbations considered by the designer. Theorem 2 shows that even when arbitrarily large (or infinite) learning costs are allowed, every f is robustly implementable, as long as the state's prior distribution satisfies a generic assumption.

4.1. *Robust implementation with bounded perturbations*

Theorem 1. *For every $\bar{c} > 0$ and $f : \Theta \to \Delta(Y)$, there exists a mechanism with $n \equiv |\Theta|$ messages for each agent that robustly implements f for all $\bar{c}$-bounded perturbations.*

For simplicity, in the main text, we prove all our results under the assumptions that $u_1(\theta, y) = u_2(\theta, y) = 0$ and $c_1 = c_2 = c$, that is, that each *normal type*'s payoff is equal to his transfer minus his cost of learning and the normal types of both agents face the same cost c. Types that are not normal can have arbitrary payoffs $\widetilde{u}_i(\omega, \theta, y)$ and $\widetilde{c}_i(\omega)$. The proofs for general utility functions (u_1, u_2) and heterogeneous costs of learning are in Appendix A and do not present additional challenges.

Proof. We propose a mechanism called the *status quo rule with ascending transfers*. Let $\Theta \equiv \{\theta^1, \dots, \theta^n\}$. Each agent's message space is given by $M_1 = M_2 \equiv M \equiv \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. The outcome function is

$$g(m_1, m_2) = \begin{cases} f(\theta^{m_1}) & \text{if } m_1 = m_2 \\ f(\theta^1) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{4.1}$$

The transfer function for agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$ is

$$t_i(m_i, m_{-i}) = \begin{cases} R^j & \text{if } m_1 = m_2 = j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \tag{4.2}$$

where $R^1 > \frac{\bar{c}}{q(\theta^1)}$, $R^j > R^1$ for every $j \geq 2$, and $\sum_{j=2}^n (R^j - R^1) q(\theta^j) > 2c$.[15]

In the *unperturbed game* induced by our mechanism, an agent's pure strategy can be described as an n-dimensional vector $(m^1, \dots, m^n)$, where $m^j \in M$ is the message that the agent sends when the state is θ^j. If agent 1 uses strategy $(m_1^1, \dots, m_1^n)$ and agent 2 uses strategy

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15. The mechanism for general (u_1, u_2, c_1, c_2) has the same outcome function. The transfers satisfy equations (A.1) and (A.2).

$(m_2^1, \ldots, m_2^n)$, then agent i's expected payoff equals

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j) \left\{ t_i(m_1^j, m_2^j) + u_i(\theta^j, g(m_1^j, m_2^j)) \right\} - \left(1 - \mathbf{1}\{m_i^1 = \cdots = m_i^n\}\right) c_i. \qquad (4.3)$$

When $u_1 = u_2 = 0$ and $c_1 = c_2 = c$—the case we focus on in the main text—agent i's expected payoff equals

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j) t_i(m_1^j, m_2^j) - \left(1 - \mathbf{1}\{m_i^1 = \cdots = m_i^n\}\right) c. \qquad (4.4)$$

In the incomplete information game induced by $\mathcal{M}$ and perturbation $\mathcal{G} = \{\Omega, \Pi, Q_1, Q_2, \widetilde{u}_1, \widetilde{u}_2, \widetilde{c}_1, \widetilde{c}_2\}$, a *type*'s pure strategy is also given by $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$, where $m^j \in M$ is the message that this type sends when the state is θ^j. A *pure strategy profile* $\{(m_i^1(\omega), \ldots, m_i^n(\omega))\}_{i \in \{1,2\}, \omega \in \Omega}$ describes each agent i's message $m_i^j(\omega)$ for each state θ^j and circumstance ω, and must satisfy the restriction that $m_i^j(\omega)$ be measurable with respect to Q_i for every $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. For every $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $\omega^* \in \Omega$, the expected payoff for type $Q_i(\omega^*)$ of agent i's is given by

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j) \mathbb{E}_\omega \left[t_i(m_1^j(\omega), m_2^j(\omega)) + \widetilde{u}_i \left(\omega, \theta^j, g(m_1^j(\omega), m_2^j(\omega)) \right) \Big| Q_i(\omega^*) \right]$$
$$- \left(1 - \mathbf{1}\{m_i^1(\omega^*) = \cdots = m_i^n(\omega^*)\}\right) \mathbb{E}_\omega \left[\widetilde{c}_i(\omega) \Big| Q_i(\omega^*) \right]. \qquad (4.5)$$

Let $\Sigma \equiv \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}^n$ denote the set of pure strategies. Agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$ is *truthful* if he uses strategy $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$, that is, if he truthfully reports the index of the realized state. We define $\Sigma^* \subset \Sigma$ as:

$$\Sigma^* \equiv \left\{ (m^1, \ldots, m^n) \in \Sigma \text{ such that } m^j \in \{1, j\} \text{ for every } j \geq 1 \right\}. \qquad (4.6)$$

If an agent's strategy belongs to Σ^*, then in every state θ^j, this agent either sends the status quo message 1 or reports the state truthfully by sending message j. For example, when $n = 2$, $\Sigma^* = \{(1, 1), (1, 2)\}$, while $\Sigma = \{(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)\}$.

4.1.1. Roadmap. The rest of the proof consists of three steps. First, we study a restricted game where agents can only use strategies in Σ^*. We show that both agents reporting the state truthfully, that is, using strategy $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$, is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < 1/2$. Next, we apply the critical path lemma in Kajii and Morris (1997), which implies that under every small perturbation, there exists an equilibrium in the *perturbed restricted game* where agents report truthfully with probability close to 1. Then, we show that even when the agents can use any strategy in Σ, no type of any agent has any incentive to deviate to strategies that belong to $\Sigma \backslash \Sigma^*$ provided that the other agent's strategy belongs to Σ^*. This verifies that every equilibrium in the perturbed restricted game remains to be an equilibrium in the *perturbed game without any restriction*.

Step 1. The first step examines a *restricted game without perturbation* where both agents are only allowed to use (mixed) strategies in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$ and it is common knowledge that agents' payoffs are $t_1 - cd_1$ and $t_2 - cd_2$. For any given $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, a γ-*dominant equilibrium* is a Nash equilibrium where every agent finds it strictly optimal to play his equilibrium strategy when he believes that the other agent will play their equilibrium with probability at least γ.

Lemma 1. *In the restricted game without perturbation, there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium.*

Proof. In the restricted game without perturbation, agents can only send message 1 conditional on $\theta = \theta^1$ and, for every $j \geq 2$, agents can only send message 1 or message j conditional on $\theta = \theta^j$.

- If agent 1 sends message j in state θ^j, his expected transfer equals $\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j)R^j$.
- If agent 1 sends message 1 in state θ^j, his expected transfer equals $\Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^j)R^1$.

Suppose agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, $\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j) \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $\Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^j) \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Since $R^j > R^1$ for every $j \geq 2$, agent 1 strictly prefers strategy $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ to any other strategy $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$ that belongs to Σ^* but is neither $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ nor $(1, 1, \ldots, 1)$. Since $\sum_{j=2}^{n}(R^j - R^1)q(\theta^j) > 2c$, agent 1's expected payoff under $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ minus that under $(1, 1, \ldots, 1)$ is at least $\sum_{j=2}^{n} \frac{1}{2}(R^j - R^1)q(\theta^j) - c$, which is strictly positive. Since each agent *strictly* prefers $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ to any other strategy in Σ^* when he believes that the other agent is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium. □

Step 2. For any $\mathcal{G}$, consider a *restricted game with perturbation $\mathcal{G}$* where agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$'s payoff is $\widetilde{u}_i(\omega, \theta, y) - \widetilde{c}_i(\omega)d_i + t_i$, and agents are only allowed to use strategies in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$. Since there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium in the restricted game without perturbation, the critical path lemma in Kajii and Morris (1997) implies that:

Lemma 2. *For every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$, such that for every η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ in the restricted game with perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, under which the probability with which both agents being truthful is greater than $1 - \varepsilon$.*

Since $g(j, j) = f(\theta^j)$ for every $j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, f is implemented when both agents are truthful, which occurs with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon$ when agents behave according to $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$.

Step 3. We show that for every $\mathcal{G}$, the equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ constructed in the previous step remains an equilibrium under perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ when agents can use any strategy in the set $\Delta(\Sigma)$.

Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a type $Q_1(\omega)$ who strictly prefers $(m^1, \ldots, m^n) \notin \Sigma^*$ to all strategies in Σ^* when agent 2 behaves according to $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$. Let us define a new strategy $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$ for agent 1 as follows:

$$m_*^j \equiv \begin{cases} m^j & \text{if } m^j \in \{1, j\} \\ 1 & \text{if } m^j \notin \{1, j\} \end{cases} \quad \text{for every } j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}.$$

By construction, $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n) \in \Sigma^*$. We compare type $Q_1(\omega)$'s expected payoff from $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$ to his expected payoff from $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$.

(1) First, $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$ and $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$ lead to the same joint distribution of (θ, y) when agent 2's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$. This is because $m_*^j = m^j$ when $m^j \in \{1, j\}$; and when $m^j \notin \{1, j\}$, agent 2 sends either 1 or j when the realized state is θ^j. Given the outcome function (4.1), the implemented outcome is $f(\theta^1)$ whenever agent 1 sends a message other than j.

(2) Second, conditional on each state, $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$ gives a weakly greater transfer to agent 1 than does $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$. This is because when the state is θ^j and agent 2's message belongs to $\{1, j\}$, agent 1 receives zero transfer when he sends any message that is neither 1 nor j.

(3) Third, if $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$ requires a strictly greater learning cost compared to $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$, then $m^1 = \cdots = m^n \geq 2$. Conditional on $\theta = \theta^1$, the transfer under m_*^1 is R^1 and the transfer under m^1 is 0 when the other agent's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$. Since $q(\theta^1)R^1 \geq \overline{c}$, the expected transfer from $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$ is greater than $\overline{c}$ plus the expected transfer from $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$.

Since each agent's learning cost is no more than $\overline{c}$ when $\mathcal{G}$ is a $\overline{c}$-bounded perturbation, every type prefers $(m_*^1, \ldots, m_*^n)$ to $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$. This contradicts the hypothesis that type $Q_1(\omega)$ strictly prefers $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$ to all strategies in Σ^*. Since $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ is an equilibrium in the restricted game with perturbation when agents are only allowed to use strategies in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$, $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ remains an equilibrium in the unrestricted game with perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ in which agents can use any strategy in $\Delta(\Sigma)$. $\qquad \square$

4.1.2. Implementation cost. We bound the expected cost to implement f focusing on the case where $u_1 = u_2 = 0$ and $c_1 = c_2 = c$. The cost for the general case is in Appendix A. The expected cost $\mathbb{E}[t_1 + t_2]$ under our mechanism equals $2\sum_{j=1}^n q(\theta^j)R^j$, which can be as low as

$$\frac{2\overline{c}}{\max_{\theta \in \Theta} q(\theta)} + 4c. \tag{4.7}$$

This is because when θ^1 maximizes $q(\theta)$, R^1 can be as low as $\frac{\overline{c}}{\max_{\theta \in \Theta} q(\theta)}$, and the requirement that $\sum_{j=2}^n (R^j - R^1)q(\theta^j) > 2c$ implies that $\sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j)R^j$ can be as low as $2c + R^1\sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j)$.

4.2. *Robust implementation with an ex ante most likely state*

We show that as long as the objective state distribution $q \in \Delta(\Theta)$ satisfies a generic condition, stated below, every f is robustly implementable even when some types have arbitrarily large biases or learning costs, or when some types are inept in the sense that they do not have the ability to learn the state, that is, their cost of learning is $+\infty$.

Definition 1. $q \in \Delta(\Theta)$ is *generic* if there exists $\theta^* \in \Theta$ such that $q(\theta^*) > q(\theta')$, $\forall \theta' \neq \theta^*$.

When there are two states, for instance, this condition rules out the objective state distribution that assigns probability exactly $\frac{1}{2}$ to each state, but allows any other full support distribution. In Supplementary Appendix A, we generalize our result to environments in which (1) there is a continuum of states, (2) the objective distribution q has no atom, and (3) (f, u_1, u_2) are continuous with respect to the state. In that environment, the generic condition is no longer required and our result holds for all full support distributions.

Theorem 2. *Suppose q is generic. For every social choice function $f : \Theta \to \Delta(Y)$, there exists a mechanism with $2|\Theta| - 1$ messages for each agent that robustly implements f.*

Proof. We propose a mechanism called the *augmented status quo rule with ascending transfers*. When q is generic, we can write $\Theta \equiv \{\theta^1, \ldots, \theta^n\}$ such that $q(\theta^1) > q(\theta^2) \geq \cdots \geq q(\theta^n) > 0$.

Consider a mechanism where each agent's message space is given by $M_1 = M_2 = M = \{-n, \ldots, -2\} \cup \{1\} \cup \{2, \ldots, n\}$. The outcome function is

$$g(m_1, m_2) = \begin{cases} f(\theta^{|m_1|}) & \text{if } |m_1| = |m_2| \\ f(\theta^1) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{4.8}$$

The transfer function for agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$ is

$$t_i(m_i, m_{-i}) = \begin{cases} R^j & \text{if } m_1 = m_2 = j \geq 1 \\ R^0 & \text{if } m_1, m_2 \leq 1 \text{ but } (m_1, m_2) \neq (1, 1) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \tag{4.9}$$

where $R^n, \ldots, R^0$ satisfy $\min\{R^n, \ldots, R^2\} > R^1 > R^0 > 0$,

$$\sum_{j=2}^{n} q(\theta^j)(R^j - R^1) > 2c, \tag{4.10}$$

and

$$\frac{R^0}{R^j} > \frac{q(\theta^j)}{q(\theta^1)} \quad \text{for every } j \geq 2. \tag{4.11}$$

When q is generic, there exist $R^n, \ldots, R^0$ that satisfy these inequalities. Our mechanism when there are two states is presented in Section 2. When there are three states, our mechanism is given by

g	-3	-2	1	2	3	t_1, t_2	-3	-2	1	2	3
-3	$f(\theta^3)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^3)$	-3	R^0, R^0	R^0, R^0	R^0, R^0	$0, 0$	$0, 0$
-2	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^2)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^2)$	$f(\theta^1)$	-2	R^0, R^0	R^0, R^0	R^0, R^0	$0, 0$	$0, 0$
1	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	1	R^0, R^0	R^0, R^0	R^1, R^1	$0, 0$	$0, 0$
2	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^2)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^2)$	$f(\theta^1)$	2	$0, 0$	$0, 0$	$0, 0$	R^2, R^2	$0, 0$
3	$f(\theta^3)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^1)$	$f(\theta^3)$	3	$0, 0$	$0, 0$	$0, 0$	$0, 0$	R^3, R^3

An agent's (or an agent type's) *pure strategy* is $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$, where $m^j \in M$ represents the message he sends when the state is θ^j. He pays the cost of learning unless $m^1 = \cdots = m^n$. An agent is *truthful* if he uses strategy $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$, according to which he reports the index of the realized state. Let $\Sigma \equiv \{-n, \ldots, -2, 1, 2, \ldots, n\}^n$ be the set of pure strategies. Let

$$\Sigma^* \equiv \Big\{(m^1, \ldots, m^n) \in \Sigma \text{ such that } m^j \in \{-n, \ldots, -2, 1\} \cup \{j\} \text{ for every } j \geq 1\Big\}. \tag{4.12}$$

By definition, if an agent's strategy belongs to Σ^*, then conditional on each state θ^j, he either sends a negative message, or sends the status quo message 1, or sends message j. For example, when $n = 2$, $\Sigma^* = \{(-2, -2), (-2, 1), (-2, 2), (1, -2), (1, 1), (1, 2)\}$, while $\Sigma = \Sigma^* \bigcup \{(2, -2), (2, 1), (2, 2)\}$.

4.2.1. Roadmap. The rest of the proof consists of three steps. First, we examine a restricted game where agents can only use strategies in Σ^*. We show that both agents using strategy $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < 1/2$. Next, we apply the critical path lemma in Kajii and Morris (1997), which implies that under every small perturbation, there exists an equilibrium in the *perturbed restricted game* where agents use strategy $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ with probability close to 1. Then, we show that even when the agents can use any strategy in Σ, no agent has any incentive to deviate to strategies that belong to $\Sigma \backslash \Sigma^*$ provided that the other agent will use strategies in Σ^*.

Step 1. We examine a restricted game *without* perturbation in which it is common knowledge that payoffs are $t_1 - cd_1$ and $t_2 - cd_2$,[16] and both agents are only allowed to use strategies in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$.

We show that there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium in the restricted game without perturbation. Suppose agent 1 believes that agent 2 plays $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$ and that agent 2's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$.

- For every $j \geq 2$, conditional on $\theta = \theta^j$, agent 1's expected transfer equals $\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j)R^j$ if he sends message j, and is at most $\Pr(m_2 \leq 1|\theta^j)R^1$ if he sends message 1 or any negative message. If he believes that agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, then $\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j)R^j > \Pr(m_2 \leq 1|\theta^j)R^1$ given that $R^j > R^1$.
- Conditional on $\theta = \theta^1$, agent 1's expected transfer equals $\Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^1)R^1 + \Pr(m_2 \leq -2|\theta^1)R^0$ if he sends message 1 and equals R^0 if he sends any negative message. If he believes that agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, then $\Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^1)R^1 + \Pr(m_2 \leq -2|\theta^1)R^0 > R^0$ given that $R^1 > R^0$.

The discussion above implies that agent 1 strictly prefers the truthful strategy to any other non-constant strategy that belongs to Σ^*. Agent 1's expected payoff from using a constant strategy in Σ^* is at most $\sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j)R^1 \Pr(m_2 \leq 1|\theta^j)$, while his expected payoff from being truthful is at least $\sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j)R^j \Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j)$. Inequality (4.10) implies that $\sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j)R^j \Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j) > c + \sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j)R^1 \Pr(m_2 \leq 1|\theta^j)$ when agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$. Since agent 1 strictly prefers to be truthful when he believes that agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that agent 1 strictly prefers $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ to any other strategy in Σ^* when (1) agent 2's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$ and (2) agent 2 is truthful with probability at least γ.

Step 2. For any perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, consider a *restricted game with perturbation* $\mathcal{G}$ where agent i's payoff is $\widetilde{u}_i(\omega, \theta, y) - \widetilde{c}_i(\omega)d_i + t_i$, and agents are only allowed to use strategies in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$.

Since there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium in the restricted game without perturbation, the critical path lemma implies that for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$, such that for every η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ in the restricted game perturbed by $\mathcal{G}$ in which both agents are truthful with probability more than $1 - \varepsilon$.

Since $g(j, j) = f(\theta^j)$ for every $j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, f is implemented when both agents are truthful, which occurs with probability more than $1 - \varepsilon$ when agents behave according to $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$.

Step 3. We show that when q is generic and $\{R^n, \ldots, R^1, R^0\}$ satisfy equations (4.10) and (4.11), the equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ in the restricted game with perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ remains an equilibrium in the *unrestricted game with perturbation* $\mathcal{G}$ in which agents can use any strategy in $\Delta(\Sigma)$, not just those in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$.

For this purpose, we only need to show that for every pure strategy that does not belong to Σ^*, there exists a pure strategy that belongs to Σ^* such that every type of agent 1 weakly prefers the latter to the former when he believes that agent 2 plays according to $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$. We consider two cases.

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16. Recall that in the main text, our proof focuses on the case where $u_1 = u_2 = 0$ and $c_1 = c_2 = c$. We explain how to generalize our proof to arbitrary $u_1(\theta, y)$ and $u_2(\theta, y)$, and to heterogeneous costs of learning in Appendix A.

First, for every $(m^1, \ldots, m^n) \notin \Sigma^*$ that is non-constant, let $(m^1_*, \ldots, m^n_*)$ be defined as

$$m^j_* \equiv \begin{cases} m^j & \text{if } m^j \in \{-n, \ldots, -2\} \cup \{1, j\} \\ -m^j & \text{if } m^j \notin \{-n, \ldots, -2\} \cup \{1, j\} \end{cases} \quad \text{for every } j \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}. \qquad (4.13)$$

By construction, $(m^1_*, \ldots, m^n_*) \in \Sigma^*$. Since $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$ is non-constant, $(m^1_*, \ldots, m^n_*)$ does not increase the cost of learning compared to $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$. The outcome function (4.8) ensures that, regardless of whether agent 1 uses strategy $(m^1_*, \ldots, m^n_*)$ or strategy $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$, he will induce the same joint distribution of (θ, y) regardless of agent 2's strategy. When agent 1 believes that agent 2's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$, which is the case when agent 2 plays according to $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$, agent 1 receives a weakly greater transfer from $(m^1_*, \ldots, m^n_*)$ compared to $(m^1, \ldots, m^n)$. This is because sending any message that does not belong to $\{-n, \ldots, -2\} \cup \{1, j\}$ leads to a transfer of 0 in state θ^j when agent 2's message in state θ^j belongs to $\{-n, \ldots, -2\} \cup \{1, j\}$.

Second, for every $(m^1, \ldots, m^n) \notin \Sigma^*$ that satisfies $m^1 = \cdots = m^n$, there exists $k \in \{2, 3, \ldots, n\}$ such that $(m^1, \ldots, m^n) = (k, \ldots, k)$. Let us compare the expected payoff that any given type of agent 1 receives with strategies $(k, \ldots, k)$ and $(-k, \ldots, -k)$. The outcome function in equation (4.8) implies that $(k, \ldots, k)$ and $(-k, \ldots, -k)$ lead to the same joint distribution over (θ, y). None of these strategies requires agent 1 to learn θ. The expected transfer is $\Pr(m_2 = k)R^k$ if agent 1 uses strategy $(k, \ldots, k)$, and is $\Pr(m_2 \leq 1)R^0$ if he uses strategy $(-k, \ldots, -k)$. When every type of agent 2's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$, we have $\Pr(m_2 \leq 1) \geq q(\theta^1)$ and $\Pr(m_2 = k) \leq q(\theta^k)$. Condition (4.11) then implies that $\Pr(m_2 = k)R^k \leq q(\theta^k)R^k < q(\theta^1)R^0 \leq \Pr(m_2 \leq 1)R^0$. Hence, type $Q_1(\omega)$'s expected transfer is weakly greater under $(-k, \ldots, -k)$ compared to that under $(k, \ldots, k)$. $\qquad \square$

4.2.2. Implementation cost. In the case where $u_1 = u_2 = 0$ and $c_1 = c_2 = c$, the expected cost $\mathbb{E}[t_1 + t_2]$ under our mechanism equals $2 \sum_{j=1}^n q(\theta^j)R^j$. A tight lower bound for this is

$$\frac{4c}{\sum_{j=2}^n (q(\theta^1) - q(\theta^j))} + 4c, \qquad (4.14)$$

which is a linear function of the agents' learning cost in the *unperturbed environment*. The calculations are in Appendix A, together with the implementation cost in the general case.

4.3. *Summary of other robustness results*

We discuss other robustness results in the Supplementary Appendix. In Supplementary Appendix A, we extend our results to environments in which there is a continuum of states and both the social choice function and normal types' payoffs are continuous with respect to the state. In Supplementary Appendix B, we extend our results when agents can choose any partition of the state space as their information structures and different partitions have different costs. Supplementary Appendix C modifies our mechanism so that it can robustly implement f when (1) agents tremble with small probability and (2) agents observe noisy private signals about the state after paying their costs of learning. This extension captures situations in which learning the state perfectly is prohibitively costly and agents can only learn an imperfect signal about the state. Supplementary Appendix D examines the robustness of our results when the designer does not know the state distribution q or faces uncertainty about agents' beliefs about the state

(*e.g.* when agents receive noisy private signals about the state before observing the mechanism and the designer does not know the agents' information structures).[17]

5. STRONGER NOTIONS OF ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION

We consider the robust implementation of *non-constant* social choice functions, defined as follows.

Definition 2. Social choice function f is non-constant if there exist θ, θ' such that $f(\theta) \neq f(\theta')$.

Section 5.1 shows that the designer *cannot* robustly implement any non-constant social choice function when we allow for perturbations where agents' payoffs do not coincide with those in the unperturbed environment with high probability. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 show that when agents' costs of learning in the unperturbed environment are above some cut-off, the designer *cannot* approximately implement any non-constant social choice function in all equilibria, and she *cannot* robust-partially implement any non-constant social choice function in an interim sense. Section 5.4 discusses extensions of these results that allow for infinite mechanisms and dynamic mechanisms.

5.1. *Impossibility of globally robust implementation*

First, suppose that perturbations for which $\widetilde{c}_i(\omega)$ is arbitrarily large are allowed, and that agents' payoffs may differ from those of the unperturbed environment with significant probability. In this case, it is easy to see that no finite mechanism can approximately implement any non-constant social choice function. To this end, fix any finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$. Clearly, no agent has any incentive to learn the state when agents' learning costs exceed the maximal transfer promised by mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ plus $\max_{i,\theta,y} |u_i(\theta, y)|$. This implies that f *cannot* be implemented conditional on this event, which can occur with probability bounded above 0.[18]

Next, we show that even when we only consider $\overline{c}$-bounded perturbations, or even when we only consider perturbations where it is common knowledge that agents' costs are c_1 and c_2, no finite mechanism can approximately implement any non-constant social choice function if the probability of normal types is not close to 1.[19]

To state the result formally, we will say that mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ *globally implements f for all $\overline{c}$-bounded perturbations* if for every $\varepsilon > 0$ and every $\overline{c}$-bounded perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, there exists an equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ of incomplete information game $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$ such that $\max_{\theta \in \Theta} \|g_{\sigma(\mathcal{G})}(\theta) - f(\theta)\|_{\mathrm{TV}} < \varepsilon$.

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17. Applying the results in Oyama and Tercieux (2010), we can extend our results to some environments with non-common priors about θ. The details are available upon request.

18. We can also show that when agents' costs of learning in the unperturbed environment are above some cut-off, the impossibility result continues to hold even when the designer's subjective belief about agents' preferences differs from agents' prior belief about each other's preferences: given any non-constant social choice function, there does not exist any finite mechanism that robustly implements the social choice function when the probability of normal types is bounded below 1 under the agents' prior belief. This result holds regardless of the designer's subjective belief about the agents' preferences.

19. Although Theorem 3 holds when we restrict attention to perturbations where the learning costs are bounded, players' utilities need to be unbounded with positive probability. This is because when it is common knowledge that $\widetilde{c}_i \leq \overline{c}$ and $|\widetilde{u}_i(\theta, y)| \leq \overline{u}$ for every $i \in \{1, 2\}$, $\theta \in \Theta$, and $y \in Y$, one can use the Maskin mechanism in Section 2 to robustly implement the desired outcome by setting the transfer R to be large enough such that $R \min_{\theta \in \Theta} q(\theta) \geq 2\overline{u} + \overline{c}$.

Theorem 3. *For every $\bar{c} > 0$ and every $f : \Theta \to \Delta(Y)$ that is non-constant, there exists no finite mechanism that can globally implement f for all $\bar{c}$-bounded perturbations.*

The proof is in Appendix B. Here, we provide some general intuition. For every f that is non-constant, one can find $\theta \in \Theta$ such that $f(\theta)$ does not belong to the convex hull of $\{f(\theta')\}_{\theta' \neq \theta}$, which we denote by Y'. For a mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ to implement f in a perturbation where all types of agent 1 dislike $f(\theta)$ and like outcomes in Y', there must exist a distribution of agent 2's messages under which agent 1's payoff cannot exceed his payoff from $f(\theta)$ no matter which message he sends. This implies that under another perturbation where all types of agent 2 like $f(\theta)$, agent 2 can guarantee his payoff from $f(\theta)$ regardless of agent 1's message, which means that mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ cannot implement any outcome in set Y'.

In fact, the proof of Theorem 3 implies the following corollary, which shows that even if one focuses on *virtual* implementation, no mechanism can virtually implement f when payoff perturbations have a probability that is bounded away from zero.

Corollary 1. *For every $f : \Theta \to \Delta(Y)$ that is non-constant, there exists $k(f) > 0$ such that for every finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ and every $\eta > 0$, there exists a $\bar{c}$-bounded η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, such that for every equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ of the game $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$, we have $\max_{\theta \in \Theta} \|g_{\sigma(\mathcal{G})}(\theta) - f(\theta)\|_{TV} \geq \eta k(f)$.*

Corollary 1 shows that for every finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$, there exists a perturbation $\mathcal{G}$ under which every equilibrium of the incomplete information game induced by $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$ implements a social choice function that is bounded away from f. This corollary shows that, even if one focuses on partial and virtual implementation, robust implementation is possible only if the perturbed environment is *close* to the unperturbed environment.

5.2. *Full implementation and virtual implementation*

We now examine whether the designer can approximately implement f in *all* equilibria under all small enough perturbations. Say that f is *virtually implementable* if for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists a mechanism $\mathcal{M}_\varepsilon$, such that $\|g_\sigma(\theta) - f(\theta)\|_{TV} \leq \varepsilon$ for every $\theta \in \Theta$ and every equilibrium σ under $\mathcal{M}_\varepsilon$.[20] Our first result provides two sufficient conditions under which every non-constant social choice function is not virtually implementable, even with no robustness concern.

Theorem 4. *Suppose f is non-constant.*

(1) If (u_1, u_2) do not depend on θ, then f is not virtually implementable.
(2) For every (u_1, u_2), there exists $\bar{c} > 0$ that depends only on (u_1, u_2) such that f is not virtually implementable when $c_1, c_2 > \bar{c}$.

The proof, in Appendix C, shows that as long as c_1 and c_2 are above some cut-off $\bar{c} > 0$, even when the designer can use arbitrarily large transfers, there always exists an equilibrium where no agent learns the state. Intuitively, suppose agent 1's message does not depend on θ. Since agents' transfers depend only on the messages, the only incentive for agent 2 to learn θ is to induce a more favourable joint distribution of (θ, y) in order to increase $u_2(\theta, y)$. Therefore, agent 2's benefit from learning the state depends only on u_2. When agent 2's cost of learning outweighs this benefit from increasing $u_2(\theta, y)$, he has no incentive to learn provided that agent

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1's message does not depend on θ, no matter how large the promised transfers are. This logic gives rise to equilibria where no agent learns the state and the implemented outcome is the same regardless of the state.

We also provide sufficient conditions under which the desired social choice function f can be robustly implemented in *all* equilibria. Say that f is *robust-fully implementable* if there exists a finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ such that (1) every equilibrium of $\mathcal{M}$ in the unperturbed environment implements f, and (2) for every $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists $\eta > 0$ such that for every η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, $\|g_{\sigma(\mathcal{G})}(\theta) - f(\theta)\|_{TV} \leq \varepsilon$ for every $\theta \in \Theta$ and every equilibrium $\sigma(\mathcal{G})$ of $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{G})$.

As we discussed in Section 3, when $c_1 = c_2 = 0$ and (f, u_1, u_2) satisfies Maskin monotonicity*, Chen *et al.* (2021) construct a finite mechanism that robustly and fully implements f. When $c_1, c_2 > 0$, f is robust-fully implementable when one of the agent's payoff function satisfies a strict version of Rochet's (1987) cyclical monotonicity condition and that c_1 and c_2 are below some cut-off. Formally, (u_i, f) satisfies *strict cyclical monotonicity* if for every permutation $\xi : \Theta \to \Theta$, we have

$$\sum_{\theta \in \Theta} u_i(\theta, f(\theta)) \geq \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} u_i(\theta, f(\xi(\theta))), \tag{5.1}$$

with strict inequality for every ξ that satisfies $f(\xi(\theta)) \neq f(\theta)$ for some $\theta \in \Theta$. Condition (5.1) is the cyclical monotonicity condition. The strict inequality condition has no bite when f is constant, but can be violated when f is non-constant (*e.g.* when u_i does not depend on θ).

Theorem 5. *If (u_i, f) satisfies strict cyclical monotonicity for some $i \in \{1, 2\}$, then there exists $\bar{c} > 0$ such that when $c_i \leq \bar{c}$, there is a finite mechanism that robust-fully implements f.*

The proof is in Appendix D.

5.3. *Interim notion of robust implementation*

Finally, we show that robust implementation in the interim sense is impossible when the costs of learning c_1 and c_2 lie above some cut-off that depends only on the unperturbed preferences u_1 and u_2, and which holds regardless of whether the designer can use arbitrarily large transfers.

We adapt the notion of interim robust implementation in Oury and Tercieux (2012) to our setting. Agents need to pay a cost to learn the state $\theta \in \Theta$. The designer knows the objective state distribution $q \in \Delta(\Theta)$ but faces uncertainty about agents' payoffs and costs of learning, and can use transfers to motivate the agents. Let Y be the set of outcomes, with $y \in Y$. Let Ω be a countable set of circumstances. Agent i's payoff is $\widetilde{u}_i(\omega, \theta, y) - \widetilde{c}_i(\omega)d_i + t_i$. Let $\omega^* \in \Omega$ be such that $\widetilde{u}_i(\omega^*, \theta, y) = u_i(\theta, y)$ and $\widetilde{c}_i(\omega^*) = c_i$ for every (θ, y) and $i \in \{1, 2\}$.

A *model* is denoted by $\mathcal{Z} \equiv (Z, \kappa)$ where $Z \equiv Z_1 \times Z_2$ is a countable type space and $\kappa_i(z_i) \in \Delta(\Omega \times Z_{-i})$ is the belief associated with type $z_i \in Z_i$. For two models $\mathcal{Z} \equiv (Z, \kappa)$ and $\mathcal{Z}' \equiv (Z', \kappa')$, $\mathcal{Z}' \subset \mathcal{Z}$ if $Z' \subset Z$ and $\kappa_i'(z_i')[(\Omega \times Z_{-i}') \cap E] = \kappa_i(z_i')(E)$ for every $z_i' \in Z_i'$ and measurable event $E \subset \Omega \times Z_{-i}$. For each type z_i, one can compute his first-order belief (*i.e.* his belief about ω), his second-order belief (*i.e.* his belief about ω and the first-order belief of agent $-i$), and so on.[21] Let $h_i^k(z_i)$ denote the kth-order belief of type z_i. A sequence of types $\{z_i[n]\}_{n=0}^{+\infty}$ converges to type z_i (under the product topology) if for every $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $h_i^k(z_i[n])$ converges to $h_i^k(z_i)$ as $n \to +\infty$.

The model that corresponds to our unperturbed environment is denoted by $\mathcal{Z}^* = (Z^*, \kappa^*)$ where $Z^* = \{(z_1^*, z_2^*)\}$ and $\kappa_i^*(z_i^*)$ assigns probability 1 to $\omega = \omega^*$ and $z_{-i} = z_{-i}^*$. That is, $\omega = \omega^*$ is common knowledge in this model. A mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ *robustly implements* $f : \Theta \to \Delta(Y)$ *in the interim sense* if for every model $\mathcal{Z}$ with $\mathcal{Z}^* \subset \mathcal{Z}$, there is an equilibrium in the game induced by $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{Z})$ such that (1) f is implemented when agents' types are (z_1^*, z_2^*), and (2) for every sequence of types in $\mathcal{Z}$ that converge to (z_1^*, z_2^*), the implemented social choice function converges to f.

Theorem 6. *For every (u_1, u_2) and non-constant f, there exists $\bar{c} > 0$ that depends only on (u_1, u_2) such that when $c_1, c_2 > \bar{c}$, no finite mechanism robustly implements f in the interim sense.*

The proof is in Appendix E. In terms of how large $\bar{c}$ needs to be, when $u_1(\theta, y) = u_2(\theta, y) = 0$, Theorem 6 only requires that $c_1, c_2 > 0$, that is, $\bar{c}$ can be 0. However, for general (u_1, u_2), the requirement that c_1, c_2 being large enough is not redundant, which we explain in Appendix E.

5.4. *Discussion: infinite mechanisms and dynamic mechanisms*

Our negative results (Theorems 3, 4, and 6) have focused on finite static mechanisms. This restriction excludes infinite mechanisms as well as dynamic mechanisms, that is, mechanisms in which agents act multiple times. These results extend to a large class of infinite, dynamic mechanisms, using essentially the same arguments.

First, Theorems 3 and 6 apply to all *bounded mechanisms*. In general, each mechanism induces an extensive-form game between the agents. A mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ is *bounded* if there exists $X > 0$ such that $|t_i| \leq X$ for every $i \in \{1, 2\}$ at every terminal node of the extensive-form game induced by $\mathcal{M}$. Bounded mechanisms include all finite mechanisms and allow for infinite mechanisms as long as there do not exist a sequence of terminal nodes such that the transfers along this sequence diverge.

As for Theorem 4, an issue may arise once we allow for infinite mechanisms for which equilibrium may fail to exist, for example, mechanisms that ask both agents to report a positive integer and rewards the agent who reports a strictly larger number with a positive transfer. Theorem 4 extends to infinite, dynamic mechanisms for which this non-existence issue does not arise.

Formally, we restrict attention to mechanisms $\mathcal{M}$ under which there exists at least one equilibrium in the auxiliary game where the extensive-form game is given by $\mathcal{M}$ but agents' payoffs do not depend on θ and are given by $\mathbb{E}[u_1(\theta, y)] + t_1$ and $\mathbb{E}[u_2(\theta, y)] + t_2$, where $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ represents the expectation under the prior belief about θ. All finite mechanisms satisfy our restriction. We show that there exists $\bar{c} > 0$ that depends only on (u_1, u_2) such that when $c_1, c_2 > \bar{c}$, under every mechanism that satisfies our restriction, there exists an equilibrium in which no agent learns θ. This implies that no such mechanism can virtually implement any non-constant social choice function.

6. RELATED LITERATURE

Our paper contributes to the literature on robust implementation.[22] We take an *ex ante* perspective and show that *all* social choice functions are robustly implementable under generic state

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22. Our results are also related to the results in Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion *et al.* (2012), who examine the robustness of undominated strategy and sub-game perfect implementation.

distributions or under bounded costs of learning.[23] This stands in contrast to Oury and Tercieux (2012) and Chen et al. (2020, 2022), who adopt an *interim* approach to study robust partial implementation. We also show that no non-constant social choice function is robustly implementable in the interim sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012) when agents' costs of learning are above some threshold, even if the designer can use unbounded transfers.

We require the desired outcome to be implemented with probability close to 1. This is related to the literature on virtual implementation such as Abreu and Matsushima (1992). They construct, for *each* ε, a mechanism that fully implements the desired outcome with probability more than $1 - \varepsilon$. The number of messages in their mechanisms goes to infinity as $\varepsilon \to 0$. By contrast, we construct for *all* ε, a mechanism that partially implements the desired outcome with probability more than $1 - \varepsilon$ when the perturbation on agents' preferences and costs of learning is small enough. The number of messages in our mechanism either equals the number of states n, or equals $2n - 1$.

Kim (2021) proposes a monotonicity condition and that he shows to be necessary for partial implementation in p-dominant strategies when the environment is quasi-linear. By contrast, we show that every social choice function is robustly implementable. This is driven by the differences between the notion of robust equilibrium in Kajii and Morris (1997) and our notion of robust implementation: We only perturb agents' preferences over outcomes and their costs of learning the state, but we assume that it is common knowledge that agents' payoffs do not directly depend on their messages.

Our work is related to the literature on robust prediction in games (*e.g.* Rubinstein, 1989; Kajii and Morris, 1997; Weinstein and Yildiz, 2007) and the literature on the robustness of equilibrium refinements (*e.g.* Fudenberg *et al.*, 1988). Our notion of robust implementation builds on the notion of robust equilibrium in Kajii and Morris (1997), which is broadly applied to study the robustness of equilibria in potential games (Ui, 2001; Morris and Ui, 2005) and supermodular games (Oyama and Takahashi, 2020). The key difference is that in our model, agents' payoffs do not directly depend on their messages, which are their actions in our mechanism design setting. This assumption is commonly made in the mechanism design literature, including Rochet (1987), Chung and Ely (2007), and Bergemann and Morris (2009).

Finally, our work is related to the literature on contracting with costly information acquisition, including Zermeno (2011), Carroll (2019), and Clark and Reggiani (2021). In contrast to those papers in which there is only one agent and the principal can verify the state *ex post*, we show that the principal can robustly implement the desired outcome even when the principal *cannot* verify the state *ex post*, as long as there are at least two agents who can learn the state.

Our mechanisms can robustly elicit costly information when the designer (almost) knows agents' learning technologies but faces uncertainty about their payoffs as well as their beliefs and higher-order beliefs.[24] Our research question differs from Carroll (2019), which examines robust contracting when the designer faces uncertainty about the agent's information acquisition technology. We show in the Supplementary Appendix that (1) the mechanisms we propose can

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23. This echoes the findings in the literature on robust predictions in games. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that an equilibrium is robust in the interim sense if and only if it is strictly dominant. Kajii and Morris (1997) provide sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to be robust in the ex ante sense, which are more permissible than the ones in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). Oyama and Tercieux (2010) drop the common prior assumption and show that the two approaches become essentially equivalent in terms of the characterization of robust equilibrium outcomes.

24. Our work is related to the literature on the optimal contracts for information acquisition. Zermeno (2011), Clark and Reggiani (2021), and Larionov *et al.* (2021) examine the optimal contracts for information acquisition in fixed informational environments. By contrast, we examine whether it is possible to implement a desired social choice function in *all* nearby informational environments.

robustly implement the desired social choice function when agents can either perfectly observe the state or observe signals that are highly correlated with the state and (2) our results do not require the designer to know the agents' interim beliefs and are robust to small trembles in agents' reporting strategies.

<div align="center">APPENDIX</div>

A. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2: general utility functions

We generalize the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 to arbitrary $u_1(\theta, y)$, $u_2(\theta, y)$, c_1, and c_2.

A.1. *Proof of Theorem 1*

The outcome function is the same as the *Status Quo Rule with Ascending Transfers* in Section 4.1. Agents receive 0 transfer if their messages do not coincide. If both of them report message j, then agent i receives R_i^j which satisfies $R_i^1 \geq \frac{\bar{c}}{q(\theta_1)}$,

$$R_i^j + u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) - R_i^1 - u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^1)) > 0 \quad \text{for every } j \geq 2 \tag{A.1}$$

$$\sum_{j=2}^{n} q(\theta^j) \left\{ R_i^j + u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) - R_i^1 - u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^1)) \right\} > 2c_i. \tag{A.2}$$

We modify the first step of our proof in which we show that both agents using their truthful strategies is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$. The second and third steps remain the same. Let $\Sigma \equiv \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}^n$ and let

$$\Sigma^* \equiv \left\{ (m^1, \ldots, m^n) \in \Sigma \text{ such that } m^j \in \{1, j\} \text{ for every } j \geq 1 \right\}.$$

In the restricted game without perturbation where agents can only use strategies in $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$, they can only send message 1 conditional on $\theta = \theta^1$, and for every $j \in \{2, 3, \ldots, n\}$, agents send either message 1 or message j conditional on $\theta = \theta^j$

- If agent 1 sends message j in state θ^j, his expected transfer equals $\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j)R^j$.
- If agent 1 sends message 1 in state θ^j, his expected transfer equals $\Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^j)R^1$.

If agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, then $\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j) \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $\Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^j) \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Hence, conditional on knowing that $\theta = \theta^j$, agent 1's expected payoff from sending message j is:

$$\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j) \left(u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) + R^j \right) + \Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^j)u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^1)),$$

and his expected payoff from sending message 1 is:

$$\Pr(m_2 = j|\theta^j)u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^1)) + \Pr(m_2 = 1|\theta^j) \left(u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^1)) + R^1 \right).$$

The former is greater than the latter if equation (A.1) is satisfied. Inequality (A.2) implies that agent i strictly prefers $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ to $(1, 1, \ldots, 1)$ when he believes that agent $-i$ uses the truthful strategy with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$. Hence, there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that agent 1 strictly prefers $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ to any other strategy that belongs to Σ^* when he believes that agent 2's strategy belongs to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$ and agent 2 is truthful with probability at least γ. The second and third steps are not affected by u_1 and u_2, which remain the same as in Section 4.1. The expected cost of implementation $\sum_{i=1}^{2} \sum_{j=1}^{n} q(\theta^j)R_i^j$ can be as low as

$$\min_{\theta^* \in \Theta} \sum_{i=1}^{2} \left\{ \frac{\bar{c}}{q(\theta^*)} + 2c_i + \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} q(\theta)(u_i(\theta, f(\theta^*)) - u_i(\theta, f(\theta))) \right\}. \tag{A.3}$$

Hence, in order to lower the implementation cost, one needs to choose a status quo state θ^* that occurs with high ex ante probability but agents receive low utilities from outcome $f(\theta^*)$ when $\theta \neq \theta^*$.

A.2. *Proof of Theorem 2*

Without loss of generality, let $\Theta = \{\theta^1, \ldots, \theta^n\}$ with $q(\theta^1) > q(\theta^2) \geq \cdots \geq q(\theta^n) > 0$. The outcome function remains the same as before. The transfers are similar although we replace R^j with R_1^j and R_2^j for every $j \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ such that for every $i \in \{1, 2\}$

$$D_i(j) \equiv R_i^j + u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) + \min_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau)) - R_i^1 - 2\max_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau)) > 0 \quad \text{for every } j \geq 2, \quad \text{(A.4)}$$

$$D_i(1) \equiv R_i^1 + u_i(\theta^1, f(\theta^1)) - R_i^0 - \max_\tau u_i(\theta^1, f(\theta^\tau)) > 0, \quad \text{(A.5)}$$

$$\sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j) D_i(j) > 2c_i, \quad \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j)\left(D_i(j) + R_i^1 - R_i^0\right) + q(\theta^1) D_i(1) > 2c_i, \quad \text{(A.6)}$$

and

$$\frac{R_i^0}{R_i^j} > \frac{q(\theta^j)}{q(\theta^1)} \quad \text{for every } j \geq 2. \quad \text{(A.7)}$$

We modify the first step of our proof in which we show that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$. Consider a *restricted game without perturbation* where both agents are only allowed to use strategies that belong to $\Delta(\Sigma^*)$ where Σ^* is defined as

$$\Sigma^* \equiv \left\{(m^1, \ldots, m^n) \in \Sigma \text{ such that } m^j \in \{-n, \ldots, -2, 1\} \cup \{j\} \text{ for every } j \geq 1\right\}.$$

We show that in the restricted game without perturbation, both agents using $(1, 2, \ldots, n)$ is a γ-dominant equilibrium for some $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$. Suppose agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$,

- Conditional on $\theta = \theta^j$ for every $j \in \{2, 3, \ldots, n\}$. Agent 1's payoff when he sends j is at least $\frac{1}{2}(R_1^j + u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^j))) + \frac{1}{2}\min_\tau u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau))$. His payoff when he sends 1 is at most $u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^1)) + \frac{1}{2}R_1^1$, and his payoff when he sends any negative message is at most $\frac{1}{2}R_1^0 + \max_\tau u_1(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau))$. Inequality (A.4) implies that his expected payoff is strictly greater when he sends message j.
- Conditional on $\theta = \theta^1$. Agent 1's payoff when he sends 1 is at least $u_1(\theta^1, f(\theta^1)) + \frac{1}{2}(R_1^1 + R_1^0)$ and his payoff when he sends any negative message is at most $R_1^0 + \frac{1}{2}u_1(\theta^1, f(\theta^1)) + \frac{1}{2}\max_\tau u_1(\theta^1, f(\theta^\tau))$. Inequality (A.5) implies that his expected payoff is strictly greater when he sends message 1.

The above discussion implies that agent 1 prefers to be truthful compared to any other non-constant strategy that belongs to Σ^*. Inequality (A.6) implies that he prefers to be truthful to any constant strategy that belongs to Σ^*. Since agent 1 has a strict incentive to be truthful when he believes that agent 2 is truthful with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$, there exists $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ such that both agents being truthful is a γ-dominant equilibrium in the restricted game without perturbation. The second and third steps are not affected by u_1 and u_2, which remain the same as in Section 4.2.

We provide a tight lower bound on expected cost of implementation $\sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^n q(\theta^j) R_i^j$ given constraints (A.4), (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7). First, we bound R_i^1 from below. Inequality (A.6) implies that

$$2c_i < \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j)\left\{R_i^j - R_i^1 + \min_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau)) - 2\max_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau)) + u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j))\right\}.$$

Inequality (A.7) implies that $R_i^0 q(\theta^1) > R_i^j q(\theta^j)$ for every $j \geq 2$, and using plugging in inequality (A.5) to substitute R_i^0 with R_i^1, we obtain:

$$2c_i < \sum_{j=2}^n (q(\theta^1) - q(\theta^j)) R_i^1 + \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j)\left\{\min_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau)) - 2\max_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^\tau)) + u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j))\right\}$$
$$- \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^1)\left\{\max_\tau u_i(\theta^1, f(\theta^\tau)) - u_i(\theta^1, f(\theta^1))\right\}. \quad \text{(A.8)}$$

Inequality (A.8) leads to a tight bound on R_i^1. Next, we compute a tight lower bound on $\sum_{j=1}^n q(\theta^j) R_i^j$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{j=1}^n q(\theta^j) R_i^j &= R_i^1 + \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j)(R_i^j - R_i^1) \\
&= R_i^1 + \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j) D_i(j) + \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j) \left\{ 2 \max_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) - \min_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) - u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) \right\} \\
&> 2c_i + R_i^1 + \sum_{j=2}^n q(\theta^j) \left\{ 2 \max_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) - \min_\tau u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) - u_i(\theta^j, f(\theta^j)) \right\}.
\end{aligned}
$$

Plugging in the tight lower bound on R_i^1, we obtain a tight lower bound on the implementation cost. In the special case where $u_1 = u_2 = 0$ and $c_1 = c_2 = c$, the lower bound is given by equation (4.14).

B. Proof of Theorem 3

For any finite mechanism $\mathcal{M} \equiv \{M_1, M_2, g, t_1, t_2\}$, let

$$
X(\mathcal{M}) \equiv \max_{(i, m_1, m_2) \in \{1,2\} \times M_1 \times M_2} |t_i(m_1, m_2)|
$$

be the highest transfer promised to any agent by $\mathcal{M}$. By definition, $X(\mathcal{M})$ exists. Recall that Y is the set of outcomes, $\Delta(Y)$ is the set of lotteries over outcomes, and $f(\theta) \in \Delta(Y)$. We use $\mathrm{co}(\cdot)$ to denote the convex hull of a set. Since f is non-constant, there exists $\theta^* \in \Theta$ such that

$$
f(\theta^*) \notin \mathrm{co}\left(\{f(\theta)\}_{\theta \in \Theta} \backslash \{f(\theta^*)\}\right) \equiv \mathcal{Y}.
$$

According to the separating hyperplane theorem, there exists $v : Y \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $v(f(\theta^*)) < \min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} v(y)$.[25] Hence, there exists $C > 0$ such that $(\min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} v(y) - v(f(\theta^*)))C > 4X(\mathcal{M})$.

First, consider a perturbation $\mathcal{G}^+$ in which $\tilde{u}_1(\omega, \theta, y) = Cv(y)$ for all $(\omega, \theta) \in \Omega \times \Theta$. If $\mathcal{M}$ implements $f(\theta^*)$ in state θ^* under perturbation $\mathcal{G}^+$, there must exist $m_2^* \in \Delta(M_2)$ such that

$$
\max_{m_1 \in \Delta(M_1)} \left\{ Cv(g(m_1, m_2^*)) + t_1(m_1, m_2^*) \right\} \leq \underbrace{Cv(f(\theta^*)) + X(\mathcal{M})}_{\text{agent 1's highest possible payoff if the designer implements } f(\theta^*)} . \tag{B.1}
$$

This is because otherwise, agent 1 can secure himself a payoff strictly greater than the right-hand side of equation (B.1), in which case $f(\theta^*)$ cannot be implemented in any state under $\mathcal{G}^+$.

Next, consider another perturbation $\mathcal{G}^-$ where $\tilde{u}_2(\omega, \theta, y) = -Cv(y)$ for all $(\omega, \theta) \in \Omega \times \Theta$. Agent 2's payoff by playing m_2^* is at least

$$
\min_{m_1 \in \Delta(M_1)} \left\{ -Cv(g(m_1, m_2^*)) + t_2(m_1, m_2^*) \right\}. \tag{B.2}
$$

Since we have chosen $C > 0$ in order to satisfy $(\min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} v(y) - v(f(\theta^*)))C > 4X(\mathcal{M})$ and moreover, $X(\mathcal{M}) \geq |t_i(m_1, m_2)|$ for every i and (m_1, m_2), inequality (B.1) implies that

$$
\min_{m_1 \in \Delta(M_1)} \left\{ -Cv(g(m_1, m_2^*)) + t_2(m_1, m_2^*) \right\} \geq \underbrace{-Cv(f(\theta^*)) - 3X(\mathcal{M}) > -C \min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \{v(y)\} + X(\mathcal{M})}_{\text{since } (\min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} v(y) - v(f(\theta^*)))C > 4X(\mathcal{M})}.
$$

Therefore, agent 2 can secure a payoff strictly greater than $-C \min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \{v(y)\} + X(\mathcal{M})$, which implies that no outcome in $\mathcal{Y}$ can be implemented under perturbation $\mathcal{G}^-$. Hence, every finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ that can implement non-constant f under $\mathcal{G}^+$ cannot implement f under $\mathcal{G}^-$.

---

25. For every distribution over outcomes $\tilde{y} \in \Delta(Y)$, we let $v(\tilde{y})$ denote the expected value of $v(y)$ when y is distributed according to $\tilde{y}$.

C. Proof of Theorem 4

Suppose that u_1 and u_2 are independent of θ. Under any finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$, there always exists an equilibrium in which both agents use state-independent strategies, since agents' preferences over messages are independent of the state regardless of the mechanism. In this equilibrium, the implemented outcome does not depend on the state, which means that for every non-constant f, there exists a state $\theta \in \Theta$ such that the implemented outcome is bounded away from $f(\theta)$.

Next, we show that f is not virtually implementable when c_1 and c_2 are above some cut-off $\bar{c}$ that depends only on (u_1, u_2). For every (u_1, u_2), let

$$X(u_1, u_2) \equiv \max_{i \in \{1,2\}} \left\{ \max_{\theta, y} u_i(\theta, y) - \min_{\theta, y} u_i(\theta, y) \right\}.$$

Fix any finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ and, for every $m_2 \in \Delta(M_2)$, let $T(m_2) \equiv \max_{m_1 \in M_1} t_1(m_1, m_2)$ be the maximal transfer received by agent 1 when agent 2's message is m_2. Suppose that agent 1 believes that agent 2's message is m_2 regardless of θ. Then, the difference between agent 1's expected payoff when he learns θ and when he does not learn θ is

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\max_{m_1 \in M_1} \{u_1(\theta, g(m_1, m_2)) + t_1(m_1, m_2)\} \right] - \max_{m_1 \in M_1} \mathbb{E}\left[u_1(\theta, g(m_1, m_2)) + t_1(m_1, m_2) \right]. \qquad (C.1)$$

By definition, if $m_1^* \in \arg\max_{m_1 \in M_1} \mathbb{E}[u_1(\theta, g(m_1, m_2)) + t_1(m_1, m_2)]$, then $t_1(m_1^*, m_2) \geq T(m_2) - X(u_1, u_2)$. This implies that the value of equation (C.1) is no more than $2X(u_1, u_2)$, and therefore, agent 1 has no incentive to learn θ when $c_1 > 2X(u_1, u_2)$. In addition, when agent 1 believes that agent 2's message is m_2, sending a message that belongs to $\arg\max_{m_1 \in M_1} \mathbb{E}[u_1(\theta, g(m_1, m_2)) + t_1(m_1, m_2)]$ regardless of the state is one of agent 1's best replies.

Similarly, suppose $c_2 > 2X(u_1, u_2)$. For every $m_1 \in \Delta(M_2)$, when agent 2 believes that agent 1's message is m_1, sending a message that belongs to $\arg\max_{m_2 \in M_2} \mathbb{E}[u_2(\theta, g(m_1, m_2)) + t_2(m_1, m_2)]$ regardless of the state is one of agent 2's best replies.

Fix any finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ and consider an auxiliary two-player normal-form game where agent $i \in \{1, 2\}$ has a finite set of pure strategies M_i and his payoff is $\mathbb{E}_{\theta}[u_i(\theta, g(m_1, m_2)) + t_i(m_1, m_2)]$ when he uses strategy m_i and his opponent uses strategy m_{-i}. Since this auxiliary game is finite, a Nash equilibrium $(m_1, m_2) \in \Delta(M_1) \times \Delta(M_2)$ exists. By construction, agent 1 sending m_1 regardless of θ and agent 2 sending m_2 regardless of θ is an equilibrium under mechanism $\mathcal{M}$. This equilibrium implements a constant social choice function. For every non-constant social choice function f, there exists $\beta > 0$ such that for every constant social choice function g, there exists $\theta \in \Theta$ such that $\|f(\theta) - g(\theta)\|_{TV} > \beta$. This implies that f is not virtually implementable.

D. Proof of Theorem 5

If f is constant, then robust-fully implementing f is straightforward. The rest of the proof focuses on the case where f is non-constant. Consider a mechanism where $M_i = \Theta$, $M_{-i} = \{1\}$, $g(m_i, m_{-i}) = f(m_i)$, $t_i(m_1, m_2)$ depends only on m_1, and $t_{-i}(m_1, m_2) = 0$. Since f and u_i satisfy strict cyclical monotonicity, there exists $t_i : \Theta \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

(1) $t_i(\theta) = t_i(\theta')$ for every $\theta, \theta' \in \Theta$ such that $f(\theta) = f(\theta')$,
(2) $u_i(\theta, f(\theta)) + t_i(\theta) > u_i(\theta, f(\theta')) + t_i(\theta')$ for every $\theta, \theta' \in \Theta$ such that $f(\theta) \neq f(\theta')$.

Under such a mechanism, agent i chooses an outcome in $\{f(\theta)\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$ and receives a transfer $t_i(\theta)$ for implementing $f(\theta)$. Under every η-perturbation $\mathcal{G}$, every normal type of agent i has a strict incentive to learn θ and to choose $f(\theta)$ in state θ for every $\theta \in \Theta$, provided that his cost of learning c_i is small enough. This implies that the above mechanism can robust-fully implement f.

E. Proof of Theorem 6

As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, for every (u_1, u_2), there exists $\bar{c} > 0$ such that for *all* finite mechanisms (even when transfers can be arbitrarily large), when $c_i > \bar{c}$, agent i finds it strictly suboptimal to learn θ when he believes that agent $-i$'s message does not depend on θ. Suppose $c_1, c_2 > \bar{c}$. For every finite mechanism $\mathcal{M}$, let $\overline{U} \equiv 2 \max_{\{i, \theta, y, m_1, m_2\}} |u_i(\theta, y) + t_i(m_1, m_2)|$. We construct a sequence of types that converge to (z_1^*, z_2^*) under the product topology but for which the implemented outcome is bounded away from f. Let $z_2[0]$ be a type that assigns probability 1 to ω' where $\widetilde{u}_1(\omega', \cdot, \cdot) = u_1(\cdot, \cdot)$, $\widetilde{u}_2(\omega', \cdot, \cdot) = u_2(\cdot, \cdot)$, $\widetilde{c}_1(\omega') = c_1$, and $\widetilde{c}_2(\omega') > \overline{U}$. Let $z_1[0]$ be a type that assigns probability β to player 2 being type $z_2[0]$ and probability $1 - \beta$ to $\omega = \omega^*$, where β is close enough to 1 such

that it is strictly suboptimal for type $z_1[0]$ to learn the state, regardless of his belief about type $z_2[0]$'s message. For every $j \geq 1$, let $z_2[j]$ be a type who knows that $\omega = \omega^*$ but assigns probability β to player 1 being type $z_1[j-1]$ and probability β to player 1 being type $z_1[j]$, and let $z_1[j]$ be a type who knows that $\omega = \omega^*$ but assigns probability β to player 2 being type $z_2[j]$ and probability $1 - \beta$ to player 2 being type $z_2[j+1]$. These sequence of types converge to (z_1^*, z_2^*) under the product topology. By construction, type $z_2[0]$ finds it strictly suboptimal to learn θ, so his message is independent of θ. Type $z_1[j]$ finds it strictly suboptimal to learn θ since type $z_2[j]$'s message is independent of θ with probability at least β. Type $z_2[j]$ finds it strictly suboptimal to learn θ since type $z_1[j-1]$'s message is independent of θ with probability at least β. Therefore, the implemented outcome under this sequence of types is independent of θ, which is bounded away from f since f is non-constant.

E.1. *Counterexample*

We show by counterexample that our requirement that c be large enough is not redundant for the result. Consider an environment where $\Theta = \{\theta^1, \theta^2\}$, $Y = \{y^1, y^2\}$, $f(\theta^j) = y^j$ for every $j \in \{1, 2\}$, and $u_i(\theta^j, y^k) = \mathbf{1}\{j = k\}$ for every $i, j, k \in \{1, 2\}$. Suppose that the agents' learning costs c_1 and c_2, are strictly lower than $1/4$. The following mechanism can robustly implement f in an interim sense:

outcome	*1*	*2*	transfers	*1*	*2*
1	y^1	y^1 with prob $1/2$	*1*	0, 0	0, 0
2	y^1 with prob $1/2$	y^2	*2*	0, 0	0, 0

This is because for each agent type whose payoff is $u_i(\theta^j, y^k) = \mathbf{1}\{j = k\}$ and whose cost of learning is less than $1/4$, he has a strict incentive to learn the state and to report truthfully since his report affects the implemented outcome with probability $1/2$ regardless of the other agent's report. Therefore, robust implementation in the interim sense fails in our setting only when the agents' learning costs are greater than some cut-off.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are available at *Review of Economic Studies* online.

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