Department of Economics
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2019 (expected)
MA, Economics, Northwestern University, 2016
MA, Economics, Bilkent University, 2009
BS, Electrical & Electronics Engineering, Middle East Technical University, 2007
Fields of Specialization
Empirical Corporate Finance, Economic History, Innovation
Job Market Paper
“How Does Government Debt Impact Corporate Financing? Evidence From War Finance” [PDF]
Using novel hand-collected data on corporate bond and stock offerings, I identify the impact of government debt on corporate financing during World War I. I focus on the war period, since the state of the economy, the method of corporate security offerings, and the unconventional financing strategy of the U.S. government provide a convenient empirical setting to identify the impact. Using this setting, I find that long-term government bond offerings negatively affected long-term corporate bonds with maturities longer than five years, common stocks, and preferred stocks. Moreover, the negative effect was stronger for high-rated corporate bonds and corporate stocks paying stable dividends. My findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Friedman (1978) and Greenwood et al. (2010), who argue that the crowding-out impact should be stronger for corporate securities most similar to government bonds in terms of maturity, risk, and payment schedule.
Other Research Papers
“Investor Protection and Innovation: Evidence from Blue Sky Laws” [PDF]
Using historical firm-level patent and accounting data, I document how investor protection affects innovation by encouraging investors to provide more funds to innovative firms. To establish a causal link, I use the enactment of the first form of investor protection laws across some U.S. states at the beginning of the twentieth century, when there was no federal regulation. These laws required firms to disclose information before selling their securities, increased penalties in case of financial fraud, and set up local institutions to regulate security issues. Using the archival records of local institutions, I document that young innovative firms (startups) had a large share of intangible assets and relied heavily on equity financing (venture capital). In a difference-in-differences setting, I show that innovative firms that previously had limited access to external finance raised more financing and increased their innovation activity— measured in terms of the number of patents and citations— after investor protection laws were enacted.
Work in Progress