PhD Candidate, Department of Economics

Egor Starkov

Contact Information

Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208

Phone: 224-619-2917

starkov@u.northwestern.edu

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, Northwestern University, 2019 (expected)
M.A. in Economics, Northwestern University, 2015
M.A. in Economics (cum laude), New Economic School, 2013
B.A. in Economics, Higher School of Economics, 2011

Primary Fields of Specialization

Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Information

Secondary Fields of Specialization

Behavioral Economics, Economics of Media and Internet

Curriculum Vitae

Download Vita (PDF)

Job Market Paper

“Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship” (with Aleksei Smirnov)
Download Job Market Paper (PDF)

Sellers often have power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if share of such “naive” consumers is not too large then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the high-type seller to use them as a costly signal of his product’s quality to rational consumers.

Other Research Papers

“Experts, Quacks and Fortune-Tellers: Dynamic Cheap Talk with Career Concerns” (with Aleksei Smirnov)

The paper studies a continuous-time communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. An expert of unknown competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of his forecast about an outcome that is revealed at time T. A competent expert may at some time before T receive an inside knowledge about the outcome, which is not available to an incompetent expert. We find that all equilibria in a sufficiently general class have the following properties: a) earlier reports are more credible, b) expert’s reputation takes a hit after any report, and c) an exogenous ban on reports at some times may increase the credibility of report, but creates a delay in signal transmission.

References

Prof. Jeffrey C. Ely (Committee Chair)
Prof. Yingni Guo
Prof. Wojciech Olszewski