Department of Economics
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2017 (expected)
M.Res., Economics, University College London, 2011
M.Sc., Economics, University College London, 2010
B.Sc., Economics and Business Administration, University of Tübingen, 2009.
Primary Field of Specialization
Job Market Paper
Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between information and incentives in principal-agent relationships with career concerns, that is when the agent wants to be perceived as of high ability. I derive conditions for when more precise information about performance or more uncertainty about the agent’s ability lead to stronger incentives due to career concerns. A key condition for deriving these comparative statics is how effort changes the informativeness of performance signals regarding ability. An indirect, yet tractable representation of information structures enables a full pure strategy equilibrium analysis without ad-hoc restrictions on the set of information structures. Moreover, I show that more sophisticated information revelation technologies that are implicitly ruled out in the literature overturn commonly held assertions regarding information design and career concerns.
Other Research Papers
“Inducing Effort through Grades“, with John Farragut
Abstract: We study the problem of a principal who wants to increase an agent’s investment in productivity through an information disclosure policy, and the agent wants to induce a high belief about his productivity. Under asymmetric information about the agent’s ability we explore how qualitative features of the optimal grading scheme depend on the distribution of the agent’s ability. When the effect of the agent’s investment is subject to exogenous shocks and there is no asymmetric information, in a wide variety of circumstances the optimal disclosure policy has a relatively simple threshold form.
“Organizing Strategic Communication”, in progress
Abstract: This paper studies the problem of an organization where multiple decisions need to be made, and information regarding the optimal course of action is dispersed. The principal can assign agents to collect information and determine communication channels. Under a separability assumption on payoffs, it is optimal to have multiple agents collect and transmit small amounts of information if the principal can commit. Absent commitment, this is overturned and the optimal mechanism solicits information from as few agents as possible. Finally, delegated decision making is studied.
“Screening and Competition in Selection Markets: A Synopsis”, in progress
Abstract: This paper aims to unify some seemingly disconnected results in the literature on competition in selection markets through screening. The qualitative nature of the allocative distortion depends on the direction of the selection effect, and on how the agent’s outside option compares to the efficient quantity. This generates novel implications for the nature of competition policy in selection markets. Depending on the configuration of the selection and outside option effect, welfare is maximized either at an intermediate amount of competition, or through extreme market structures such as monopoly or perfect competition.