

DANIEL GALVIN

Jefferson and Presidential Party Building

The presidency of Thomas Jefferson stands as one of the most successful and consequential examples of the presidential politics of party building in American history. Jefferson's party building activities are informative not only for our understanding of Jefferson as a president, but also for our appreciation of the office of the presidency and the peculiar mix of institutional and political forces which have motivated presidential behaviors over time.

Jefferson's presidency has been combed for decades by able historians, who have thoroughly documented his party building activities and provided rich, thick descriptions of his methods.¹ But historians disagree over the extent of Jefferson's partisanship, and their explanations for why he built the Republican party in the way he did seem to talk past one another.² Yet despite their differences, a single argument runs throughout their explanations: Jefferson was a truly exceptional leader. He managed to build the Republican party despite prevailing norms proscribing partisanship; he was able to make his highly-charged ideological agenda "fit" with existing institutional arrangements; and he capably summoned the political authority to dismantle the existing Federalist regime.³ Solid historical evidence demonstrates Jefferson's exceptionalism as a thinker, politician, and leader, and therefore his success as a president is generally attributed to his unique abilities.⁴ Yet the peculiar political and institutional pressures Jefferson felt as president cannot be so easily explained. His efforts to build a party that reflected his own nuanced brand of politics—steadfastly republican, committed to a partisan policy agenda, yet respectful of the idea of the Patriot King and unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of a loyal opposition—involved more than personal, internal conflicts over his values and strategies.

If we are to derive anything from Jefferson's party building beyond historical knowledge of what he did and what he believed, then we must consider the possibility that Jefferson's exceptionalism only explains part of the story. His actions were shaped by many factors in addition to his political philosophy and strategic political concerns. Specifically, the office of the presidency played a role in motivating and circumscribing his actions. As I will contend, *presidential party building* is a persistent feature of presidential politics, one that stems as much from the institution of the presidency as from the man and his times. Jefferson's party building is therefore viewed as the outgrowth of the institutional and

political impulses inherent in the presidency, and not just as a peculiarly Jeffersonian innovation.⁵

A Theory of Presidential Party Building

Presidential party building is a systemic response to the peculiar impulses—meaning the motives, incentives, and purposes that shape presidential action—generated by the office of the presidency. Like all presidents, Thomas Jefferson was subject to the same basic impulses that have driven presidential politics for over two centuries: *to represent the nation as a whole, to be partisan, and to be a strong leader*. The following section defines these impulses, and then the remainder of the paper applies the concept of presidential party building to Jefferson's presidency.

The President as National Representative. The president is the only truly national officer of the federal government. He is the personification of American government who represents the entire nation before the rest of the world. As Woodrow Wilson wrote, "the nation as a whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. He is the only national voice in affairs."⁶ The Founders designed the presidency as a unitary office with a four-year duration and (later limited) reeligibility in order to cultivate in the president a "due dependence on the people" and to ensure that he would be held accountable to the whole nation for his actions.⁷ Tying the president's personal interests (fame, greatness, personal goals) to the strength of his relationship with the entire nation, the institutional design of the presidency generates his primary impulse to represent the whole nation.

The President as Partisan. Yet since the presidency of John Adams, all presidents have been selected and nominated by a political party. The president is therefore expected "to represent [his party] before public opinion and to stand before the country as its representative man, as a true type of what the country may expect of the party itself in purpose and principle."⁸ Yet the president's partisanship is more than a response to popular expectations. The presidential office itself *ensures* that the president's actions will be politically partisan. This claim might strike the Founders as a bit odd, but let us consider the simple logic behind it. In the normal course of governing, the president must make choices. Faced with any number of alternatives, the president must choose a single course of action. By necessity, his choice must favor one subset of political interests, one ideological commitment, one policy preference over another. Even George Washington, the quintessential "president above party"⁹ found that his choices ultimately politicized his administration in the debate over the nation's financial measures in his first term and over the Neutrality Proclamation in his second term. Consequently, the

choices the president makes will associate him with certain organized political interests, ideological commitments and substantive policy agendas. Without necessarily meaning to, every presidential action has political implications. Ironically, then, the president's constitutional independence, originally designed to hold him above faction and interest, actually politicizes the office of the presidency and infuses the president's actions with partisanship. The president therefore has a *partisan impulse* in addition to his impulse to represent the entire nation.

The President as Leader. Finally, the president has a *leadership impulse*: presidents want to be considered as strong leaders. Of course, one might argue that presidents are fundamentally interested in success (as each president defines it), not leadership. Yet almost every conceivable measure of success is a byproduct of strong leadership: reelection, policy accomplishments, a historical legacy, and so on.¹⁰ Strong leaders will, by definition, be considered successful. Thus, we can posit that all presidents are ultimately concerned with the *quality, legitimacy, and strength of their leadership*.

The problem, however, is that the president's partisanship is not formally legitimate or constitutionally recognized—yet it is unavoidable. Every political action he takes cast doubt on whether he truly, legitimately represents the entire nation. Therein lies the president's leadership dilemma: how to reconcile his partisanship with his impulse to represent the entire nation.

Perhaps the sharpest way to depict this dilemma is to compare the president's leadership position to that of a prime minister. The prime minister's leadership is predicated on his selection by members of his party or coalition in parliament. His authority and legitimacy as a leader rests on the continued confidence of his party; he can hold a confidence vote at any time and can call for early elections.¹¹ Thus, in parliamentary regimes, *partisanship* is a formal, institutionalized, and integral component of the executive's leadership—the prime minister's political preferences and partisan biases are, in fact, essential to what sustains his legitimacy as a leader.

In contrast, the president is not an official officer of his party and parties are not recognized by the Constitution. His partisanship lacks the formal, institutional basis for legitimacy enjoyed by prime ministers. The legitimacy of the president's claims to represent the whole nation are grounded in his national election and constitutional mandates, but his partisan actions—which represent the *part*, not the *whole*—lack a proportionate basis of legitimacy. In order to be a strong leader, the president must create legitimacy for his partisanship where no formal legitimacy exists.

Faced with this dilemma, it is easy to see why the president often

turns to his resources of rhetoric to justify his partisanship in terms of the national interest.¹² Rhetoric helps the president to blur the distinction between his partisanship and the national interest; rhetoric can be used to semantically reconcile the contrast between the president's partisanship and his role as national representative. But there is more the president can do. He can zero in on the cause of his legitimization problem by directly addressing the incongruity between his partisanship and his impulse to represent the entire nation. In theory, there are three ways he can reconcile his competing impulses. The first two options are: (1) to *minimize his partisanship* by changing his party to be more reflective of the nation as a whole; or (2) to *maximize his partisanship* by trying to shape the whole nation to be more reflective of his party. Both strategies treat the president's partisan affiliation as problematic to his pursuit of strong leadership, and both are intended to help the president better represent the whole nation.

In practice, however, neither option is all that feasible or all that likely to strengthen the president's position of leadership. The first option, shaping the party to be more like the whole nation, means making the party reflect at least some of the interests of the opposition—a move that the party faithful will consider traitorous at worst, and reflective of weak leadership, at best. The other alternative is equally bad. Trying to make the whole nation more like his party means impressing the president's partisanship on those outside his party—a move that could be seen as blind partisanship and rejected out of hand.

The third theoretical possibility, however, is more promising. The president can build a party of his own—to make both the nation more like him *and* his party more like him. Since the president wants the whole nation and his political party to follow *him*, he has an incentive to build a party that reflects his own personal brand of politics. This is an attractive option, since it most directly addresses the president's legitimacy problem. For one, a party built to reflect the president's interests is most likely to support his independent actions in the future and by its existence, to confirm that the president's actions have been in pursuit of legitimate ends in the past. In addition, the president's party would provide legitimacy for his leadership beyond support and popularity: parties provide an organizational structure, resources, processes, and capabilities for effective governance, for partisan election campaigns, for legislative accomplishments, and for shaping the president's historical legacy. Party building is also attractive for its flexibility: as independent political actors, presidents can work within the existing party structure, but they are also free to initiate new structures, relationships, and networks outside existing channels as well. Of course, party building has drawbacks, too. Most seriously, it

threatens to shake up the existing foundations of the president's political support and leave him isolated. The divisiveness of presidential action ensures that winners and losers will result from any party building the president undertakes. This is a real risk, and one that makes the benefits of party building dependent on how much the president can reshape his party without losing more support than he is gaining. The extent to which the president is successful at building a party to reflect his own politics, then, determines the extent to which his leadership is legitimated. Party building can be seen as an essential piece of the president's quest for strong leadership, the manifestation of the president's competing impulses.

Before proceeding with this theory of presidents as party builders in hand to examine the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, we need to define "the party" to which we refer. I will define the party as a *network of public officials, both elected and appointed, and an extra-governmental organization, including the distribution of power and influence within it*.¹³ As such, it consists of three central components with which the president interacts: (1) the network of public officials, both inside and outside of government; (2) the structures, processes, and resources of the party organization; and (3) the distribution of power and influence across the party. A descriptive chart is found in *Appendix A*, where each element of party building is paired with a sampling of corresponding party building activities presidents might undertake (on the right-hand side of the chart).¹⁴

Thomas Jefferson as Party Builder

Using this framework, we now examine the party building of Thomas Jefferson. Like all presidents, Jefferson's competing impulses led him to seek legitimacy for his leadership by building his party to better reflect his own brand of politics. His party was inchoate, finally in the position of governing after being in the minority for most of the 1790s. With an overwhelming majority in Congress, a sense of "revolution" in the air, and the president himself the author of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson found himself in perhaps the most opportune time in American history to build a party of his own—his "political capital" was abundant. In this way, Jefferson's party building is not only instructive for its historical significance, but also as the prototypical example of how presidents build party. Other presidents can be examined in this light.¹⁵

Jefferson and the Patronage: Building a Network of Appointed Officials

If Jefferson's inauguration showed any signs of his conflicting impulses,

it was in his appeal to short-circuit them, to resolve them before they arose. He called for unity and national reconciliation after the fiercely partisan campaign, indicating that as president, he would eschew his partisan commitments in favor of "equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political." He famously declared, "We are all republicans, we are all federalists."¹⁶ In private letters, too, Jefferson revealed his desire to transcend partisanship and achieve "a perfect consolidation, to effect which, nothing shall be spared on my part, short of the abandonment of the principles of our revolution."¹⁷ Ever the optimist, Jefferson gauged that the Federalists, excluding their "incurable" leaders, "are now aggregated with us, they look with a certain degree of affection and confidence to the administration, ready to become attached to it, if it avoids in the outset acts which might revolt and throw them off."¹⁸ Therefore, with regard to patronage, Jefferson resolved *not* make removals on political grounds. Of course, he would only appoint Republicans, but he foresaw "that deprivations of office, if made on the ground of political principles alone, would revolt our new converts, and give a body to leaders who now stand alone."¹⁹

Thus, despite popular expectations that Jefferson would purge the Federalists from office in one fell swoop, the new president planned to "discourage and restrain" the "baneful effects of the spirit of party," as George Washington had encouraged his successors to do, and resist his partisan impulse.²⁰ In a private letter to William Giles, Jefferson explained his patronage strategy: he would only remove Federalists from their positions if they were appointed by Adams after the results of the 1800 election were known (these were considered "nullities"),²¹ or if they were found "guilty of official mal-conduct." Otherwise, "good men, to whom there is no objection but a difference of political principle...are not proper subjects of removal."²² Jefferson's patronage plan was purposefully devised to subdue the partisan rancor of the day and, by extension, his own implication in it.

But Jefferson's responsibility to fill the executive branch with the personnel who would carry out the business of the federal government pressed up uncomfortably against his intentions to remain above the partisan fray. After three months in office, Federalists outnumbered Republican federal office holders by a ratio of about six to one. The Republican program of reform was passing Congress, yet Jefferson could not be sure that the policies to which he was deeply committed would actually be carried out by executive branch officials throughout the country. Put simply, Jefferson stated that he did not have "confidence" in the "agency" of Federalist officers, who held a preponderance of federal offices.²³ This gave rise to a dilemma: the strength of his

leadership would be determined by the extent to which the Republican program was implemented—yet to remain a legitimate national leader, Jefferson could not expel all Federalists from office to make sure that implementation happened—nor could he sit idly by. Jefferson made the frustrated admission that with regard to the burdens of the presidency, "it is the business of removal and appointment which presents the serious difficulties. All others compared with these, are as nothing."²⁴

Jefferson's Republican party was growing, thanks in large part to his conciliatory messages in the early months of his presidency, and he did not want to halt the "current with which the republican federalists were returning to their brethren, the republicans"²⁵ by making politically-motivated removals and appointments. Thus to build a party of his own would require that Jefferson remove Federalists from office very carefully: not so quickly as to completely arrest the flow of newcomers to his party mantle, yet not so slowly as to lose the support of his existing followers. Jefferson was acutely aware of his predicament, he wrote to Attorney General Levi Lincoln:

I had foreseen years ago, the first republican President who should come into office after all the places in the government had become exclusively occupied by federalists, would have a dreadful operation to perform. That the republicans would consent to a continuation of everything in federal hands, was not to be expected, because neither just nor politic. In him, then, was to devolve the office of an executioner, that of lopping off...²⁶

Jefferson's legitimacy as a leader would turn on how he could reconcile his partisanship with the interests of the whole nation and how he could build a network of party members inside the administrative arms of the executive branch without being so partisan that his entire party building project would be set back.

His only option was to continue party building. On July 12, 1801, Jefferson announced his policy to make removals on political grounds. His statement was a formal response to angry Federalists in Connecticut, who protested Jefferson's removal of the collector of the port of New Haven on political grounds two months earlier. Otherwise highly reserved with his public statements, Jefferson viewed his public response to the Connecticut remonstrance as an opportunity to set forth, once and for all, the principles that would govern his administrative actions.²⁷

Jefferson began: "Declarations by myself in favor of *political tolerance*, exhortations to *harmony* and affection in social intercourse, and to respect for the *equal rights* of the minority, have, on certain occasions, been quoted and misconstrued into assurances that the tenure of offices was to be undisturbed. But could candor apply such a construction?" With

Federalists packed into every federal office across the country, "was it to be imagined that this monopoly of office was still to be continued in the hands of the minority? Does it violate their *equal rights*, to assert some rights in the majority also? Is it *political intolerance* to claim a proportionate share in the direction of the public affairs?" Jefferson continued:

If the will of the nation, manifested by their various elections; calls for an administration of government according with the opinions of those elected; if, for the fulfillment of that will, displacements are necessary, with whom can they so justly begin as with persons appointed in the last moments of an administration, not for its own aid, but to begin a career at the same time with their successors, by whom they had never been approved, and who could scarcely expect from them a cordial co-operation? ... If a due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are few; by resignation, none. Can any other mode than that of removal be proposed?... This is a painful office; but it is made *my duty*, and I meet it as such.²⁸

Jefferson would make every effort to make removals on nonpartisan grounds, but if federal officeholders engaged in "open, active and virulent abuse of official influence in opposition to the order of things established by the will of the nation,"²⁹ they would be subject to partisan removal. After the percentage of federal offices held by Republicans reached the proportion of Republicans across the nation, Jefferson promised to no longer consider political affiliation a qualification for office.

Though Jefferson's policy was "meant as an explanation to our friends," i.e., crafted to appease anxious Republicans, it was also designed to justify the inescapable politicization of his governing responsibilities.³⁰ He justified his partisanship by extending the rights that were considered unalienable and self-evident for individuals to the Republican party. Not only did individual "republicans have some rights; and must be protected" in accordance with "principles of justice and policy," but the Republican party had its own set of rights, too.³¹ The most important of these rights was the right of the elected majority party to hold a proportionate number of offices to its votes—which might be called the *representative principle* or the *principle of due participation*.³² His partisan removals and appointments, therefore, were not truly partisan actions, but were the duty of the president, to serve the interests of justice and due participation for the majority.

In Jefferson's innovative formulation, partisan removals and appointments were protecting the majority and giving it its just share of federal offices, and his partisan party building activities were representing the public good. Jefferson's patronage policy was designed

to bring his partisanship into alignment with his national leadership. Making partisan removals and appointments would promote the public good; at the same time, it would build a network of appointed party officials who would reflect Jefferson's personal brand of politics, all the while legitimizing Jefferson's leadership.

For the remainder of his presidency, Jefferson continued to make politically motivated removals and appointments. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know precisely how many political removals Jefferson made. In June 1803, he specified that Republicans were entitled to somewhere between two-thirds to three-fourths of all federal offices according to his principle of due proportion.³³ In September 1801, a Republican press published a list of party attachments of the nation's "collectors, naval officers, surveyors, supervisors, district attorneys, and marshals." It counted a total of 30 Republicans (15 percent) and 198 Federalists (85 percent) holding federal offices.³⁴ Two years later, Jefferson figured that 130 federal officers were Federalists (41 percent) and 186 were Republicans (59 percent).³⁵ This dramatic 44 percent change in the partisanship of federal office holders, which promptly followed Jefferson's New Haven statement, was recorded diligently by Jefferson in his personal records, where he added a category for political removals: "removals on the principle of giving some participation in office to republicans, and also to disarm those who were using the weight of their official influence to oppose the order of things established."³⁶

Executive branch officials outside the direct command of the president were also subject to Jefferson's party building patronage policy: the president directed Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin and Postmaster General Gideon Granger to make partisan removals and appointments to subordinate posts like collectorships and postmen; minor federal patronage was also given to printers for publishing federal laws, to Republican banks through the deposit of federal funds, and to officers of the army and navy.³⁷ Patronage was perhaps most needed in the U.S. Post Office—in one state, a Republican complained that Republican party newspapers were not being delivered and correspondences between Republicans were being blocked.³⁸ Postmaster Granger reported to the president that removals and patronage appointments were being made "as rapid as the prompt execution of the duties and the safety of the Department will permit."³⁹

The historical record shows that Jefferson's decision to use his removal and appointment power for partisan purposes was carefully considered and implemented most seriously across the executive branch. But patronage was only the first episode of party building in his presidency. The president's quest to legitimate his leadership required more than patronage. Building a *network of elected officials*, as well as tending to the

party's *extra-governmental organization* helped Jefferson build the Republican party in his image.

Jefferson and the Congress: Building a Network of Elected Officials

Historians have capably demonstrated how Jefferson built and manipulated a network of elected officials in Congress during his eight years as president. But questions remain: What motivated Jefferson to push the bounds of legitimate patrician politics in an era where prevailing governing norms were so strictly observed and so widely revered?⁴⁰ What compelled Jefferson to shape the distribution of power and influence across the party as he did? Why did he show any restraint at all in pursuit of his republican agenda? What historians have not done is to view Jefferson's party building from an institutional perspective, as a logical, appropriate response to the leadership dilemma faced by the president.

The most well-known instances of party building over the course of American history fall into the category of "building a network of public officials"—Andrew Jackson's dominance over the various factions of the Democratic party, Abraham Lincoln as an "astute and dextrous operator of the political machine,"⁴¹ Woodrow Wilson's rhetorical influence over his party in Congress,⁴² and FDR's purge campaign.⁴³ Jefferson, too, built a network of public officials and exerted unprecedented influence over his fellow partisans in Congress.

Jefferson's hope for a successful presidency and strong leadership depended on the success of Republican policies,⁴⁴ and the success of Republican policies depended on Republican congressmen who could promulgate the party's agenda. Building the party network in Congress to reflect his own brand of politics was not an easy task, since the Republican party was highly decentralized and its representatives in Congress held a diversity of political opinions and policy objectives which represented diverse state and local interests. Yet Jefferson had every incentive to try anyway.

John Randolph was the first floor leader in the House of Representatives during Jefferson's presidency. A feisty and ambitious politician, Randolph gained his leadership position through his friendship with House Speaker Nathaniel Macon, not through his relationship to the President. Despite early attempts to bring Randolph into his confidence and deputize him as his personal liaison with Congress, Jefferson never felt a strong connection with the floor leader—so he recruited and encouraged others to run for office and seek leadership positions. Though his party building was ultimately intended

to strengthen his legitimacy as leader, he framed his actions in terms of the necessity of having presidential liaisons in Congress for the sake of good interbranch relations:

I do not mean that any gentleman relinquishing his own judgment, should implicitly support all the measures of the administration; but that, where he does not disapprove of them, he should not suffer them to go off in sleep, but bring them to the attention of the house and give them a fair chance. Where he disapproves, he will of course leave them to be brought forward by those who concur in the sentiment.... If the members are to know nothing but what is important enough to be put into a public message, and indifferent enough to be made known to all the world, if the Executive is to keep all other information to himself, and the house to plunge on in the dark, it becomes a government of chance and not of design.⁴⁵

In an effort to procure these "gentlemen" to represent the administration before Congress, Jefferson encouraged his friend Caesar Rodney of Delaware to challenge the incumbent Federalist in his district, which Rodney did successfully.—Jefferson then wrote to Rodney privately and expressed his hope that the freshman congressman would assume a leadership position on the floor, despite his junior status. Two years later, despite Rodney's failure to rise to leadership, he begged the congressman not to retire, writing: "I had looked to you as one of those calculated to give cohesion to our rope of sand..."⁴⁶ Rodney was defeated, however, and never had a chance to be Jefferson's floor leader.

Later, Jefferson sought to deputize another potential floor leader in Barnabas Bidwell, a leading Massachusetts Republican. In June of 1806, Jefferson's relationship with Randolph had become quite distant. He wrote to Bidwell and pleaded with him to seek another term and seek leadership in the House: "there never was a time when the services of those who possess talents, integrity, firmness and sound judgment, were more wanted in Congress. Some one of that description is particularly wanted to take the lead in the H. of R. ... It is only speaking a truth to say that all eyes look to you."⁴⁷ Bidwell agreed to run again, and pledged that he would act as presidential liaison: "having had satisfaction of a cordial concurrence with the principles and measures of the Executive Administration, generally, it will be my happiness to give them the feeble aid of my support, both in and out of the House."⁴⁸ Jefferson's designs were thwarted a year later, however, when Bidwell resigned to become the attorney general of Massachusetts.

Turning again to a Virginian, Jefferson spared no praise as he urged Wilson Cary Nicholas to run for Congress and lead congressional Republicans. Since Jefferson's son-in-law was retiring, Jefferson asked Nicholas to take his spot:

Never did the calls of patriotism more loudly assail you than at this moment... there is no one whose talents and standing, taken together, have weight enough to give him the lead [in the House]. The consequence is, that there is no one who will undertake to do the public business, and it remains undone. Were you here, the whole would rally around you in an instant, and willingly co-operate in whatever is for the public good. Nor would it require you to undertake drudgery in the House. There are enough, able and willing to do that. A rallying point is all that is wanting. Let me beseech you then to offer yourself. You never will have it so much in your power again to render such eminent service.⁴⁹

Nicholas did stand for election, but like Jefferson's other attempts to hand-pick a floor leader, his leadership hopes for Nicholas were never realized.

Despite having little success in procuring floor leaders of his own choosing, Jefferson's efforts to gain direct influence over the proceedings in Congress were unmistakable. This is not surprising, since the greater degree of control Jefferson could exert over congressional proceedings, the more likely that his party in Congress would promote his political preferences. For this reason, Jefferson used an informal network of administration-friendly congressmen to ensure that his priorities would dominate the legislative agenda. Jefferson and his most loyal Cabinet secretaries monitored and guided Republican party maneuvers in Congress: they drafted bills and confidentially sent them to political allies for consideration on the floor; they wrote privately to congressmen to express the preferences of the administration; and his secretaries even attended meetings, delivered reports, and made recommendations to congressional committees.⁵⁰

Jefferson also frequently held informal dinners at the White House, where he would reinforce his position as the party leader—as host of the dinners, he chose the topics of conversation and used his considerable powers of persuasion.⁵¹ Gaining knowledge of local issues, testing his ideas, getting feedback on his proposed policies, and establishing channels of communication where he could direct the flow of information and ideas, Jefferson skillfully built a party network around himself. The dinners, he said, helped him to

cultivate personal intercourse with the members of the legislature that we may know one another and have opportunities of little explanations of circumstances, which, not understood might produce jealousies and suspicions injurious to the public interest, which is best promoted by harmony and mutual confidence among its functionaries. I depend much on the members for the local information necessary on local matters, as well as for the means of getting at public sentiment.⁵²

Focusing his attention on building an informal network of congressmen, Jefferson and his deputies largely bypassed John Randolph. By 1806, the relationship between Randolph and the administration had worn so thin that Randolph felt compelled to make a public break with the administration. Randolph's defection threatened to split apart Jefferson's informal network and carve out a new network of Republicans loyal to Randolph. Whether Randolph's own political ambitions motivated him to make the break—Madison stood in the way of Randolph's strategy to get James Monroe nominated in 1808 and possibly a Cabinet post for himself—or whether it was due to a confluence of policy disagreements, his failed prosecution of Justice Chase in the Senate, or any number of other reasons, the important issue is that Jefferson now found himself with an intra-party revolt by the most vocal party leader in the House. How he dealt with the situation demonstrates the swift resolve of a president who depended on the strength of his party network and took every opportunity to build it. Taking no chances, Jefferson quickly disposed of Randolph's allies, rallied his own troops, and made it clear that it was he who led the party. Ever a party builder, Jefferson used Randolph's defection to create an even more loyal and cohesive network going forward.

First, Jefferson secured the support of House Speaker Nathaniel Macon, the most important supporter of Randolph's by inviting him to the White House for a private conversation: "Some enemy, whom we know not, is sowing tares among us...at least on my part, my confidence in you is so unqualified that nothing further is necessary for my satisfaction. I must therefore ask a conversation with you..."⁵³ Macon subsequently refused to speak publicly against the president. Jefferson then nominated Joseph H. Nicholson, one of Randolph's close confidants, for a federal judgeship in Maryland. Nicholson accepted the post and resigned immediately.⁵⁴ Jefferson next wrote to Monroe, to whom Randolph was expected to turn for support, and explained "it is unfortunate for you, to be embarrassed with such a *soi-disant* friend. You must not commit yourself to him."⁵⁵ Within a few months, Randolph had lost all support in the House, was stripped of his chairmanship of Ways and Means, and Jefferson was left to conclude: "the minority of republicans voting with [Randolph] has been from four to six or eight, against from ninety to one hundred."⁵⁶ Speaker Macon lost his authority as speaker, and was replaced at the start of the next congress in no small part because of his ties to Randolph. After his counter-attack on Randolph was complete, Jefferson marveled, tongue-in-cheek, "that so eminent a leader should at once and almost unanimously be abandoned."⁵⁷

Thus, in shaping the distribution of power and influence across the

party, Jefferson was careful when appropriate and forceful when necessary. When party divisions threatened the success of the national party, Jefferson used the full weight of his influence to intervene. Like his response to Randolph's defection, Jefferson spared no energy purging former vice president Aaron Burr from his party when Burr's ambitious scheming threatened the tenuous coalition of Republicans in New York. Rather than let the divisions among New York Republicans swing that state to Federalists in the next election, Jefferson maneuvered to discredit Burr and strengthen the Clintonian faction instead.⁵⁸ But when party divisions were isolated to local disputes that presented no imminent national threat, Jefferson remained "above the fray." More often than not, Jefferson found that transcending state and local disputes helped him maintain his authority and stature in the party. With all party factions jockeying for his support, the president could, through his patience, ensure his continued credibility. Impartiality on most intraparty disputes enabled Jefferson to maintain the greatest degree of congruence between his own interests and the majority of interests in his party. As he explained to a Pennsylvanian seeking his support for one side:

With respect to myself particularly, after eight and thirty years of uniform action in harmony with those now constituting the republican party, without one single instant of alienation from them, it cannot be but my most earnest desire to carry into retirement with me their undivided approbation and esteem. I retain therefore a cordial friendship for both the sections now so unhappily dividing your state.⁵⁹

By 1808, despite obvious schisms in the Republican party, which Jefferson believed to be inevitable,⁶⁰ the president easily managed to hand-pick his successor, and electioneering on behalf of alternative candidates never created a serious threat to Madison's nomination.⁶¹

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Jefferson's party building efforts can be seen in the efforts taken on his behalf to secure his re-nomination and re-election. For the elections of 1804, the congressional Republican caucus created a committee for the sole purpose of nominating Jefferson for president and George Clinton for vice president. This committee, which some historians have called the Republican party's "national committee,"⁶² was distinguished mainly for its members' close ties to the sitting president. By a rough tally, it can be safely said that the committee not only supported the president, its members were chosen for that very reason (see *Appendix E*). Because it proved effective in re-nominating Jefferson, the new institution stuck: Republican congressional caucus nominating committees appeared every four years after 1804, until it was crippled by the election debacle of 1824.

Jefferson's loyal network of congressional Republicans, then, helped

to establish and legitimate a wholly partisan institution for the purposes of presidential selection — the congressional party caucus—as the successor to the electoral college. The constitutional system for electing a president was originally one and the same as the process for selecting a president: the people would elect electors, whose votes for president would select a man of national reputation—selection and election would happen simultaneously. Jefferson's Republicans, however, sought to politicize this system in order to ensure the re-nomination of their president. His followers institutionalized the use of "King Caucus" to circumvent the electoral college and secure the selection, nomination, and election of a Republican president for the next quarter century. Jefferson's party building in Congress thus culminated in a new institutional form which legitimated the central role of partisanship in national politics.

In sum, Jefferson's quest to reconcile his partisanship with his impulse to represent the entire nation led him to cultivate a network of public officials that looked to him for leadership, and which undertook substantial reconstructive projects to transform American politics in his own image. Despite many failures and setbacks, including Randolph's defection, a perpetual inability to cultivate floor leaders from among his followers, and the failed impeachment trial of Justice Chase, Jefferson's party building was a central piece of his legitimization project. The point to be emphasized here is not that presidential party building is always a successful endeavor. Rather, presidents have an incentive to party build, and often do so, in order to fulfill their competing leadership responsibilities.

Jefferson and the Press: Building an Extra-Governmental Party Organization

The inchoate state of the Republican party during Jefferson's term led the president to focus almost all of his efforts on cultivating a network of appointed and elected public officials. There was little party "machinery" to speak of: state committees were not formally established institutions, and were not regulated by state laws or codified as such until much later.⁶³ Between 1801-1808, the party organization consisted of highly localized, loosely affiliated coalitions of notables who shared common political preferences. Prevailing norms proscribed the president from intervening directly in local party affairs, and were reinforced by Jefferson's own views on States' rights and primacy of local self-government. Therefore, Jefferson's efforts to legitimate his leadership position had to focus elsewhere: on what might be called the *informal* organizational capacity of the party organization.

Specifically, Jefferson played a pivotal role in encouraging the development of Republican party presses, which provided an essential means of intra-party communication. Most elected officials maintained close connections with local newspapers, and the editors of the party presses were usually active partisan leaders in state and local politics.⁶⁴ The partisan newspapers thus comprised the central site for partisan political exchange and for shaping the opinions of the electorate; Republican congressmen used the papers to communicate with their constituents, and for promulgating Republican ideas and policies; and the papers were the primary means of promoting Republican candidates.

In 1804, Jefferson estimated that Federalists controlled a whopping three-fourths of the papers in circulation.⁶⁵ By 1808, Republicans had shifted the balance in their favor, and controlled a majority of the newspapers published in the United States—114 weeklies, 11 semi-weeklies, 9 tri-weeklies, and 8 dailies. It is impossible to know exactly how much of this reversal can be attributed to Jefferson's party building efforts. But it can be shown that Jefferson viewed partisan presses as a primary tool of party building, one could prove quite useful in shaping the party to better reflect his own brand of politics.

Jefferson's primary means of building the party presses was through his informal influence. Particularly in areas which were previously dominated by Federalists, but also in Republican strongholds, Jefferson explicitly encouraged party members to establish new partisan newspapers. Not all of his recruits proved successful, but it was not for lack of trying. He also did not hesitate to use his administrative discretion to direct contracts for the printing of public laws and official proceedings away from Federalist publishers and into the hands of Republican publishers.⁶⁶ In reply to a fellow partisan who complained that Federalists still received the publishing business of his state, Jefferson explained his policy:

I am sorry to learn...that the officers in the public employment still use the influence and the business of their offices to encourage presses which disseminate principles contrary to those on which our constitution is built. This evil will be remedied. We proceed with circumspection to avoid doing any wrong. Your press having been in the habit of inculcating the genuine principles of our constitution, and your sufferings for those principles, entitle you to any favors in your line which the public servants can give you; and those who do not give them, act against their duty. Should you continue in the business you will have the publication of the laws in your state, and probably whatever else of business any of the offices within your state can give.⁶⁷

Jefferson even devoted a considerable amount of his own wealth to pay

for paper subscriptions. By choosing to patronize certain papers over others, Jefferson gave his stamp of approval to certain interests represented in the Republican party. Granted, Jefferson also subscribed to Federalist presses, demonstrating the seriousness with which he regarded the opposition. But the symbolic support and informal encouragement he gave to Republican publishers helped to spread his political doctrine, express his political preferences, and reconfigure the distribution of power and influence across his party. In 1804, Jefferson subscribed to 14 different papers; in 1807, he recorded owning 51 copies of at least 23 different papers published between 1797-1807; and official records show that the president subscribed to at least 33 different papers during his two terms.⁶⁸

Under Jefferson's influence, the *National Intelligencer* of Washington, D.C. became the closest thing to an official Republican party paper. Jefferson and his administration used the newspaper to promote the policies they favored, such as the classification of the militia and the use of gunboats in the navy, and used it as the main propaganda device for demonstrating the president's resolve in enforcing the Embargo Act. The newspaper provided a forum through which Jefferson could express his political purposes and shape public opinion at the same time. Cabinet secretaries, as well as the president on at least one occasion, published anonymous essays to clear up public misconceptions, dispel rumors, and explain policies. Local party papers reprinted pieces from the *National Intelligencer*, thus disseminating information from the administration throughout the country.⁶⁹ Jefferson encouraged an organized, hierarchical system of communication within the Republican party, and placed himself squarely at the top.

The party presses helped Jefferson explain his political preferences and justify his actions to the public; they also helped generate intra-party consensus around his initiatives, improve the party's processes of communication and deliberation, and expand the president's reach to the literate public. The presses also served a vital function at election time, providing a forum for candidate statements and endorsements. In this way, Jefferson worked to build an informal organizational capacity within the Republican party that reflected his political purposes.

Conclusion

To achieve legitimacy for his partisanship, Jefferson shaped the Republican party to reflect his personal brand of politics. He established a carefully-devised set of principles to govern his patronage practices; he strategically used the patronage power to create a network of appointed officials to carry out the government's business; he cultivated an informal network of elected partisan officials in Congress to bring

congruence between the motives and purposes of congressional Republicans and his administration; and he played a prominent role in encouraging the development of partisan presses. Thanks to years of capable historical work on Jefferson and his party building, these actions are in full view. What is offered here is a conceptual framework for understanding Jefferson's party building as more than a simple strategy of moderation and cautiousness, more than a reconciliation of patriot king ideals with republicanism. Party building proved to be a central means through which Jefferson reconciled his partisanship with his role as national representative. As long as Jefferson's partisan actions were supported and legitimated by his party, and as long as his party was reflective of the majority of the nation, Jefferson achieved the legitimacy he was seeking. In this way, Jefferson's party building pursued his primary objective: to be a strong leader.

Historians have long been eager to celebrate Jefferson's successes as president: Hofstadter credits Jefferson because at the end of his term, "he had gauged public sentiment correctly and he was giving the people what they wanted—frugal government, low taxes, fiscal retrenchment, a small army and navy, peace, and the warm sentiments of democratic republicanism. And he had behind him a party far more popular and efficient than anything the Federalists could mobilize against him."⁷⁰ Praise of Jefferson as a party leader is well deserved; yet it is incomplete without a deeper appreciation for the leadership dilemma that the office of the presidency creates for its incumbents. Jefferson's actions as party builder take on much greater significance when they are understood as logical and appropriate responses to the competing pressures inherent in the institution of the presidency.

Notes

1. The best historical account of Jefferson's party building is Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *Jeffersonian Republicans in Power*. Other excellent sources include Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *The Process of Government under Jefferson*, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978. Gaillard Hunt, "Office-Seeking during Jefferson's Administration," *The American Historical Review*, 3, 2, Jan. 1898, 270-291. Carl Russell Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage*, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905. Leonard White, *The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-1829*, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1951. Forrest McDonald, *The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976. Wilfred Binkley, *President and Congress*, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1947. Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System: the Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969. Theodore J. Crackel, *Mr. Jefferson's Army*, New York: New York Univ. Press, 1987. Robert M.

Johnstone, Jr., *Jefferson and the Presidency: Leadership in the Young Republic*, Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978. Ralph Ketcham, *Presidents Above Party*, Chapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1984. Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997, 62-85.

2. Ralph Ketcham and Richard Hofstadter's studies emphasize Jefferson's efforts at *ideational reconciliation*. Ketcham argues that Jefferson was motivated by the Bolingbroke idea of the nonpartisan "patriot king," on the one hand, and a commitment to republicanism on the other. Ketcham claims that Jefferson "never made party itself the key to his leadership . . . [he] did not consider it part of his role either to ensure the *organizational strength* of his party or to perpetuate a division in the country between an administration party and a 'loyal opposition' . . ." 111. Any partisanship shown by Jefferson was at best, only a "muted partisanship," a single component in a "brilliant series of strategies." Jefferson's primary objective, therefore, was to "somehow republicinize the patriot king" and make his exercise of governing authority compatible with his republican, anti-authority ideology, 111, 112. Although Hofstadter is more willing to acknowledge Jefferson's partisanship, like Ketcham, he is ultimately concerned with how Jefferson reconciled two competing ideologies—anti-party ideology and Republican ideology. Hofstadter describes Jefferson's party building activities as the result of his struggle to implement a political agenda while remaining faithful to anti-party ideas.

Those who emphasize the *pragmatic politics* underlying Jefferson's party building include Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., and Robert M. Johnstone. Cunningham argues that Jefferson "clearly recognized the usefulness of party devices to advance and implement the aims of the Republican interest" (*Jeffersonian Republicans*, 303). Jefferson balanced nonpartisan with partisan leadership in the interest of political pragmatism and partisan sensitivity, for example: "In general, Jefferson tried to steer a middle-of-the-road course between Republicans who demanded a general sweep of Federalists and those who felt that the Republican predecessors in employing only political intolerance of their Federalist predecessors in employing only political partisans in federal offices." His "middle-of-the-road, day-to-day removal policy," however, "makes it difficult to summarize Jefferson's patronage policy" (69-70). Johnstone, too, views Jefferson's party building activities as examples of the president's keen political sense, as demonstrations of how Jefferson confronted a political system stacked against him. Following Neustadt's model of persuasion and bargaining, Johnstone argues that Jefferson skillfully tapped into the well of informal power inherent in the presidency to circumvent formal procedures of governing. Neustadt's formulation is found in Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, New York: The Free Press, 1990.

3. Ketcham, *Presidents Above Party*, Johnstone, *Jefferson and the Presidency*, and Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*, 69-85.
4. An exception to this formulation is found in Skowronek, *The Politics*

"the party," which sometimes, but not always, refers to three different spheres of the party: the "party in government," the "party in the electorate," and the "party as an organization." Frank Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 3rd edition, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976; and V.O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 3rd edition, New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1952. This more specific definition is intended to capture the essence of the party as an identifiable configuration of institutions and people with which the president interacts.

14. Across party periods (however they may be defined: partisan alignments, party "systems," ideological epochs, regime cycles) these three core components of the party have remained the same. The party has always consisted of a network of public officials, though the network has taken different shapes over time; it has always had some kind of organizational structure, processes and resources, though some of these have become legally codified and some have remained informal; and the distribution of power and influence in the party has always been crucial to the party's activities, character, and purposes, though that distribution has varied over time. This definition allows us to analyze presidential interventions in "the party" from the founding era to today according to a consistent set of indicators, despite significant changes in the party and in the political landscape over time. Moreover, by excluding most indicators of the "party in the electorate," this emphasis on structure focuses our inquiry on how presidents build reliable, relatively stable measures of their legitimacy as leaders.
15. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson is a single case study within a larger research project being undertaken by this author on the subject of presidential party building.
16. President Thomas Jefferson, *Inaugural Address*.
17. To John Dickinson, Mar. 6, 1801, in *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, from the Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Thomas Jefferson Randolph, ed. Vol. III, second edition, Boston: Gray and Bowen, 1830, 454. Henceforth cited as *Memoir*.
18. To Monroe, Mar. 7, 1801, in *Memoir III*, 465.
19. Jefferson to William B. Giles, Mar. 23, 1801, in *Memoir III*, 465.
20. President George Washington, *Farewell Address*.
21. Jefferson counted this date as December 12, 1800, and not when the House of Representatives finally selected him over two months later.
22. The only other Federalist office holders subject to removal were federal attorneys or marshals, who as the "doors of entrance into the courts," were "indispensably necessary as a shield to the republican part of our fellow citizens." See Jefferson to Giles, Mar. 23, 1801, in *Memoir III*, 464.
23. See Jefferson to Elias Stupman and Others, a Committee of the Merchants

Presidents Make, which examines how Jefferson's place in political time lent him the authority to reconfigure existing interests and institutions. Skowronek shows that the presidential politics of reconstruction have been recurrent throughout American history. In this way, Jefferson's party building is exceptional in the same way that all reconstructive leaders have been exceptional party builders. Though Skowronek places Jefferson's party building alongside other reconstructive presidents such as Jackson, Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan, Jefferson still "show us the reconstructive authority at its most expansive" (61).

5. For an excellent case for approaching research on the presidency in this way, see Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey Tulis, "The Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency," in Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey Tulis, eds., *The Presidency in the Constitutional Order*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1981, who write "Once he assumes office, a new president will be subject to an independent set of influences rooted in the constitutional order. While these influences may have varying impacts on different presidents, for they will all shape the potentialities of executive power in American government" (16).
6. Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, New York: The Columbia University Press, 1961 [1908], 68. Of course, the Vice President is elected by the entire nation as well. But it would be reasonable to treat the Vice Presidency as a part of the presidency since the 12th Amendment institutionalized its subordination to the presidential office in the selection process.
7. Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist No. 70*. For an incisive and provocative discussion of the Founders' republicanism of the executive power, see Harvey C. Mansfield, *Taming the Prince*, New York: Free Press, 1989, ch. 10.
8. Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government*, 65-66.
9. Ketcham, *Presidents Above Party*.
10. For a similar case that leadership is the primary motivation of presidents, see Terry Moe, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory," in George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
11. For a good discussion of the difference between presidential and parliamentary regimes, see Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
12. Jeffrey Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1987; and Melvin C. Lacey, *Presidents and the People: the Partisan Story of Going Public*, College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002.
13. Note that this definition avoids the more common, amorphous notion of


- of New Haven, July 12, 1801, in *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and Private*, Vol. IV, H.A. Washington, ed., Washington, DC: Taylor & Murray, 1854, 404. Henceforth cited as *Writings*.
24. Jefferson to John Dickinson, Jun. 21, 1801, cited in Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 17.
 25. Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, Aug. 26, 1801, in *Writings IV*, 405.
 26. Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, Aug. 26, 1801, in *Writings IV*, 405.
 27. Jefferson's statement was printed in full in newspapers across the country. See Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 26.
 28. Jefferson to Elias Shipman and Others, a Committee of the Merchants of New Haven, July 12, 1801, in *Writings IV*, 404. Emphasis added.
 29. Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, July 24, 1803, not sent, in Paul Leicester Ford., ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York, Vol. VIII, 64-65.
 30. Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, Aug. 26, 1801, in *Writings IV*, 405.
 31. Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Jun. 11, 1801, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York, Vol. VIII, 64-65.
 32. As coined by the Republican party press Washington National Intelligencer, Apr. 15, 20, 1803, cited in Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 60.
 33. In June, 1803, published in Boston *Independent Chronicle*, Jun. 27, 1803, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York, Vol. VIII, 234-239n.
 34. Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 60.
 35. Hunt, *Office-Seeking*, 281.
 36. Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 61-62.
 37. *Ibid.*, 60-69; and Crackle, *Mr. Jefferson's Army*.
 38. Kirby to Jefferson, Nov. 10, 1801 cited in Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 63.
 39. Granger to Jefferson, Aug. 23, 1802, cited in *Ibid.*, 63.
 40. See James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966; Ketcham, *Presidents Above Party*.
 41. David Donald, *Lincoln Reconsidered*, New York: Vintage Books, 65.
 42. Kendrick A. Clements, *The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
 43. Sidney M. Milkis, "Presidents and Party Purges: With Special Emphasis on the Lessons of 1938," in Robert Harmel, ed., *Presidents and their Parties*, New York: Praeger, 1984; Sidney M. Milkis, *The President and the Parties*,

New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

44. Jefferson eventually passed nearly all the major items of his policy agenda, including repeal of the Judiciary Act and other federal government retrenchment measures; financial reform including the retirement of the public debt; territorial expansion, including acquisition of the Louisiana territory and West Florida; establishment of a new defense policy, and the Embargo Act.
45. Jefferson to Bidwell, Jul. 5, 1806, in *Memoir IV*, 56-58.
46. Jeff to Rodney, Feb. 24, 1804, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York: Vol. VIII, 296.
47. Jefferson to Bidwell, Jul. 5, 1806 in *Memoir IV*, 56-58.
48. Bidwell to Jefferson, Jul. 28, 1806, cited in Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 95-96.
49. Jefferson to Nicholas, Feb. 28, 1807, in *Memoir IV*, 66.
50. Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 98, and White, *The Jeffersonians*, 50.
51. See Johnstone, *Jefferson and the Presidency*.
52. Jefferson to Williams, Jan. 31, 1806, cited in Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 95-96.
53. Jeff to Macon, Mar. 22, 1806. Jeff. Papers, cited in *Ibid.*, 86.
54. *Journal of the House*, 9 Congress, Session 1, Apr. 9, 1806, 375.
55. Jefferson to Monroe, May 4, 1806, in *Memoir IV*, 51-54.
56. Jefferson to Monroe, May 4, 1806, in *Memoir IV*, 51-54.
57. Jefferson to Monroe, May 4, 1806, in *Memoir IV*, 51-54.
58. On the Burr purge, see Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 205-213.
59. Jefferson to Leib, Aug. 12, 1805, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York, Vol. VIII, 353-354n.
60. See Jefferson to Gallatin, Mar. 28, 1803, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York, Vol. VIII, 222-223: "I have for some time been satisfied a schism was taking place in Pennsylvania between the moderates and the high-flyers. The same will take place in Congress whenever a proper head for the latter shall start up, and we must expect division of the same kind in other States as soon as the Republicans shall be so strong as to fear no other enemy."
61. For the campaign of 1808 and Jefferson's role, see Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 228-235.
62. *Ibid.*, 104-108.

APPENDIX A

Constitutive Elements of "the Party" and "Party Building"



APPENDIX B

Republican Congressional Caucus National Committee

NAME	STATE	RELATIONSHIP TO PRESIDENT
Wilson C. Nicholas	Virginia	Encouraged by Jefferson to run for the House in 1807 and assume leadership post
Abraham Baldwin	Georgia	An unofficial congressional liaison for Administration
John Breckinridge	Kentucky	Introduced the Kentucky Resolutions written confidentially by Jefferson
Thomas Sumter	S. Carolina	
William Cocke	Tennessee	

63. Later, the party's extra-governmental organization would come to include the national committee, state committees, party clubs, and committee leaders and members at the precinct, ward, city, county, congressional district, and state levels—thus the "totality of the machinery operated by party officials, leaders, members, and activists." Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 59-60.
64. For a good list of editors and their political participation, see Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 238-240.
65. *Ibid.*, 236-237.
66. *Ibid.*, 241-242.
67. Cited in Cunningham, *Jeffersonian Republicans*, 247-248.
68. *Ibid.*, 253-254.
69. *Ibid.*, 259-274.
70. Hofstadter, 166.

Samuel Smith	Maryland	Conferences with Jefferson helped him get elected during election of 1800 debacle
John Condit	New Jersey	
Andrew Gregg	Pennsylvania	Introduced the Jefferson supported anti-British Gregg Resolution, which led to Randolph's decision
Samuel L. Mitchell	New York	A personal friend of James Madison's
Nathaniel Macon	North Carolina	Speaker of the House, in the confidence of Jefferson
Caesar A. Rodney	Delaware	Begged by Jefferson to assume leadership post in Congress; also House impeachment manager in Chase trial
Joseph Stanton, Jr.	Rhode Island	
Gideon Olin	Vermont	