EPISTEMIC PSYCHOLOGY (PHIL 401-1)

Professor Baron Reed
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office hours: W 1:30-3:00 and by appointment

Fall Quarter, 2016
1-140 Crowe Hall
M 4:00-6:50

Course Description:
This course is the epistemic analogue of a seminar in moral psychology. We will take up a variety of related issues, including normative constraints on belief, the nature of reasons, the aim of belief, the normativity of rationality, and the relations between belief and other attitudes like doubt and the emotions.

Required Texts:
All readings will be posted on Canvas.

Required Work:
Work for the course will include:

30% First paper (5 pages)
50% Presentation (25 minutes + Q&A)
20% Comments on classmate's presentation (2 pages)

Excellent class participation is also expected.

Course Policies:

(1) VERY IMPORTANT: plagiarism will not be tolerated. All cases of alleged violation of academic integrity will be referred to the Assistant Dean for Advising and Academic Integrity. Possible penalties range from failing the course to permanent exclusion from the university. For more on plagiarism, see:
http://www.wcas.northwestern.edu/advising/dishon.html
http://www.writing.northwestern.edu/avoiding_plagiarism.html.

Students with Disabilities:
Any student with a documented disability needing accommodations is requested to speak directly to the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) (847-467-5530) and to the instructor, as early as possible in the quarter (preferably within the first two weeks of class). All discussions will remain confidential.

Schedule of Readings:

Sept. 26 EVIDENTIALISM
Miriam McCormick, *Believing Against the Evidence*, pp. 15–51 (2015)

Oct. 3 INSTRUMENTALISM & PRAGMATISM
Hilary Kornblith, "Epistemic Normativity," *Synthese* 94: 357–376 (1993)
Thomas Kelly, "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66: 612–640 (2003)

Susanna Rinard, "Against the New Evidentialists," *Noûs* 25: 208–223 (2015)

Oct. 10 CONTROL & DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM
John Pollock, "Irrationality and Cognition," in *Epistemology: New Essays*, pp. 249–275 (2008)
Miriam McCormick, *Believing Against the Evidence*, pp. 91–127 (2015)

Oct. 17 REFLECTION & REASONING
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, "Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 88 (2014): 314-345
Hilary Kornblith, "The Role of Reasons in Epistemology," *Episteme* 12: 225–239 (2015)

Oct. 24 METAEPISTEMOLOGY & NORMATIVITY
Sharon Street, "Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons," in *Belief and Agency* pp. 213–248 (2009)
Michael Lynch, "Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons," *Philosophical Issues* 23: 343–362 (2013)

Oct. 31 EPISTEMIC ABILITIES & PERFORMANCES
Ernest Sosa, *Judgment & Agency*, pp. 65–88 (2015)
John Hyman, *Action, Knowledge, & Will*, pp. 159–190 (2015)

Nov. 7 DOUBT & SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT
Ernest Sosa, *Judgment & Agency*, pp. 233–254 (2015)
Jane Friedman, "Why Suspend Judging?" *Noûs* (online): 1–25 (2015)
Christopher Hookway, "Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry," in *Pragmatism*, pp. 203–225 (1998)

Nov. 14 EPISTEMIC EMOTIONS
Catherine Elgin, "Emotion and Understanding," in *Epistemology and Emotions*, pp. 33–49 (2008)
Christopher Hookway, "Epistemic Immediacy, Doubt and Anxiety: On a Role for Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation," in *Epistemology and Emotions*, pp. 51–65 (2008)
Michael Brady, "Emotion and Understanding," in *Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience*, pp. 118–157

Nov. 21 **Presentations**

Nov. 28 Reading period begins
Presentations

Dec. 5 **Presentations**