I. Context

Andrew Yang is the founder and co-chair of the Forward Party, a centrist political party aiming to challenge the two-party system by promoting open primaries and ranked choice voting. Formerly a Democrat, he first gained public notoriety when he participated in the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries, where he campaigned on a platform primarily focused on implementing universal basic income (UBI), monthly $1000 payments for all Americans. Because he entered the race as a political newcomer with very little name recognition, few expected him to win the Democratic nomination, which allowed him to remain vague about how he planned to fund his UBI proposal — although he would later gesture towards drawing funds from preexisting social programs. Though it didn’t translate into many votes, this campaign gained him a substantial online following, the “Yang Gang,” which led many media outlets to dub him “the Internet’s favorite candidate.”

In 2021, he entered politics again, this time running for the mayor of New York City. While he was a frontrunner, continuing to advocate for UBI and calling himself the “anti-poverty” candidate, he eventually faced greater scrutiny both over his political inexperience and his support for increased policing and anti-homeless policies. He became the first candidate in the race to concede.

Originally from upstate New York, Yang moved to the city to attend law school at Columbia University in 2002. He then worked in the tech industry, became the CEO of a test-prep company he sold in 2009, and started Venture for America, a nonprofit that sends young entrepreneurs to struggling cities to create jobs. Although he planned to create 100,000 jobs in these cities, only 150 remain, according to a report by the New York Times. Yang said this experience made him realize that adding new jobs could not make up for wages lost to automation. Around this time, Yang fathered two children, one of whom was autistic. He told Time magazine that he found it “heartbreaking” that some parents had to face the challenges of caring for autistic children with “no resources.” He has credited both these experiences with fuelling his campaign for president and his interest in UBI. By placing an emphasis on paying Americans direct, unconditional economic relief, his presidential campaign gained him many progressive followers who would go on to support his mayoral run. 

However, one of the issues that ultimately cost Yang the mayoral election is his lack of civic engagement or demonstrated civic interest prior to his run — which was later reflected in his politics. It was revealed during his campaign that he has never voted in a New York mayoral election. Throughout the election, Yang presented his politics as “apolitical,” and it’s true that his policies defy the notions of progressive and conservative. Though UBI naturally made him popular among progressives, Hua Hsu points out in the New Yorker that “the very idea of universal basic income is, in a sense, anti-identitarian…it treats people as though they are in the same boat.” The inherent universalism of UBI, and Yang’s consequent lack of engagement with the specific struggles of marginalized and racialized groups, could be perceived as a rejection of identity politics. This gained him the support of many white and wealthy donors, whose beliefs on crime, homelessness and mental illness gradually seeped into Yang’s rhetoric. He began voicing plans to increase the institutionalization of unhoused people with mental illnesses, stating that New York residents “have the right to walk down the street and not fear for our safety because a mentally ill person is going to lash out at us.” Similarly, he advocated for increased policing just a year after the murder of George Floyd and the New York Police Department’s subsequent routine violence towards Black Lives Matter protesters, and gained him the endorsement of the NYPD Captain Endowments Association.

As an Asian American politician, Yang’s rejection of identity politics translates into a general lack of awareness of the specific needs of Asian Americans and inability to properly represent the community nor address its issues. This is not to say that Yang has tried to distance himself from his racial identity. In many instances, he does draw attention to his Asian American-ness — from joking during a debate that, as an Asian person, he knew a lot of doctors, to stating that the opposite of Donald Trump was “an Asian man who likes math.” While many have criticized these comments for reinforcing the model minority myth, Yang has stated that he intended them as a way of poking fun at stereotypes that just “happen to be true” in his case, and many Asian Americans did receive them as such at the time — although it’s hard in hindsight not to view these jokes as Yang leaning into model minority stereotypes when that framing benefits him.

Beyond these comments, Yang also likes to emphasize his identity as the child of immigrants, although he has framed his parents’ immigration story in different ways throughout his run. He has frequently mentioned that his father came to the U.S. as a graduate student with dozens of U.S. patents under his belt, calling it “the immigration story we should be telling,” but he has also utilized the more conventional immigrant narrative in debates, saying, “My father grew up on a peanut farm in Asia with no floor, and now his son is running for president.” The latter narrative, one that valorizes the United States as a land of opportunity, is common among Asian American politicians across the political spectrum. Hoan Huynh, Illinois’s first Vietnamese American representative, similarly emphasized his humble origins, stating “only in the United States of America can a refugee from Vietnam come here, have access to opportunities and be able to be the Democratic nominee in this great state.”

Overall, Yang seems to understand that descriptive representation is important to Asian American voters, as Lemi et al. note. As Jo-Ann Yoo, executive director of the Asian American Federation in New York, tells Vox, Yang was at one point the most popular candidate among New York’s Asian American voters because many believed that, by virtue of his identity, Yang understood the challenges that Asian Americans face. However, Yang’s increasingly conservative stances toward the end of his mayoral campaign led many Asian American voters to question their allegiance. Many Asian Americans do see their experiences in Yang, who has spoken openly about facing racist bullying as a child attending predominantly white schools, or the anxiety he felt as an Asian person during the height of anti-Asian sentiment during the early pandemic. But as May Lin states in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Asian Americans do not develop group consciousness through shared experiences of racism, but by reframing those experiences in a way that challenges dominant racial narratives. By Lin’s definition, group consciousness includes not only identity, but an interest in collective political activity and an awareness of diminished group status and systemic inequality. 

Despite Yang’s attempt to present himself as a representative of Asian Americans, the substance of his policies reveal an ignorance towards Asian American interests. His plan to increase funding for the NYPD Asian Hate Crimes Task Force, for instance, runs counter to community members’ desire to adopt solutions that involve less policing, as well as the solidarity that progressive Asian American activists are aiming to build with Black, Latine and other communities of color, who would be harmed by an increase in police funding. 

This disconnect was also evident in an op-ed Yang wrote in April 2020, in which he calls for Asian Americans to show their “American-ness” in response to anti-Asian violence and to volunteer, donate gear and even “wear red, white and blue” to demonstrate that they are “Americans who will do our part for our country in this time of need.” The same article made reference to Japanese Americans who volunteered for military duty during World War II, making no mention of the fact that many of those who stayed were incarcerated in internment camps. The ideology that pervades this op-ed is reminiscent of the neoliberal rhetoric used by other Asian American politicians like Dalip Singh Saund, the first Asian, Indian and Sikh American to be elected to Congress. Saund, who served in the House of Representatives between 1957 and 1963, emphasized “Asian American integration into American society,” framed racism as “injustice of man toward man” and promoted the “bootstrap myth,” the idea that individuals are responsible for their economic conditions and the government is not responsible for addressing racial inequities. By asking Asian Americans to assimilate in response to racism in order to be viewed as equal, Yang likewise frames racism as a matter of individual instances of ignorance that Asian Americans are responsible for correcting, rather than something built on centuries of systemic anti-Asian discrimination.

Since his failed mayoral campaign, Yang has gone on to found the centrist Forward Party. In response to a question about where his party stands on issues like abortion or gay marriage, he doubled down on his apolitical stance by stating the main principles of the party are “open primaries and ranked-choice voting, universal basic income, fact-based governance, a human-centered economy, a modern and effective government, and grace and tolerance.” Though he hasn’t announced anything officially, he has told Politico that he may run for president again.

II. Issue

Although the most memorable policy proposal of Yang’s campaign was undoubtedly universal basic income, journalists and political analysts noted during both his presidential and mayoral campaigns that it was unclear how he planned to implement the idea. Despite running for president as a single-issue candidate focused almost entirely on promoting the idea of UBI, Yang was such an outsider to the political scene that not even his supporters expected him to win. As a result, he was given an unusual amount of leniency and was rarely questioned on the specifics of implementation. Later, during his mayoral campaign, he alluded to reallocating money from preexisting social programs to journalist Edward-Isaac Dovere, who noted that there was “no clear path” within the bureaucracy of New York’s government to distribute monthly basic income checks. 

While Yang’s championing of UBI — essentially a repackaging of ideas championed by activists like Martin Luther King Jr. — drew in many progressive voters, the proposal was ultimately underdeveloped and, towards the end of his campaign, overshadowed by Yang’s takes on other issues that would ultimately cost him the election. 

One such issue was Yang’s support on policing, a stance that took some of his supporters by surprise. Following the Atlanta spa mass shooting in March 2021 — during which a white gunman murdered eight people, including six women of Asian descent, across three spas — Yang addressed the issue of anti-Asian violence at a press conference and called for an increase in funding for the NYPD Asian Hate Crimes Task Force. At the first mayoral debate two months later, he stated that “‘defund the police’ is the wrong approach for New York City,” telling officers that “your city needs you.” His statements came just under a year after the police killing of George Floyd reinvigorated a nation-wide movement against police violence and systemic anti-Black racism — a movement which called, among other things, for police departments funding to be reallocated to other community services and resources. 

Though he proposed some reforms, such as the appointment of a police commissioner independent from the NYPD and required New York City residency for officers, Yang emphasized in debates, on his website and in other statements that police needed more funding and more support. At the time, Asian Americans in and beyond New York were grappling with the role of policing in their communities. During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Asian Americans experienced a surge in anti-Asian incidents and violence, in part fueled by then-President Donald Trump referring to the virus as the “Chinese virus” or “Kung Flu.” From there, the #StopAsianHate movement was born, calling for an end to the discrimination, harassment and violence Asian Americans faced. 

Within this movement, most Asian Americans shared similar goals: to prevent further violence and to protect the most vulnerable in their communities. They differed, however, on what they thought that should look like. In an overview of 21st century Asian American politics published in the Annual Review of Political Science, researchers Janelle S. Wong and Karthick Ramakrishnan note that the #StopAsianHate movement gave rise to controversies over “the role of law enforcement as a solution to anti-Asian violence in the wake of high-profile police killings of unarmed Black men and women.” 

Across the country, many Asian Americans did support an increase in police presence. Anni Chung, the executive director of Self-Help for the Elderly, a San Francisco nonprofit, told Vox that police are a resource that community members, particularly elders, find familiar, trustworthy and able to provide protection. Though Wong and Ramakrishnan do not discuss anti-Black racism within the Asian American community in the context of policing, they do note the “potential for Asian American complicity in opposing policies that increase access to education and resources for Black Americans” in the context of affirmative action. With an understanding that Black individuals and communities are disproportionately targeted and harmed by the police, Asian American support for increased police funding seems to likewise exemplify complicity in furthering the surveillance and criminalization of Black Americans. 

However, many Asian American activist organizations objected to the idea that the rise in anti-Asian violence should be addressed by bolstering the police, arguing that police presence cannot address the root cause of anti-Asian violence. Instead, they advocated for violence intervention programs, community ambassador programs as well as greater access to health care, housing and other neighborhood resources like public parks. Though Black-Asian solidarity played a key role in shaping these perspectives, activists pointed out that members of the Asian American community have also been harmed by the police. 

This is particularly the case in New York, where the Asian American Feminist Collective issued an open letter signed by 27 community organizations denouncing the NYPD’s Asian Hate Crime Task Force, and over 900New Yorkers signed a letter opposing Yang’s mayoral candidacy, citing his “pro-police stances” as one of the reasons they oppose him.

Screenshot of Asian and Pacific Islander New Yorkers Against Andrew Yang as of Oct. 13, 2021 via Wayback Machine

The city’s Asian residents have experienced a long history of mistrust and violence with the police, Asian American Feminist Collective member Salonee Bhaman told New York Magazine. Several examples of violence remain salient for many Asian New Yorkers. In the 90s, a surge of anti-immigrant sentiment led to 71 incidents of anti-Asian violence, nearly half of which were committed by the police. In 2014, 84-year-old Kang Wong, who didn’t speak much English, was beaten by police for jaywalking on the Upper East Side. Three years later, Yang Song, a 38-year-old sex worker from China, died after she fell from a four-story window as officers tried to arrest her.

In an Amerasia Journal study, Elizabeth Hanna Rubio follows members of the National Korean American Services and Education Consortium to learn how organizers are aiming to redefine immigrant justice. In the study, organizers argue that mainstream activism for “immigrant rights” often exclusively centers citizenship and access to equal rights. They add that this further entrenches hegemonic systems of power by accepting the framework that immigrants perceived as “deserving” can be uplifted at the expense of those who don’t fit that mold. Through legislation like the DREAM Act, the humanity of immigrants seems to hinge on their levels of education, financial contribution or “Americanness,” while those who do not meet those standards are criminalized. 

Yang, and other Asian American pro-police advocates, promote a similar idea. While increasing police presence in predominantly Asian communities might provide a sense of immediacy of security for the most privileged Asian Americans, who are able to find the police trustworthy, Asian Americans who have been historically targeted by the police — working class Asian immigrants such as massage parlor employees, street vendors, taxi drivers and sex workers — see the police not as a source of protection, but a threat. Thus, the call for increased police presence echoes mainstream immigration activism in how it prioritizes the safety and interests of a privileged segment of the Asian American community while neglecting the trauma and vulnerabilities of others. Despite emphasizing his identity as an Asian American and child of immigrants, Yang’s policy positions clearly do not align with New York’s low-income immigrant communities.

Yang’s stance on policing is revealing of his own class privileges, which also illuminates the class divisions within the Asian American diaspora. In both his presidential and mayoral campaigns, Yang was the recipient of substantial donations from billionaires and Super PACs controlled by New York elites. During his mayoral campaign, he worked closely with political strategist Bradley Tusk, a powerful New York lobbyist and venture capitalist. During his presidential run, he was the leading recipient of Asian American donations among the Democratic candidates — even though 41% of polled eligible AAPI voters said they were unfamiliar with Yang, demonstrating that at the height of his popularity, Yang was supported by Asian Americans with the capacity to donate to his campaign, but that didn’t translate into support from the average Asian American voter. It’s likely that Yang’s wealthy supporters, who stand to benefit the most from increased law enforcement, influenced Yang’s policy on policing.

On top of that, Yang was ridiculed during his mayoral campaign for not knowing what a bodega was, or naming Times Square ashis favorite subway station — a comment that exposed him for someone who rarely, if ever, takes public transit. Though the discourse at the time was that Yang wasn’t a “real New Yorker,” it more clearly revealed him as someone who was out of touch with the everyday reality of New York’s working class. By Yang’s own account, he is the son of an accomplished physicist, and he grew up attending preparatory private schools and Ivy League universities. Economically, Yang is extremely privileged, and in New York, home to the largest concentration of Asian Americans living in poverty, it became obvious that he was not able to understand the challenges that Asian New Yorkers faced — and, based on the people he chose to associate with during his campaign and the policy positions he chose to take, it seems he did not try to.

While one can only speculate about Yang’s internal motivations, it’s likely that his class has influenced his perspective and his political goals as much — or perhaps more than — his race. In her study, May Lin states that group consciousness involves three criteria in addition to group identity: an awareness and dissatisfaction with the group’s diminished status, an understanding that social inequality is responsible for this diminished status, and support for collective political action to elevate group status. The limitations to Yang’s own group consciousness become apparent when reflecting on his actions and rhetoric throughout his two campaigns. While Yang has spoken about his experiences with anti-Asian racism growing up, his reinforcing of the model minority myth as well as his comments demonizing unhoused and mentally ill people show that his view of kinds of discrimination Asian Americans face is deeply limited. Furthermore, Yang has always framed racism as an interpersonal issue rather than a systemic one — hence the assimilationist beliefs he championed when anti-Asian violence peaked during the early pandemic — and he has time and time again ignored the voices of Asian American advocacy groups, showing a lack of regard for genuine solidarity building with Asian American communities. 

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