Program of African Studies

By: Eric G. Berman

Last August, the East African Community became the 14th regional organization on that continent to deploy a peace operation (see Table below). The mission in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo is certain to encounter resistance among many of the hundred-plus nonstate armed groups active in the subregion. These groups secure considerable quantities of lethal materiel from uniformed personnel—both peacekeepers and national security forces serving within or near these missions’ areas of operation. Much can be done to reduce such diversion.  

Enhancing the effectiveness of African-led peace operations is especially important and worthy of support as these organizations will remain significant actors for the foreseeable future.  Without minimizing the shortcomings and challenges many such missions have faced, numerous deployments have helped promote human security and ushered in beneficial political change. These objectives have often been achieved at considerable cost and sacrifice by the troop-contributing countries. Moreover, regardless of their track record, the United Nations (UN) Security Council is not likely to “re-hat” these missions as readily as they have in the past.     

The security threats facing these missions, however, are quite grave. The African Union (AU)-led peace operations in Somalia, for example, have come under repeated attack from al-Shabaab, losing considerable lethal materiel as a result. Between June 2015 and January 2016, that armed group overran three forward operating bases—military camps housing more than 100 uniformed personnel with associated equipment to allow them to be self-sufficient, often at extended periods—of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In May of last year, al-Shabaab again overran such a base in the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which succeeded AMISOM last April. These two operations have likely lost millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of firearms, and many hundreds of crew-served light weapons (such as heavy machine guns and mortars) to their adversary. 

Materiel that armed groups have seized from African-led peace operations includes heavy weapons systems. The Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) have looted the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (FC-G5S), respectively. Items stolen include battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and both self-propelled as well as towed multiple-launch rocket systems. 

The UN, which has undertaken peace operations for over 70 years, also has experienced challenges in securing lethal materiel in its missions. Eight months after the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked and overran an AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) base, the successor UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) lost 600,000 rounds of ammunition when a convoy transporting contingent-owned equipment was attacked and the container of munitions seized. 

That said, the UN has numerous well-established checks and balances to keep tabs on arms and ammunition deployed in its missions. For example, it has quarterly on-site checks of materiel, well-resourced investigations into diversion incidents, and reimbursement mechanisms to encourage transparency and accountability. African regional organizations lack equivalent administrative practices and procedures.  

Such checks and balances that do exist to manage such equipment in African-led peace operations are often not fully utilized. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a case in point. It has a convention that came into force more than ten years ago that calls on its 15 member states to record and report materiel taken into a peace operation, resupplied, destroyed, or taken back when it withdraws. This is to be done whether ECOWAS, the UN, or some other entity undertakes the mission. These stipulations—on paper—represent a global best practice. Were they to be followed, ECOWAS could quickly determine what materiel was used or lost after deployment and make appropriate inquiries. Details concerning implementation are not made public, but it is widely understood that member states’ adherence to their commitments is limited, despite their being legally binding. 

This disconnect between expectation and reality is especially important to address because so many ECOWAS member states participate in peace operations. ECOWAS currently fields two missions: one in the Gambia and another in Guinea-Bissau. But these are relatively small and also relatively peaceful (although, last January, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) attacked Senegalese troops serving in the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) and disarmed them). More critical for oversight purposes are the FC-G5S, MNJTF, and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which operate in less permissive environments and peacekeepers come under attack routinely.   

Also of note is a new AU policy adopted to promote the management of recovered lethal materiel in peace operations that it authorizes or mandates. When they undertake formal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, these initiatives usually include funding for storehouses and procedures for record-keeping. But many such undertakings recover materiel outside DDR through cordon-and-search activities or clashes with hostile forces. Since oversight and resources have been lacking, the new policies are meant to improve on previous practice. This includes ATMIS, FC-G5S, and MNJTF. Progress is slow-going. 

A challenge African-led operations have is that the secretariats overseeing their implementation are not adequately staffed. This is not a criticism of officials’ work ethic or expertise but rather a comment on the mismatch between mandates and resources. There are too few staff in relation to the work needed. The long-standing recruitment freeze at ECOWAS has recently been lifted, which should bring relief. The AU, however, remains woefully understaffed, which is not likely to change in the short term.  

Recognizing these challenges and opportunities is an essential first step. More appropriate staffing alone will not solve the problem, and yet it is essential to ensure that existing checks and balances are promoted and used. Member States and external donors must become aware of available frameworks and policies and incorporate them in their discourse and priorities. And the counter-terrorism, development, and security sector governance communities, among others, should acknowledge their important role in enhancing weapons and ammunition management in peace operations, help generate appropriate resources, and set the agenda. The deployment of peacekeepers ought not to add fuel to the fires they are trying to extinguish. 

Eric G. Berman is director of the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S4) Initiative (www.s-4.org) and a visiting scholar at the Program of African Studies. He can be reached at director@s-4,org.