PhD Candidate, Department of Economics


Contact Information

Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208

Phone : (+1) 224-415-6685
takahashi@u.northwestern.edu

 

Education

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, 2018 (expected)
MA, Economics, Kyoto University, 2011
BA, Economics, Kyoto University, 2009

Primary Fields

Macroeconomics and International Trade

Curriculum Vitae

Download Vita(PDF)

Job Market Paper

Equilibrium Implementation in a Monetary Model

Abstract A substantial literature analyzes monetary models governed by active Taylor rules for setting the interest rate. The literature focuses on the unique equilibrium which remains in a neighborhood of non-stochastic steady state (locally bounded equilibrium), while the models often have a continuum of other equilibria. Focusing on the locally bounded equilibrium allows researchers to use linearization methods and has led to much useful empirical analysis. This paper studies how a government can design a game to encourage private individuals to co- ordinate on the locally bounded equilibrium. I extend the analysis of two important papers in this literature, Bassetto (2005) and Atkeson et al. (2010) by introducing a state variable. First, I show how the presence of the state variable affects the implementation results obtained by Atkeson et al. (2010). Atkeson et al. (2010) explores a reversion-to-constant-money-growth (ECMG) monetary policies in which the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule as long as the economy appears to be in the locally bounded equilibrium, and switches to a constant money growth rate if it appears that the economy has entered another equilibrium. With the presence of a state variable, the policy needs to be modified to implement the locally bounded equilibrium. However, that equilibrium is not robust unless individuals strictly coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. Namely, if individuals have idiosyncratic wrong beliefs about the aggregate economy, then the equilibrium is not robust. I show that robustness of equilibrium to trembles occurs under a properly designed monetary policy.

Personal Web Page

https://sites.google.com/view/yutatakahshi

Working Papers

Universal Gravity  with Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis (Resubmitted to the Journal of Political Economy)

Abstract This paper studies the theoretical properties and counterfactual predictions of a large class of general equilibrium trade and economic geography models. We begin by presenting a framework that combines aggregate factor supply and demand functions with market clearing conditions. We prove that existence, uniqueness and – given observed trade flows – the counterfactual predictions of any model within this framework depend only on the demand and supply elasticities (the “gravity constants”). We propose a new strategy to estimate these gravity constants using an instrumental variables approach that relies on the general equilibrium structure of the model. Finally, we use these estimates to compute the impact of a trade war between US and China.

Layoff Risk, Welfare Cost of Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy with David Berger, Ian Dew-Becker, and Lawrence Schmidt

Abstract The single strongest predictor of changes in the Fed Funds rate in the period 1982–2007 was the level of the layoff rate (initial unemployment claims divided by total employment). That fact is puzzling from the perspective of representative-agent models of the economy, which typically imply that the welfare gains of stabilizing employment fluctuations are small. It is now well known, though, that accounting for the heterogeneous effects of business cycles can substantially increase their welfare costs. We, therefore, augment a standard New Keynesian model with a labor market featuring endogenous countercyclical layoffs that lead to large and persistent wage declines. In our benchmark calibration, welfare may be increased by 0.5 percent of lifetime consumption when the central bank’s policy rule responds to the layoff rate instead of purely targeting inflation. The theory provides a theoretical rationale for the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate and its apparent responsiveness to changes in the number of layoffs.

References

Prof. Lawrence J. Christiano (Committee Chair)
Prof. Kiminori Matsuyama
Prof. David Berger
Prof. Treb Allen